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This paper offers empirical evidence on factors influencing credit spreads on commercial mortgage loans. It extends existing work on the pricing of commercial mortgage loans. The authors examine the relative significance of a range of factors on loan pricing that are lender, asset and loan specific. The research explores and quantifies the sources of spread differentials among commercial mortgage loans. The paper contributes to a limited literature on the subject and serves the purpose of price discovery in commercial property lending. It offers a framework to compare actual pricing with fundamental-based estimates of loan spreads.

Panel analysis is deployed to examine the cross-section and time-series determinants of commercial mortgage loan margins and credit spreads. Using an exclusive database of loan portfolios in the United Kingdom (UK), the panel analysis enables the authors to analyse and quantify the impact of a number of theory-consistent and plausible factors determining the cost of lending to commercial real estate (CRE), including type and origin of lender, loan size, loan to value (LTV) and characteristics of asset financed – type, location and grade.

Spreads on commercial mortgages and, therefore, loan pricing differ by the type of lender – bank, insurance company and debt fund. The property sector is another significant risk factor lenders price in. The LTV ratio has increased in importance since 2012. Prior to global financial crisis (GFC), lenders made little distinction in pricing different LTVs. Loans secured in secondary assets command a higher premium of 50–60bps. The analysis establishes an average premium of 35bps for loans advanced in regions compared to London. London is particularly seen a less risky region for loan advancements in the post-GFC era.

The study considers the role of lender characteristics and the changing regulation in the pricing of commercial mortgage loans and provides a framework to study spreads or pricing in this market that can include additional fundamental influences, such as terms of individual loans. The ultimate aim of such research is to assess whether mortgage loans are correctly priced and spotting risks emanating from actual loan spreads being lower than fundamental-based spreads pointing to tight pricing and over-lending.

The analysis provides evidence on lender criteria that determine the cost of loans. The study confirms that differences in regulation affect loan pricing. The regulatory impact is most visible in the increased significance of LTV. In that sense, regulation has been effective in restricting lending at high LTV levels.

The paper exploits a database of a commercial mortgage loan portfolio to make loan pricing more transparent to the different types of lender and borrowers. Lenders can use the estimates to assess whether commercial loans are fairly priced. Borrowers better understand the relative significance of risk factors affecting margins and the price they are charged. The results of this paper are of value to regulators as they can assist to understand the determinants of loan margins and gauge conditions in the lending market.

This paper has used account-level data of corporate and retail borrowers, assessed their credit risk through the risk-neutral principle and examined its implication on loan pricing.

It derives the capital charge and credit risk-premium for expected and unexpected losses through a risk-neutral approach. It estimates the risk-adjusted return on capital as the pricing principle for loans. Using GMM regression, the article has assessed the determinants of risk-based pricing.

It has been found that risk-premium is not reflected in the current loan pricing policy as per Basel II norms. However, the GMM estimation on RAROC can price risk premium and probability of default, LGD, risk weight, bank beta and capital adequacy, which are the prime determinants of loan pricing. The average RAROC for retail loans is more than that of corporate loans despite the same level of risk capital requirement for both categories of loans. The robustness tests indicate that the RAROC method of loan pricing and its determinants are consistent against the time and type of borrowers.

The RAROC method of pricing effectively assesses the inherent risk associated with loans. Though the empirical findings are confined to the sample bank, the model can be used for any bank implementing the Basel principle of risk and capital assessments.

The article has developed and validated the model for estimating RAROC, as per Basel II guidelines, for loan pricing that any bank can use.

It has developed the risk-based loan pricing model for retail and corporate borrowers. It has significant practical utility for banks to manage their risk, reduce their losses and productively utilise the public deposits for societal developments.

The article empirically validated the risk-neutral pricing principle using a unique 1,520 retail and corporate borrowers dataset.

This chapter studies banks’ loan pricing behavior in mainland China during 2003–2013 by applying panel regressions to firm-level loan data and the estimated default likelihood for listed companies. The authors find that with the progress of market-oriented financial reforms, banks generally require compensation for their exposure to borrowers’ default risks. It is even more so if the borrower is a non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE), mainly due to the pricing behavior of the Big Four banks. Bank lending rates are shown to be less sensitive to the default risks of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our results also reveal that banks priced in firm default risks before 2008 financial crisis, but not necessarily so after the crisis. As for industries, we find that after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the real estate sector and other government-supported industries tended to enjoy better terms on loan pricing in terms of default risks. We believe the main reason is that the government stimulus policies tilted toward those industries that have played crucial roles in China’s economic growth.

The purpose of this study is to understand the profit implications of analytics-driven centralized discriminatory pricing at the headquarter level compared with sales force price delegation in the purchase of an aftermarket good through an indirect retail channel with symmetric information.

