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1 – 10 of over 1000This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.
Design/methodology/approach
A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.
Findings
The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.
Research limitations/implications
This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.
Practical implications
This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.
Originality/value
Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.
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Issam Tlemsani, Robin Matthews and Mohamed Ashmel Mohamed Hashim
This empirical research examined the factors and conditions that contribute to the success of international strategic learning alliances. The study aimed to provide organisations…
Abstract
Purpose
This empirical research examined the factors and conditions that contribute to the success of international strategic learning alliances. The study aimed to provide organisations with evidence-based insights and recommendations that can help them to create more effective and sustainable partnerships and to leverage collaborative learning to drive innovation and growth. The examination is performed using game theory as a mathematical framework to analyse the interaction of the decision-makers, where one alliance's decision is contingent on the decision made by others in the partnership. There are 20 possible games out of 120 outcomes that can be grouped into four different types; each type has been divided into several categories.
Design/methodology/approach
The research methodology included secondary and primary data collection using empirical data, the Delphi technique for obtaining qualitative data, a research questionnaire for collecting quantitative data and computer simulation (1,000 cases, network resources and cooperative game theory). The key variables collected and measured when analysing a strategic alliance were identified, grouped and mapped into the developed model.
Findings
Most respondents ranked reputation and mutual benefits in Type 1 games relatively high, averaging 4.1 and 3.85 of a possible 5. That is significantly higher than net transfer benefits, ranked at 0.61. The a priori model demonstrate that Type 1 games are the most used in cooperative games and in-game distribution, 40% of all four types of games. This is also confirmed by the random landscape model, approximately 50%. The results of the empirical data in a combination of payoff characteristics for Type 1 games show that joint and reputation benefits are critical for the success of cooperation.
Practical implications
Research on cross-border learning alliances has several implications. Managerial implications can help managers to understand the challenges and benefits of engaging in these activities. They can use this knowledge to develop strategies to improve the effectiveness of their cross-border learning alliances. Practical implications, the development of game theory and cross-border models can be applied in effective decision-making in a variety of complex contexts. Learning alliances have important policy implications, particularly in trade, investment and innovation. Policymakers must consider the potential benefits and risks of these collaborations and develop policies that encourage and support them while mitigating potential negative impacts.
Originality/value
International learning alliances have become a popular strategy for firms seeking to gain access to new knowledge, capabilities and markets in foreign countries. The originality of this research lies in its ability to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of these complex relationships in a novel and meaningful way.
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This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.
Design/methodology/approach
In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.
Findings
The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.
Research limitations/implications
Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.
Practical implications
This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.
Social implications
Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.
Originality/value
Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.
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The purpose of this paper is to review the utilization of game theory in the entrepreneurship literature. Game theory can potentially be employed to assess strategies…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to review the utilization of game theory in the entrepreneurship literature. Game theory can potentially be employed to assess strategies incentivizing productive entrepreneurial activities and subsequent economic development. Therefore, the author reviews entrepreneurship articles and explores the application of game-theoretic models and concepts in the literature.
Design/methodology/approach
First, the author provides an overview of the entrepreneurship ecosystem concept, highlighting key challenges in its study. The author also briefly highlights successful applications of game theory in the innovation literature. Second, the author systematically reviews and synthesizes entrepreneurship research employing game-theoretic models and concepts. The author's objective is to provide a state-of-the-art overview of the use of game theory in entrepreneurship.
Findings
Broadly, the author categorizes entrepreneurship-game theory articles into three groups based on their scope and purpose: entrepreneurial policy applications, inter-firm applications and entrepreneurship theory applications. Entrepreneurial policy applications include entrepreneurs and the government or policy as the main players in a game. Inter-firm applications encompass games between entrepreneurs and other private entities. Entrepreneurship theory applications include articles that utilize game theory to advance the author's understanding of entrepreneurial behavior and/or mechanisms in the market.
Originality/value
To the best of the author's knowledge, no previous paper has reviewed the use of game-theoretic approaches and models in entrepreneurship literature. This study addresses this research gap.
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Jie Jian, Xingyu Yang, Shu Niu and Jiafu Su
The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of…
Abstract
Purpose
The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.
Findings
The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.
Originality/value
The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.
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Junjie Lv, Ruyu Yang, Jianye Yu, Wenjing Yao and Yuanzhuo Wang
Influencer marketing mediated by social media is prevalent in social commerce. Micro-, meso- and macro-influencers all play an irreplaceable role in marketing. The purpose of this…
Abstract
Purpose
Influencer marketing mediated by social media is prevalent in social commerce. Micro-, meso- and macro-influencers all play an irreplaceable role in marketing. The purpose of this paper is to explore how companies with limited budgets choose influencers according to products' various levels of brand familiarity.
Design/methodology/approach
This study constructs an evolutionary game model of influencer marketing based on evolutionary game theory on complex networks. This model initiates various networks to demonstrate how influencers disseminate information and constructs update mechanisms to depict how individuals react to this information based on individuals' information utility and friends' strategies.
Findings
Simulation results suggest that companies should invest more in macro-influencers than in meso-influencers, however investing all in macro-influencers is not a good choice. The investment in meso-influencers will increase as brand familiarity decreases, whereas it will not exceed investment in macro-influencers. Furthermore, the accumulation of micro-influencers can accelerate the marketing process.
