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The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of government supervision and market environment on farmers' pesticide application behavior, as well as the intermediary effect of farmers' literacy, and investigate the substitution effect between government supervision and market environment.

In this paper, logit and Poisson regression models were used to investigate the comprehensive impact of government supervision and market environment on farmers' pesticide application behavior, and the intermediary effect model is used to examine the intermediary effect of farmers' literacy.

Government supervision is an important constraint for the formation of individual behavior paradigm, but it has both positive and negative effects, depending on different instruments. The market subject constraint and market incentive are two important ways that the market environment affects Chinese farmers' pesticide application behavior. Farmers' literacy plays a partial mediating role in the influencing mechanism of government and market factors. The government supervision and market environment, two different constraint forces, have substitution effects in the process of regulating farmers' pesticide application behavior.

In the influence mechanism, farmers' literacy, such as values, responsibilities and skill requirement related to scientific pesticide use, was included into the analysis framework as intermediary variables. The authors found that government supervision and market environment not only directly affect farmers' pesticide application behavior but also indirectly affect farmers' pesticide application behavior through farmers' literacy.

The paper aims to describe the application of two key service quality frameworks for improving the delivery of postgraduate research supervision. The services quality frameworks are used to identify key areas of overlap between services marketing practice and postgraduate supervision that can be used by the supervisor to improve research supervision outcomes for the student.

The paper is a conceptual and theoretical examination of the two streams of literature that proposes a supervision gap model based on the services gap literature, and the application of services delivery frameworks of co‐creation and service quality.

Services marketing literature can inform the process of designing and delivering postgraduate research supervision by clarifying student supervisor roles, setting parameters and using quality assurance frameworks for supervision delivery. The five services quality indicators can be used to examine overlooked areas of supervision delivery, and the co‐creation approach of services marketing can be used to empower student design and engaged in the quality of the supervision experience.

As a conceptual paper based on developing a theoretical structure for applying services marketing theory into the research supervision context, the paper is limited to suggesting potential applications. Further research studies will be necessary to test the field implementation of the approach.

The practical implications of the paper include implementation suggestions for applying the supervisor gaps for assessing areas of potential breakdown in the supervision arrangement.

The paper draws on two diverse areas of theoretical work to integrate the experience, knowledge and frameworks of commercial services marketing into the postgraduate research supervision literature.

The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicitly macroprudential supervisory framework designed to identify threats to financial stability use existing mechanisms to reduce the risk of these threats and to provide information to the authorities to more efficiently mitigate any instability that does arise.

This paper begins with an analysis of the limitations of microprudential regulation. It then develops a macroprudential surveillance framework focused on those financial markets that have the potential to undermine financial stability. It concludes with a discussion of how the surveillance results may be used to enhance financial stability.

The current supervisory focus on microprudential supervision of systemically important institutions is insufficient; an explicitly macroprudential focus is required.

Although this paper’s conceptual framework is applicable to all advanced financial systems the discussion of specific regulatory structures focuses on the USA.

An explicit supervisory focus on the threats posed by major financial markets is feasible and desirable.

The probability of a financial crisis and the economic damage caused by a crisis can be significantly reduced by redirecting some regulatory efforts toward in-depth analysis of major financial markets.

The paper emphasizes that macroprudential supervision must include both quantitative and detailed analysis of the qualitative aspects of key markets.

The objective of this work is to analyse worldwide trends in financial supervision architectures. The focus is on the key issue in the debate – the single supervisor versus multiauthority model – in order to build up indexes of supervision unification, essential to perform studies on the causes and effects of various supervisory regimes. First, the paper introduces a Financial Authorities’ Concentration (FAC) Index. A comparative analysis of 69 countries confirmed that an increase in the degree of concentration of supervisory powers is evident in the developed countries, and particularly in the European Union. Secondly, the paper considers the nature of the institutions to which control responsibilities are entrusted. In particular, the role the central bank plays in the various national institutional settings is examined. An index of the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision is introduced, the Central Bank as Financial Authority (CBFA) Index. Each national institutional structure can be identified with the two above characteristics. Two models are the most frequent: (a) countries with a high level of unification of powers and weak central bank involvement (single financial authority regimes); and, (b) countries with a low level of unification of powers and strong central bank involvement (central bank dominated multiple supervisor regimes). A trade‐off therefore emerges between the degree of financial sector unification and the role of the central bank. Two possible explanations of this relationship emerged: the blurring hazard effect and the monopolistic bureau effect.

This study concerns how well stock market regulators prevent trading by using trading halts when they suspect asymmetric information in the market. Security trading halts in the Portuguese stock market are analysed to measure the effectiveness of trading halts imposed by market authorities as well as their timing in interrupting and restarting trading. Stock price returns, abnormal returns and volatility are used to compare the significance of differences for pre‐and post‐halt periods. First the global sample is used to analyse abnormal returns and then it is split into good and bad news halts. A GARCH (1,1) model is also applied and found to be a more sensitive instrument on justifying trading halts. Justification for trading halts tends to rise as event window size increases, suggesting that supervisory authorities tend to spot the dominant changes better. In fact, when very short time‐sampling periods are used weaker justifications for stock halting are found. The opportunity for market authorities to interrupt trading seems to be increasing. In terms of timing they seem, on the whole, to be delayed when imposing trading halts or anticipated when authorising the restart. Nevertheless, when considering good news, although the halt tends to be late the restart seems to be on time. It is concluded that all methodologies should be jointly applied by stock watch departments of supervision authorities for detecting trading under asymmetric information, but special attention is drawn to GARCH methodologies that show superior ability for detecting changes in stock characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is to understand farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming in China and quantify the degree to which farmers’ moral hazard is prevented by incentive or constraint means or their combinations.