Using individual-level loan application and approval data from a North American financial institution and segment-level customer risk as the price discrimination criterion for the firm, the authors develop a three-stage model that accounts for the salesperson’s price decision within the limits of the latitude provided by the firm; the firm’s decision to approve or not approve a sales application; and the customer’s decision to accept or reject a sales offer conditional on the firm’s approval. Next, the authors compare the profitability of this sales force price delegation model to that of a segment-level centralized pricing model where agent incentives and consumer prices are simultaneously optimized using a quasi-Newton nonlinear optimization algorithm (i.e. Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm).

The results suggest that implementation of analytics-driven centralized discriminatory pricing and optimal sales force incentives leads to double-digit lifts in firm profits. Moreover, the authors find that the high-risk customer segment is less price-sensitive and firms, upon leveraging this segment’s willingness to pay, not only improve their bottom-line but also allow these marginalized customers with traditionally low approval rates access to loans. This points out the important customer welfare implications of the findings.

Substantively, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically investigate the profitability of analytics-driven segment-level (i.e. discriminatory) centralized pricing compared with sales force price delegation in indirect retail channels (i.e. where agents are external to the firm and have access to competitor products), taking into account the decisions of the three key stakeholders of the process, namely, the consumer, the salesperson and the firm and simultaneously optimizing sales commission and centralized consumer price.

The cost of agricultural loans is a major constraint to the growth of the agriculture sector. This paper examines agricultural loan pricing by banks in Ghana using panel data analysis.

Data were obtained from audited financial reports of 15 agricultural loan lending banks from 2010 to 2017. The study applies the random-effect model and the fixed-effect model in the analysis and uses the system generalized system method of moment to check the robustness of the results from the baseline models.

The study found that agricultural loan pricing by banks is significantly influenced by risk premium, cost of funds, loan impairment, agricultural growth rate and food inflation. Banks should leverage emerging technologies to de-risk agriculture loan pricing to allay the fear of default. Farmers should look for long-term and relatively cheaper funds to support agricultural loans. Increasing credit to the agricultural sector could increase output, thereby reducing food inflation uncertainty for competitive pricing of agricultural loans.

Agriculture employs about 52% of Ghana's labor force, contributing about 20% to GDP. But it is “under” financed. This study leads the way in unraveling the factors accounting for the high prices of agricultural loans in Ghana. This study further contributes to policy development toward increasing credit to the agricultural sector.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a loan insurance pricing model allowing for the skewness and kurtosis existing in underlying asset returns.

Using the theory of Gram-Charlier option, the authors first derive a closed-form solution of the Gram-Charlier pricing model. To address the difficulties in implementing the pricing model, the authors subsequently propose an iterative method to estimate skewness and kurtosis in practical application, which shows a relatively fast convergence rate in the empirical test.

Not only the theoretical analysis but also the empirical evidence shows that the effects of skewness and kurtosis on loan insurance premium tend to be negative and positive, respectively. Furthermore, the actual values of skewness and kurtosis are usually negative and positive, respectively, which leads to the empirical result that the pricing model ignoring skewness and kurtosis substantially underestimates loan insurance premium.

This paper proposes a loan insurance pricing model considering the skewness and kurtosis of asset returns, in which the authors use the theory of Gram-Charlier option. More importantly, the authors further propose a novel iterative method to estimate skewness and kurtosis in practical application. The empirical evidence suggests that the Gram-Charlier pricing model captures the information content of skewness and kurtosis.

The purpose of this paper is to assess whether project finance loans were properly priced based on their risk before the crisis of 2008-2009 and what lessons can be learned under different market circumstances.

A literature review presents the structure of project financing, how banks are inspired to apply risk-adjusted price calculations for loans to create value for shareholders and how risk measurement differs by project loans. The authors adapt a general model for risk-adjusted pricing to project loans. Based on empirical parameters, assuming different margins and leverages, the authors estimate the implied maximum probability of default of projects, where project loans could produce value added to lenders. The authors compare these maximum probabilities of default with reference points.

The authors conclude that by the years of 2006-2007 several projects were very unlikely to produce any value added for shareholders and did not reach the minimum margin. Market and regulatory circumstances of 2016-2017 have significantly increased required margin levels and must shift lenders to a more conservative pricing and leverage policy.

Though the presented model is general, the simulation focusses on the European banking market.

In high market competition, banks tend to underestimate risk, underprice loans and loosen risk parameters. The crisis pushed banks back to a more conservative approach, however, the danger to return to a loosen project loan policy is real. The simulation shows how required prices are influenced by different market circumstances.

