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This paper empirically shows that the long-term persistence of negative swap spreads, which was unique phenomenon only in Korean interest rate swap market, could be caused by the covered interest rate arbitrage trading by foreign investors in Korean market. It concretely shows the fixed rates of currency swap, whose decreases expand the incentive for arbitrage trading by foreign investors, to positively influence the interest rate swap spreads. The empirical results suggests that the foreign factors might make more effect on the interest rate swap market than the spot bond market, resulting in the negative interest rate swap spreads. The results implies that, the asset pricing for interest rate swap needs to consider the foreign factors under the circumstances of open capital market.

The author examines the presence of foreign currency effects and the risk-mitigation channel through which a foreign-currency denomination reduces the loan spread.

The author runs regression analyses using loan data of firms incorporated in member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from 2000 to 2020. The author also runs several robustness tests to address forward exchange rate bias, endogeneity concern and sample-selection bias.

Consistent with the currency matching motive of foreign debt use, the results show that a foreign currency denomination is associated with a lower spread and the relationship is amplified when there is a positive correlation between the changes in the return on assets and in the exchange rate.

This paper enriches existing studies on the use of foreign debt as an exchange rate risk management tool.

The results suggest that as firms utilize foreign debt and policymakers need to design banking regulations that not only oversee but also encourage the use of foreign debt as a hedging instrument to lower firms' borrowing costs.

This paper contributes to extant studies by examining the presence of foreign currency effects in emerging countries' loan markets and by exploiting the micro-level demand-side factors as the channel through which the currency denomination affects the loan spread.

The purpose of this article is to investigate the return associated with a Canadian dollar (C$) investment in the USA under passive, random walk, value at risk, and Sharpe ratio strategies.

To comply with the purpose, this paper used a GARCH model, and used, as basic data, daily C$ exchange rates and weekly US and Canadian interest rates on 90‐day CDs, from January 2 to November 26, 2004.

The empirical results suggest that currency returns are positively correlated to risk; and that the return provided by the random walk strategy beats the other strategies considered in this paper.

The findings suggest that currency investment is similar to other forms of investment, since it shows a positive relationship between risk and return. It also supports the long‐standing belief that sophisticated strategies do not beat simple‐minded approaches such as a random walk strategy.

This paper uses a utility function to investigate the response of investors to risk and return under different aversion scenarios.

Although the global economic crisis that began in 2007 has renewed interest in Keynes among the wider educated public, graduate courses in macroeconomics usually teach little about Keynes and the issues he analyzed, and what little they teach is often wrong (e.g., that Keynes assumed an arbitrarily fixed money wage rate or that he ignored expectations). Consequently, as macroeconomists turn their attention to the possibility, causes and consequences of financial crises and global depression, they do not have access to the insights into these questions produced by earlier generations of economists. The time and attention constraints of theory courses do not allow simply directing the students to the extensive scholarly literature on the economics of Keynes, so this paper offers a suggested introduction to the economics of Keynes for a graduate course in macroeconomics.

The research for this paper focuses on the implied expected exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and the Deutsche Mark. We use one year debt yield and one year inflation forecasts to derive expected exchange rates based on uncovered interest arbitrage and on the purchasing power parity relationship. We also explore the explanatory power of combinations of these two alternative expected exchange rates including what they might reveal regarding exchange rate premiums. Our results indicate that a combination of the two approaches which models a risk premium may be beneficial. We indicate some further work to be done along this line and provide a summary and conclusion based on the work reported here.

The national objectives of forward exchange controls are to restrain speculation in foreign exchange, to limit international capital flows and to affect the forward exchange rates. Restrictions on forward transactions are economic welfare costs for enterprises and banks, which are analysed in terms of risk‐return and supply‐demand theory. Empirical answers to whether forward exchange control is really necessary await collection and disclosure of company currency exposure, which itself may contribute to the national objectives implicit in forward exchange controls.

The chapter first emphasizes the aspects which Steuart (1767), Thornton (1802), Tooke (1844, 1838–1857), and Keynes (1923) have in common about the relation between the exchange rate and the short-term rate of interest: they all considered a temporary unfavorable foreign balance caused by an asymmetrical exogenous shock, which called for a discretionary policy favoring international short-term capital inflows to overcome the consequences of the deficit. These aspects draw an unorthodox genealogy on this issue between the four authors, contrary to the tradition originating in Hume and developed later by the British monetary orthodoxy. Secondly, the chapter shows that there was an analytical progress from Steuart (1767) to Keynes (1923), which however faced a limit: if it reinforced an unorthodox genealogy, it did not integrate the modern idea according to which international short-term capital movements may themselves be a source of external disequilibrium. The origin of this limit was probably in the question raised, which was the adjustment to an exogenous asymmetrical shock.

In a by now classic article, R.A. Mundell demonstrated that an open economy could maintain internal and external balance without using the exchange rate as a policy tool. This, he showed, could be done by using fiscal policy to produce internal balance, and interest rate policy to produce an imbalance on the capital account to offset whatever imbalance there might be on the current account. There have been two criticisms of this analysis. The first, fairly common in the literature, is that it presumes international capital movements are flows. If, as is often maintained, they are stock adjustments, a certain amount of funds will move in response to an interest rate rise, and then to produce a further reallocation of portfolios a further rise in interest rates will be required. It is thus concluded that Mundellian policy in the presence of a current account deficit would have to be not merely interest rates above those elsewhere, but interest rates rising higher and higher above those elsewhere. The second criticism was first suggested by H.G. Johnson, and later developed in detail by John Williamson. They attacked not the feasibility of the policy, but its desirability. They argued that the policy would produce resource misallocation, both because it compels the choice between home and overseas investment to be made exclusively on short‐term balance of payments grounds, and because it distorts the consumption/investment mix at home.

Whereas the last decade has seen remarkable growth in United States (US) futures business, in the United Kingdom (UK) the volume in some sectors has been disappointing. Although new markets are continuing to appear (such as the Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange, BIFFEX, which opened for business in May 1985), on 31 January 1985 the London Gold Futures Market (LGFM) announced its intention to close and from time to time there has been speculation that LIFFE, the London International Financial Futures Exchange, may not be able to continue in its present form because of lack of business (although the range of traded instruments continues to expand). Some factors that would tend to discourage business are:

Just a few years ago, active management of foreign exchange risks was confined to a relatively small number of multinational firms. With saturation of domestic markets, though, many firms have turned their attention to product markets abroad. Some have gone abroad in search of lower production costs. Second, since 1973, foreign exchange rates have fluctuated widely, oftentimes wildly. Finally, recent financial accounting reporting requirements have made corporate gains and losses due to foreign exchange transactions much more visible. All of these factors have served to magnify the importance of managing foreign exchange risks.