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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Review of O’Brien, D. P., & Creedy, J. (Eds.). (2010). Darwin's clever neighbor: George Warde Norman and his circle. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. ISBN: 978-1848445574. $165.00.

These two books reflect very different attitudes to classical economics: O'Brien writes from a neoclassical standpoint, Napoleoni from a Marxist one. Two questions deserve consideration. Is anything worthwhile to be gained by devoting attention to the works of the classical economists (and of Marx)? Where, if we do turn to the classics, do they lead us?

This chapter investigates the nature of the transformation of macroeconomics by focusing on the impact of the Great Depression on economic doctrines. There is no doubt that the Great Depression exerted an enormous influence on economic thought, but the exact nature of its impact should be examined more carefully. In this chapter, I examine the transformation from a perspective which emphasizes the interaction between economic ideas and economic events, and the interaction between theory and policy rather than the development of economic theory. More specifically, I examine the evolution of what became known as macroeconomics after the Depression in terms of an ongoing debate among the “stabilizers” and their critics. I further suggest using four perspectives, or schools of thought, as measures to locate the evolution and transformation; the gold standard mentality, liquidationism, the Treasury view, and the real-bills doctrine. By highlighting these four economic ideas, I argue that what happened during the Great Depression was the retreat of the gold standard mentality, the complete demise of liquidationism and the Treasury view, and the strange survival of the real-bills doctrine. Each of those transformations happened not in response to internal debates in the discipline, but in response to government policies and real-world events.

This article is not the work of an expert on the period in question (see Robinson, 1971; Rheinwald, 1977); rather it is a commentary on a book whose half‐century has just passed almost unnoticed. In a sense the argument involves a further visit to what J.A. Schumpeter once described as the “lumber room” of historical knowledge, although this particular visit is prompted neither by nostalgia nor piety, but rather by the conviction that Chamberlin still has much to teach those interested in the theory of the firm and in the wider area of industrial economics. The article is also prompted by the conviction that the conventional textbook accounts of Chamberlin's work have introduced misleading simplifications in pursuing the qualities of coherence and precision in the presentation of ideas.

Elie Halévy essentially expressed the view recorded by James Mill in his anonymously written ‘On the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value’⁷ that the first chapter of the Critical Dissertation relating to the nature of value ‘contains not an assertion, who which, as far as ideas politico-economical are concerned, Mr. Ricardo would not have assented; it contains, not indeed, as far as such ideas are concerned, an assertion which is not implied in the propositions which Mr. Ricardo has put forth. It is a criticism on some of Mr. Ricardo's forms of expression…’ ([J. Mill], 1826a, p. 157). The justification for the Ricardian reaction is clear enough, as I shall now show.⁸

The Preliminary Argument The fifteen years following the end of the Great War saw considerable activity amongst economists concerned with competitive structures and the “firm”. As has been argued elsewhere much of this work may be interpreted as an attack on Marshall's treatment of the subject with a view to replacing it by a more “rigorous” and formal analysis. E. H. Chamberlin to a very large extent stands apart from these developments, as he makes plain in the “Origin and Early Development of Monopolistic Competition Theory” (1961). Serious work on his thesis apparently began in 1924, was largely completed in 1926 and the study filed in the following year. This means that Chamberlin's “discovery” of the curves of marginal cost and marginal revenue was made quite independently of his English and German colleagues. Further, as Chamberlin himself made clear, the thesis had no link either with Sraffa or the Symposium of 1931: “Nor did the Book itself attack Marshall…on any of the issues there involved” (ibid., p. 532). Indeed, he always insisted that his work was an attack “not on Marshall, but on the theory of perfect competition” (ibid., p. 540). He might have added that Monopolistic Competition is essentially Marshallian both in its style of reasoning and in the pre‐occupation with realism; a pre‐occupation which led Chamberlin to play down the operational significance of the marginal curves while recognising their importance in a technical sense (1957, pp. 274–76).

This study concerns how well stock market regulators prevent trading by using trading halts when they suspect asymmetric information in the market. Security trading halts in the Portuguese stock market are analysed to measure the effectiveness of trading halts imposed by market authorities as well as their timing in interrupting and restarting trading. Stock price returns, abnormal returns and volatility are used to compare the significance of differences for pre‐and post‐halt periods. First the global sample is used to analyse abnormal returns and then it is split into good and bad news halts. A GARCH (1,1) model is also applied and found to be a more sensitive instrument on justifying trading halts. Justification for trading halts tends to rise as event window size increases, suggesting that supervisory authorities tend to spot the dominant changes better. In fact, when very short time‐sampling periods are used weaker justifications for stock halting are found. The opportunity for market authorities to interrupt trading seems to be increasing. In terms of timing they seem, on the whole, to be delayed when imposing trading halts or anticipated when authorising the restart. Nevertheless, when considering good news, although the halt tends to be late the restart seems to be on time. It is concluded that all methodologies should be jointly applied by stock watch departments of supervision authorities for detecting trading under asymmetric information, but special attention is drawn to GARCH methodologies that show superior ability for detecting changes in stock characteristics.