The paper adapts the risk-adjusted pricing methodology of standard loans to a new segment of project financing and gives an insight into the risk-pricing characteristics of project loans. The authors can draw down several valuable conclusions what how the market environment or project phases affect risk-adjusted pricing and the ability to produce value added to shareholders.

An objective method of pricing, where the cost of each component of a product is determined separately, is relevant to the pricing of loans in banking. Relevant factors in this case are a “real rate” of interest, an inflation premium, administrative expenses, a maturity factor and an allowance for credit risk. All these can be accounted for in the pricing of retail loans. This systematic approach enhances the loan pricing procedure and offers an objective way for an institution to establish and monitor the risk level of its portfolio of earning assets. From data it is clear that banking has priced its retail loans well and this brings the evolution of new pricing techniques into question.

This study examines bank practices of corporate loan pricing in the Asia‐Pacific region. We find that the all‐in‐spread for loans (mostly term loans with longer maturities) in the Asia‐Pacific region are significantly smaller than those in the US. In addition, foreign banks tend to price their loans favorably in the Asia‐Pacific region, while foreign banks in the US have a higher loan spread. This finding indicates that foreign banks foster more competitive loan pricing in the Asia‐Pacific region, while foreign banks in the US seem to experience a competitive disadvantage compared to domestic lenders.

The questions of loan availability and pricing were considered from the perspectives of financial economic theory and practice as well as a survey of lenders capable of financing a one-year bridge loan to determine the market's willingness to make such a loan and what rate of interest would be charged. Utilizing the sources above, in conjunction with professional knowledge and industry contacts, 101 lenders were selected as representative of the universe of lenders who had the capacity to make directly or otherwise to arrange, a $192 million bridge loan. The survey of lenders involved interviews with 67 of the 86 selected lenders from 59 firms. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Loan availability and pricing were considered from perspectives of financial economic theory and practice plus a survey to determine market's willingness to make a loan at what price. Utilizing professional knowledge and industry contacts, 101 lenders were selected as representative of those which had the capacity to make a $192 million bridge loan. When lenders were evaluated against criteria of size, product type, geographic territory, and willingness/capability to provide nonstandard loans, list selected for telephone interviews was narrowed, then subsequently expanded with referrals that led to identification of new potential lenders to be contacted.

Nine lenders offered conceptualized deal structures to provide the required financing. Though the price may be expensive, especially relative to what borrowers may wish to pay, financing is available. Developers’ and deal-makers’ protestations that “it's impossible,” should be discounted and rejected. Because the subject property is characterized by high-risk, it is logical conclusion that the lenders expressing a desire to provide the bridge loan would expect to earn a high return, meaning that the interest rate would approach, if not exceed, 20 percent.

Because the nature of the research required that the specific identities of the building and the parties were not revealed, some lenders might decline to consider this financing opportunity. And, real world negotiation of financing terms could result in higher rates than quoted and/or disinclination of lenders to proceed. Because of very specialized circumstances surrounding this proprietary research, conducted subject to nondisclosure agreement, publication had to be deferred until those constraints no longer applied. Though the data are more than a decade old, this consideration does not compromise the relevance, validity, or generalizability of the findings.

Markets can accommodate transactions that might be perceived as improbable. Investors which approach opportunities with creativity and open mind, can make deals that would not be possible, were strict, rigid, unbending eligible deal preference parameters to be employed. Strategists establishing policies for real estate enterprises should insist on progressive, expansive thinking in turning the scope of their potential venture involvements. Real estate education and training should address more attention to financial economic theory, strategic initiative, and creative deal making, which priority topics are too seldom prioritized, with the consequence that too many in real estate think narrowly rather than expansively.

This research substantiates a fundamental theory of financial economics and refutes conventional applied wisdom. Seldom do researchers and investors have the opportunity to “get inside” the lending decision process for a large scale commercial property, especially one characterized by daunting circumstances and considerable complexity, such as studied here. A unique real world date set – not normally accessible to property scholars – enables study of the proposition that every commodity has a price, no matter how severe or difficult the circumstances, in a manner fully congruent with the new AACSB Business School Deans policy emphasis on relevance in addition to rigor.

As commercial mortgages much less studied than residential mortgages, this paper is significant addition to undeveloped segment of literature. As the majority of mortgage finance research, estimated to be in the range of 90 percent, has been limited to single family residential financing, the study of commercial mortgage financing is relatively under-researched. Further, the studies of commercial mortgage finance tend to be illustrative case studies with stylized facts rather than explorations of empiricism-based investigations. As most researchers engaged in exploring real estate topics limit themselves to public information, research that provides access to real world private transactions is especially important.