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Coal and power generation are related upstream and downstream industries. Coal price marketization and electricity price regulation have caused the price of coal to be sensitive to the benefits of generators. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

As a financial tool, contracts for differences can both help balance interests and reduce risks caused by spot price fluctuation. This thesis regards coal demand as a triangular fuzzy stochastic variable while directing a levelling consideration towards risk returns for coal and power enterprises that are involved in coal generation contracts for differences. Risk and benefit measurement models were established between coal suppliers and power generators, and risk and benefit balance optimization models for contract negotiation were constructed.

A numerical example showed that the above models can be effectively used to avoid the risks of coal-electricity parties.

This thesis regards coal demand as a triangular fuzzy random variable while directing a levelling consideration towards the risk return to coal and power enterprises that are involved with coal generation contracts for differences. The features of this thesis are the following: demand information is regarded as a fuzzy random variable instead of a random variable. With historical data, sales experience and increasingly clear macro-economic conditions, coal and power enterprises are able to make a fuzzy decision – to a certain extent – when the transaction approaches. Accurate market information enables the supply chain system to satisfy the clients’ needs better, improve the profit level or avoid severe financial damages; by developing a feasible set of contracts for different parameters, it is possible to estimate whether the price difference enables supply chain coordination, requires changes or gives accounts to all involved parties of the supply chain; and without the assumption that the traditional M-V rule is unfavourable to decision makers, this thesis proposes the prospect M-V rule, which involves decision makers’ projections of future coal generation prices and enables wide applicability of the response method to contracts for differences.

Long-term contract is an important developing direction of China's coal industry coordination. This paper aims to discuss how to use contract for difference (CFD) to avoid risk and effectively increase the benefit of both coal and thermal power plants in the coal-electricity supply chain.

Based on prospect theory, this paper takes the risks and benefits of the coal and coal-fired power plants in the coal supply chain under CFD into balanced consideration to construct the contract coordination mechanism. In this mechanism, the coal demand in the coal supply chain equilibrium under centralized decision-making is regarded as the total annual volume of transactions needed to design the contract coordination mechanism and solve double marginalization. Then, based on prospect theory, in the construction of CFD, this paper takes the income of power and coal enterprises when they are in equilibrium under Stackelberg non-cooperative game as the reference point. In addition, considering that coal demand is a random variable, the CFD with a one-year trading session can be designed.

The research derives the coal price of the contract for difference, contract trading volume and its proportion of the total trading volume. A numerical example shows that the model above can be used to effectively avoid the risk of both coal and electricity sides.

To solve the conflict between coal enterprises and thermal power plants, let the coal-electricity supply chain be converted from non-cooperative game to cooperative game. Based on the prospect theory, this paper takes the income of the non-cooperative game of coal and thermal power plants as a reference point and considers how to design the coordination mechanism, the contract for difference, so as to make the two parties cooperate to solve the double marginal utility of the non-cooperative game in a chain supply. The main innovation of the work lies in the following: first, the coal demand when the coal-electrical supply chain is in balance under centralized decision-making is taken as the total annual trading volume needed to design the contract coordination mechanism and solve double marginalization. Second, based on prospect theory, in the construction of CFD, the benefits of coal-fired power plants and coal enterprises when both sides are in equilibrium under the Stackelberg non-cooperative game are taken as the reference points, and coal demand is taken as a random variable to design the CFD with a one-year transaction period. The price of coal that is not traded through CFD is calculated according to the daily market price. Third, this paper proposes the prospect M-V criterion of the risk-benefit equilibrium of both power and coal enterprises, which means that the risk-benefit equilibrium of both sides is the prospect variance effect of both sides relative to the reference point benefit divided by the prospect expectation effect.

Public agencies contract out to pursue a variety of goals. But, these goals cannot be realized if the performance of contractors is not assessed and monitored. This study examines the state of performance measurement and contract monitoring in the U.S. transit agencies. We focus on three research questions: (1) What monitoring capacity exists within transit agencies? (2) What monitoring methods are used by transit agencies? (3) What performance measures are tracked by transit agencies? We find monitoring units are common in a third of agencies in the study. Service and customer complaints are the most common performance measures, while penalties and liquidated damages are the most frequent form of penalties. Finally, we find that transit agencies utilize a variety of output and outcome measures to monitor contractors.

