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The purpose of this paper is to examine evolution of the American strategy toward terrorism in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. In other words, this study revolves around a key question: How and why the American security strategy toward terrorism evolved in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001? Based on the neorealist approach in international relations, this paper attempted to answer that question: first, through defining the concept of terrorism and how the Americans perceive it; second, via pinpointing the characteristic of the American counter-terrorism strategy before September 11 attacks; and third, through examining the effects of those terrorist attacks on that strategy.

The nature of the subject of this study calls for reliance on the analytical descriptive approach to highlight the role and strategy of the USA in the fight against terrorism following the events of September 11, in addition to the use of the system analysis methodology, which can identify the inputs and outputs of the system that had an impact in formulating the US counter-terrorism strategy.

This study has come up with seven findings. The first finding was that the 9/11 attacks served as a turning point of the US counter-terrorism strategy and restructured its agenda. Confronting the communist threat had been its primary objective, until terrorism came to the fore and became its first and foremost priority. The USA vowed that terrorism is its enemy and waged the war on terror to thwart its risk as a global threat. The second finding revolves around the idea of double standards in the American foreign policy. True to its long-standing tradition of favoring its own interests, in complete disregard of the interests of any other party, the USA continued to uphold the double-standards policy.

This study adds a new study to the Arab Library in the field of counter-terrorism studies, national security strategies and American foreign policy. In addition, the researcher seeks to complete the scientific effort to study the US strategy against terrorism, with a clear impact on the development of the situation in the region. This study contributes to the study of how one of the great powers in the international system, the USA, deals with the terrorist organizations that have become widespread in the Arab region.

UK government counter‐terrorism policy in the wake of the London bombings of 7 July 2005 has included an evolving set of measures seeking to engage the support of and productive interaction with UK citizens, so as to help oppose violent extremist ideology, to thwart potential sympathy for its proponents and to avert future incidents. The primary focus of such attempts has been Al‐Qaida‐influenced violent extremism. Government preventative measures have provoked controversy, especially in British Muslim communities. The article examines their reaction, from research commissioned by the Metropolitan Police Service and undertaken in London by the International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion (ISCRI) from the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan), in its community engagement (CE) Pathfinder programme. The findings from this research find many parallels in recent academic literature and other commentaries. The authors contend that some government programmes have erroneously served to stigmatise UK Muslim communities ‘en masse’, which has been counter‐productive to the government objective of gaining community support and involvement, and has thereby compromised the effectiveness of counterterrorism preventative measures. The article highlights a different emphasis and some specific elements for a revised prevention policy in counter terrorism from consideration of these sources, including the primary evidence from Muslim communities themselves in the community engagement Pathfinder programme.

Al‐Qaeda poses a major challenge to western democracies with its international networks and suicide attacks; it has been involved in some of the most horrific terrorist attacks across the world. As a result the UK, similar to many other countries, has enacted hard‐line counter‐terrorism legislation that has had an impact upon Muslim community relations with law enforcement agencies. This paper aims to examine the glorification offence under the Terrorism Act and its implications for free speech.

The paper is designed to examine counter‐terrorism legislation in Britain and in particular the offence of glorification and the impact it has had upon Muslim communities using empirical case studies and theoretical evidence.

It is found that Muslim communities feel that their freedom of speech, thought and expression have been seriously curtailed as a result of the glorification offence and has led them to feel a sense of alienation and stigma which has manifested itself in the community by not trusting law enforcement agencies and counter‐terrorism policies.

In order to build trust with the Muslim community law enforcement agencies such as the police need to ensure that they do not disproportionately use their power of arrest under the guise of combating terrorism. Therefore, there is a need for law enforcement agencies to improve their internal and external structures through a process of engagement and understanding Muslim communities which would help rebuild trust and confidence.

The paper examines counter‐terrorism legislation and provides a theoretical framework for how policy should be shaped in the area of counter‐terrorism. Currently the literature available concerning the new government reforms and the glorification offence under the Terrorism Act is limited and thus this paper provides a unique contribution towards understanding this offence in more detail and the impact it may have upon Muslim communities and civil liberties.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current UK Prevent Agenda 2011 and the possible threat to local communities from such policies which may actually fuel further resentment and make communities less safe and more susceptible to radicalisation and extremism.

The paper presents a short qualitative study that involved members of the Alum Rock community in Birmingham (UK) that had experience of Prevent strategies. The study involved semi‐structured interviews which were conducted with Muslim community members who were involved either directly or indirectly with Prevent programmes in the area of Alum Rock.