The logit model is used to analyze farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming and the effects of determinants by applying survey data of 560 vegetable and fruit farmers in China.

The result reveals that farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming is prevented by a combination of incentives and constraints. Among incentive factors, profits from safe agro-products are verified to affect farmers’ moral hazard negatively, whereas the effect of safe certification subsidy is not clear. In constraint factors, production environmental supervision (PESUPV) and agricultural input supervision (AISUPV) have significant effects in reducing farmers’ moral hazard, whereas the effects of production process supervision and market access supervision are not clear. Further, the incentives from higher profits of safe agro-products play a greater role in the prevention of farmers’ moral hazard than the constraints from PESUPV and AISUPV. The results indicate that farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming is more likely to be prevented by incentives compared with constraints.

The study has some limitations that should be taken into account in future research. First, food safety incidents happen frequently in China, which caused widespread social concern. These affairs may spark a rethink for farmers about how to produce safe agro-products. From this prospective, farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming may be prevented by their social responsibility. However, the survey did not show it. This may be related to the beginning stage of safe farming in China. With the development of safe farming, the effect of social responsibility on the prevention of farmers’ moral hazard would constitute an interesting extension of the work. Second, the study focusses on farmers’ production of safe vegetables and fruits in three areas of China. Covering more activities and areas is likely to commit fruitful results.

Based on the theoretical analysis of farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming through using a principal-agent model, the paper proposes hypotheses of incentives and constraints affecting farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming and verifies them through logit model with the survey data from 15 counties (or cities) in Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Sichuan Provinces of China. The result provides some evidences that farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming is simultaneously affected by a combination of incentives and constraints and may be taken as proofs for China's policy-making and focusses implementation in preventing farmers’ moral hazard in safe farming.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyse the cross‐countries determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs), the potential impact of supervisory devices, and institutional environment on credit risk exposure.

The paper employs aggregate banking, financial, economic, and legal environment data for a panel of 59 countries over the period 2002‐2006. It develops a comprehensive model to explain differences in the level of NPLs between countries. To assess the role of regulatory supervision on credit risk, the paper uses several interactions between institutional features and regulatory devices.

The empirical results indicate that higher capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and prudent provisioning policy seems to reduce the level of problem loans. The paper also reports a desirable impact of private ownership, foreign participation, and bank concentration. However, the findings do not support the view that market discipline leads to better economic outcomes. All regulatory devices do not significantly reduce problem loans for countries with weak institutions, corrupt environment, and little democracy. Finally, the paper shows that the effective way to reduce bad loans is through strengthening the legal system and increasing transparency and democracy, rather than focusing on regulatory and supervisory issues.

First, higher CARs results in less credit exposures. Second, international regulators should continue their efforts to enhance financial development. The results suggest that foreign participation plays an important role in reducing credit exposure of financial institutions. However, in developed countries, foreign entry led to more problem loans. Finally, to reduce credit risk exposure in countries with weak institutions, the effective way to do it is through enhancing the legal system, strengthening institutions, and increasing transparency and democracy.

The paper contributes to the literature on banking regulation and supervision. It examines aggregated data which best reflect the level of NPL of the banks in a country as opposed to individual data included in databases that suffer from the problem of representativeness. It considers the impact of regulatory variables after controlling for bank industry factors that alter primarily problem loans. Finally, the paper examines the effectiveness of regulation through the inclusion of institutional factors.

Amid benign monetary policy in mature market countries and high liquidity‐induced demand, lower risk premia have encouraged risk diversification into alternative asset classes outside the scope of conventional investment. The development of derivative markets in emerging economies plays a special role in this context as more institutional money is managed on a global mandate, with more and more capital being dedicated to emerging market equity. This paper aims to focus on these issues.

This paper reviews the recent development of equity derivative markets in emerging Asia and informs a critical debate about market practices and prudential supervision. Goal of the paper is also to outline essential elements and key policy considerations in developing derivative markets.

The supervision of emerging derivative markets depends on the expedient and tractable resolution of challenges arising from consistent risk management, risk mutualization, and prudential standards that guarantee market stability in crisis situations. In particular, further efforts are needed in areas of cash market liquidity, trading infrastructure as well as legal and regulatory frameworks based on a set of coherent principles for capital market development.

The paper offers a comprehensive set of principles for the development of equity derivative markets based on the current state of equity derivative trading in emerging Asia. Given current efforts by national regulators in the region to implement comprehensive guidelines on derivatives and revise short selling restrictions, the scope of this paper has topical appeal from the perspective of market participants and regulators.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether auditor's unqualified opinion on internal control (ARIC) is a powerful proxy for the effectiveness of internal control in Chinese context. A rich body of research conducts their designs on an assumption that companies have more effectiveness of internal controls if they disclose ARICs. This study argues that the ARICs are not always reliable, because audit market is well characterized by excessive competition and market supervision is poorer in China compared to developed countries.

The study uses 2008 and 2009 years Chinese listed‐firms data and the Tobit regression to test the relationship between ARIC and accrual quality. The paper employs the Heckman model for self‐selection bias, which are possibly introduced by choice in disclosing ARICs.

The paper finds that firms disclose ARICs do not report lower abnormal accruals relative the non‐ARIC firms, and firms with ARICs issued by dominant auditors show more reliable accruals relative to non‐ARIC firms and firms that disclose ARICs but fail to be issued by dominant auditors. The results are robust to additional accrual quality measure, additional audit quality measure, and the correction of self‐selection bias by using the inverse Millo ratio approach.

The results suggest that implementing Chinese‐SOX could be facilitated by improving audit quality.