This study was motivated by a belief that existing knowledge on management of a contractual claim in international contracting practice is different from a standardised local practice. The paper is aimed at building competence for managing contractual claims in a standardised practice.

Comparative studies of British and Finnish contracting practices were used to determine the reason why claims are not pronounced in a standardised practice. Empirical study via direct interviews and questionnaires of a Finnish‐based contractor operating in the Russian markets was used. The players are three‐dimensional in nature where the client, consultants, and contractor come from different countries/practices and two of the projects studied were joint ventures.

The findings show the effects of: legal system, procurement methods, standardised practice and size of the market on the management of contractual claims. The remedial measures suggested include: operational management, i.e. learning through personal contacts, and management competence development of employees by learning through proper communication and education programmes in a form of continuing professional development.

Management of claims in the construction industry is vital to a successful implementation of the project. It brings about a fair dealing between the project owner and the contractor, improves contractor's cashflow and discourages abandonment of project and disputes. Lack of knowledge in managing claims constitutes a threat to successful implementation of project. The engagement of an expert and knowledge transfer through joint ventures/partnerships are suggested as solutions.

The non‐storable nature of electricity and the increasing complexity of financial instruments as a tool for hedging against risk make the area of research very useful in the real world. Many power portfolio optimization problems have been developed to combat the issue of risk tolerance, but very few (if any) have included transmission constraints. The purpose of this paper is to consider optimization of portfolios of real and contractual assets, including derivative instruments, in a multi‐period setting where transmission constraints also exist.

Rather than using a flowgate constraint as a representation of transmission congestion, the authors use fixed transmission rights. A model is introduced that involves a three‐node unidirectional network in order to evaluate the significance of transmission constraints. Data from the PJM, which is located in the eastern USA, were used for model implementation.

The stochastic nonlinear mixed‐integer model presented shows that transmission constraints and fixed transmission rights can have a significant effect on the choices a utility will make when dealing with power procurement. It is demonstrated that the inclusions drastically decrease the value of the objective function.

Conditional value at risk (CVaR) was chosen over VaR as a risk measurement for two different reasons. First, it is important to have a good representation of the trade‐off between the best expected profit and the volatility experienced when obtaining that profit. Second, it provides protection against very undesirable scenarios that may occur with low probability. In order to simplify the fixed transmission rights contracts, a three‐node network is used with unidirectional flow.

When markets were regulated, transmission lines were owned and operated by local utilities, and all power sent over the lines was either owned by the operating utility or wheeled for another utility based on existing agreements. With the advent of deregulation, utilities were forced to wheel other companies' power, which introduced more risk in terms of transmission constraints.

The contribution of this research is to help companies not only hedge the risk of unknown power prices but also unknown transmission congestion. One distinctive feature of the authors' research is to expand upon existing “power portfolio optimization with risk” literature by introducing a transmission constraint into the model. Historically, transmission congestion has been modeled in different ways, including flowgates, transmission rents and fixed transmission rights.

Observes that strategic alliances continue to be an important research and business focus. Many firms struggle with how to link alliance theory with actual practice. In particular, managers question how long‐term commitment between alliance partners is developed and achieved. Traditional business practice has relied primarily on formal written contracts, but informal social contracts or verbal agreements are also utilized. Examines the role of formal and informal contracts in positioning alliances for long‐term success. Findings indicate that extremely successful alliances exhibited informal social contracts regardless of whether or not formal written contracts were included in the relationship. In other words, while a written contract may initially serve as an agreement to collaborate, the partners’ actions signify long‐term commitment to the alliance. This has important managerial implications for how key contacts in the alliance develop co‐operation, trust and loyalty which illustrates the strength of the informal contract.

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power market demand is also fluctuant. Meanwhile, there is fierce competition among power producers in the power supply market and retailers in the demand market after deregulation, which increases the difficulty of renewable energy power grid-connection. To promote grid-connection of renewable energy power in the hybrid electricity market, the authors construct different contract decision-making models in the “many-to-many” hybrid power supply chain to explore the pricing strategy of renewable energy power grid-connecting.