The study found that overall Muslim communities within Alum Rock were suspicious of the role of law enforcement agencies and counter‐terrorism policies such as Prevent.

In a short qualitative study and with a small sample size there is clearly a need to do further research and deal with a larger sample size that would demonstrate a more representative view of the community.

This study can help inform and improve the counter‐terrorism policy framework which includes Prevent. For example, more emphasis is needed on getting views from Muslim communities through focus groups and interviews which could in turn help build trust between Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies.

There is currently little research on the Prevent Agenda 2011 and the present paper provides an important contribution in understanding the views of Muslim communities in an area which has been the subject of a number of high profile counter‐terrorism operations (for example, Operation Gamble involved a number of police raids aimed at foiling a plot to behead a Muslim soldier), Project Champion (where West Midlands police used overt and covert surveillance (CCTV) cameras in predominantly Muslim areas). The data collected could be used as a template for gaining a better understanding of how Muslims feel about Prevent and as such can improve relations between Muslim communities and the police.

The 2006 General Assembly adoption of the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-terrorism strategy marked the first time all member states ratified a collective counter-terrorism (CT) agenda. Building on the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the strategy incorporated Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to development. This promised human-oriented and holistic methods for countering terrorism and violent extremism, in contrast to the post-2001 ‘hard security’ context of the United States–led Global War on Terror (GWOT). Although the first pillar of the strategy emphasised human rights and social progress over isolated economic growth, poverty, violence and retrogression in conflict zones since 2006 have led to the deaths of millions. Combined with resource scarcity and environmental devastation, insurgency-related conflicts have resulted in 70 million people displaced worldwide in 2019, while the politically violent phenomena of extreme right-wing nationalism and neo-jihadism remain prevalent. Reflecting on the social and economic outcomes of the GWOT, this chapter evaluates development-related discourses and activity in UN-led initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism. In doing so, it accounts for the impacts of UN CT measures on contemporary patterns ‘in phenomena described in policy arenas as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, including ‘neo-jihadism’ and right-wing extremism, in Global North and Global South contexts.

Post-9/11 a first order terrorism narrative has been widely asserted. In this chapter, I explore the development of second order terrorism narrative or ideal-type.

The chapter begins by providing a brief synopsis of three highly mediated Australian counter-terrorism operations and of shortcomings in incident counting. It also relies on some U.S. research on counter-terrorism prosecutions in support.

In first order terrorism, crime appears as a spectacular irruption or original sin on a tabula rasa of innocence and there is a clean division between us and them, non-state and state, victim and offender. In the second order terrorism narrative there is a contrasting claim that 9/11 is blowback, in kind, for U.S.-led interventions and does not offer a clean division between how we and they behave, blurs non-state and state culpability in big crimes, and sees victims and offenders trading places over time. As we adjust our perspective from the presumptive first order to second order event-acts, terrorism and counter-terrorism, event-act and interdiction, is merged as one.

The concept may be useful in accounting for assumptions pertaining to this category of crime, including its relation with precaution and security.

Purpose – This chapter highlights how counter-radicalization, as a manifestation of diffuse securitizing, impacts the work of Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) in Canada.

Methodology – The author presents how Muslim communities and their civil society representatives experience and adapt to the pressures from counter-radicalization policies. Data for the analysis are drawn from 16 semi-structured, anonymized interviews with managers and board members of prominent Muslim CSOs that are based in urban centers in Canada with high density of Muslim populations.

Findings – Though counter-radicalization policies are advanced under the rubric of community-orientedness and risk governance, security discourse and practice constructs radicalization as a problem within Muslim communities treating them as suspects who are “potentially radical.” Despite this framing, Muslim CSOs are cooperating with state security agencies in counter-radicalization efforts but are doing so cognizant of the immense power the state exerts over them in such “partnerships.” CSOs are raising questions about the selective nature of security practice which views Muslims as dangerous and violent but fails to fully acknowledge their reality as victims of Islamophobic violence. CSOs are using anti-racism, anti-oppression, and rights-based frames to call out the discriminatory treatment of Muslims under national security.

Originality/Value – The author’s study contributes to a community perspective in counterterrorism and counter-radicalization research that is dominated by analyses from “above.” By sharing the experiences of Canadian Muslim CSOs under counter-radicalization, the author illustrates the practice of “diffuse securitizing” and how it limits the work of civil society in liberal democracies.