Considering the dual-uncertainty of renewable energy power output and electricity market demand, the authors construct different decision-making models of wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract to compare and optimize grid-connecting pricing, respectively, to maximize the profits of different participants in the hybrid power supply chain. Besides, the authors set different parameters in the models to explore the influence of competition intensity, government subsidies, etc. on power pricing. Then, a numerical simulation is carried out, they verify the existence of the equilibrium solutions satisfying the supply chain coordination, compare the differences of pricing contracts and further analyze the variation characteristics of optimal contract parameters and their interaction relations.

Revenue-sharing contract can increase the quantity of green power grid-connection and realize benefits Pareto improvement of all parties in hybrid power supply chain. The competition intensity both of power supply and demand market will have an impact on the sharing ratio, and the increase of competition intensity results in a reduction of power supply chain coordination pressure. The power contract price, spot price and selling price have all been reduced with the increase of the sharing ratio, and the price of renewable power is more sensitive to the ratio change. The sharing ratio shows a downward trend with the increase of government green power subsidies.

On the basis of expanding the definition of hybrid power market and the theory of newsvendor model, considering the dual-uncertainty of green power generation output and electricity market demand, this paper builds and compares different contract decision-making models to study the grid-connection pricing strategy of renewable energy power. And as an extension of supply chain structure types and management, the authors build a “many-to-many” power supply chain structure model and analyze the impact of competition intensity among power enterprises and the government subsidy on the power grid-connecting pricing.

Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd (Morgan Grenfell) entered into a ten‐year interest rate swap contract with Welwyn Hatfield District Council (Welwyn) on the basis that Morgan Grenfell would be the fixed rate payer and Welwyn, the floating rate payer.

This paper aims to analyze the statistical characteristics of changes in property forward prices. As highlighted in a survey conducted at the MIT Center for Real Estate in 2006, the relatively weak understanding in their prices is one of the most important barriers in their use. In this context, the analysis of the forward price term structure is essential. Do the short- and long-term forward prices behave similarly? Do property derivatives behave like other derivative assets or other related assets? This study also investigates the lead–lag relationship between spot and forward returns for different maturities.

Using four years and nine months of data on the UK Investment Property Databank (IPD), all property total return swaps are examined. We strip the swaps into their forwards and study their statistical characteristics (the first four moments and their autocorrelation levels). The relationships among the forward contracts, the underlying asset (IPD index and IPD unsmoothed) and other assets (risk-free rate, listed real estate) are explored. Using the Yiu et al. (2005) methodology, the lead–lag relationship between the spot and the forwards is assessed.

The index appears to be significantly less volatile and less efficient, in terms of correlation than its own derivative contracts. Moreover, changes in forward prices are leading indicators of the IPD index. Their risks tend to converge with the implied volatility of the REIT’s operating asset but without being affected by the general stock market risks. Regarding the forward price–discovery function, investors should collect information not only from the spot market but also, maybe primarily, from the derivative market.

In this paper, we use a never-exploited database that is relative to the quotes of the UK IPD swaps. It is the first attempt to analyze the statistical characteristics of their changes. Our results show that these prices are clearly superior to the spot series, in terms of risks but without behaving affected by the tyranny of the past values. These findings may conduct to consider new methods to unsmooth current real estate indices. Characterized by a strong sensitivity to the changes in the information set, property derivative-based indicators should lead to increased efficiency in the spot market.

This study aims to formulate a mechanism design in the derivatives market, summarizing a framework to set up the Brazilian electricity futures market.

This exploratory study formulates a mechanism design in the derivatives market, summarizing a framework to set up the Brazilian electricity futures market.

The results show a positive economic outcome for the creation of the Brazilian futures electricity market.

The main feature in this work is to summarize a framework to set up the Brazilian electricity futures market applying mechanism design, applicable in other countries. The features of the mechanism are the space of expected results (Z), the strategies to survey the environmental space (θ) and the mechanism design – messages space (M).