Originality/value
This study examines the combined effects of micro-influencers, meso-influencers and macro-influencers in marketing by simulating the marketing process initiated by influencers on social media.
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The purpose of this study is to propose a decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme based on a certificate transaction mechanism for the transaction of excess consumption…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to propose a decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme based on a certificate transaction mechanism for the transaction of excess consumption certificates (ECCs) of renewable energy. The aim is to address the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode and to promote the development of the green electricity industry.
Design/methodology/approach
The proposed scheme involves calculating the quotation difference for the same type of certificate transaction based on the quotations of all users of both buyers and sellers. The transaction volume is then determined based on the order of quotation difference from large to small, and the total interests of cooperation are calculated. The nucleolus method is adopted to allocate the total interests to each member of the alliance and calculate the final transaction price. The blockchain technology is used for the transaction to achieve accurate traceability and efficient supervision, and a corresponding smart contract is designed and simulated in the Ethereum consortium chain.
Findings
The results of the simulation show the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme can overcome the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode, such as low transaction efficiency, difficulty in obtaining the optimal transaction strategy and efficient supervision. The proposed scheme can promote the development of the green electricity industry by stimulating users' demand potential for green electricity.
Originality/value
The proposed scheme is original in its use of a certificate transaction mechanism to facilitate the trading of ECCs of renewable energy. The scheme adopts a decentralized multi-party cross-trading approach that overcomes the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode. The use of the nucleolus method for the allocation of total interests to each member of the alliance is also original. Finally, the use of blockchain technology for accurate traceability and efficient supervision of the transaction is an original contribution to the field.
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Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union…
Abstract
Purpose
Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.
Design/methodology/approach
This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.
Findings
Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.
Originality/value
Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.
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Yi-Ling Gao, Bengang Gong, Zhi Liu, Juan Tang and Chengfu Wang
Recycling and reuse of the electric vehicle (EV) batteries are ways to extend their limited lives. If batteries can be traced from production to recycling, it is beneficial for…
Abstract
Purpose
Recycling and reuse of the electric vehicle (EV) batteries are ways to extend their limited lives. If batteries can be traced from production to recycling, it is beneficial for battery recycling and reuse. Using blockchain technology to build a smart EV battery reverse supply chain can solve the difficulties of lack of trust and data. The purpose of this study is to discuss the behavioural evolution of a smart EV battery reverse supply chain under government supervision.
Design/methodology/approach
This study adopts evolutionary game theory to examine the decision-making behaviours of the government, EV manufacturers with recycled used batteries and third-party EV battery recyclers lacking professional recycling qualification.
Findings
On the smart reverse supply chain integrated by blockchain technology, a cooperative recycling strategy of the third-party EV battery recycler is the optimal choice when the government tends to actively regulate. The probability of the EV manufacturer choosing the blockchain adoption strategy exceeds (below) the threshold, and the government prefers negative (positive) supervision. According to numerical analysis, in the mature stage in the EV battery recycling industry, when the investment cost of applying blockchain is high, EV manufacturers' willingness to apply blockchain slows down, the government accelerates adopting a negative supervision strategy and third-party EV battery recyclers prefer cooperative recycling.
Practical implications
The results of this study provide opinions on the strength of government supervision and the conditions under which EV manufacturers and third-party EV battery recyclers should apply blockchain and cooperate. On the other hand, this study provides theoretical analysis for promoting the application of blockchain technology in smart reverse supply chain.
Originality/value
Compared with previous research, this study reveals the relevance of government supervision, blockchain application and cooperation strategy in smart EV battery reverse supply chain. In the initial stage, even if the subsidy (subsidy reduction rate) and penalty are high and the penalty reduction rate is low, the EV manufacturer should rather give up the application of blockchain technology. In the middle stage in the EV battery recycling industry, the government can set a lower subsidy (subsidy reduction rate) combined with a penalty or a higher penalty (penalty reduction rate) combined with a subsidy to supervise it. The third-party EV battery recycler is advised to cooperate with the EV manufacturer when the subsidy is low or the penalty is high.
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Dong-lin Chen, Min Fu, Meng-Di Yao and Lei Wang
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal competition or cooperation decision between technology service platforms and governments in the context of fierce competition…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal competition or cooperation decision between technology service platforms and governments in the context of fierce competition within urban agglomerations.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on the cooperation and competition game model, this study builds a two-level model for government and technology service platforms considering three cases: perfect competition, platform cooperation and government-led cooperation.
Findings
By analyzing the optimal strategies of the government and a platform in three cases, the research shows that choosing appropriate cooperation in a competitive situation is beneficial to both the government and the platform. Government-led cooperation is conducive to increasing social welfare. From the perspective of the platforms, if they actively seek cooperation, they can obtain higher subsidies and profits. The more intense the competition is, the higher the profits and social welfare generated from the platforms' active cooperation.
Practical implications
The contribution of this study relates to the development of technology service platforms in urban agglomerations. As local governments and platforms continuously undertake decision-making processes, this study constructs quantitative models to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of competition and cooperation. It is worth noting that relying on government subsidies to maintain the sustainable development of technology service platforms is not a long-term solution. Government subsidies play a vital role in the initial development of technology service platforms. The analysis results are in line with Guo et al. (2016), Jung and Feng (2020) and Li (2021) conclusions. Furthermore, long-term government subsidies will make platforms dependent on these subsidies. These are the contributions to the scientific literature.
Originality/value
Instead of focusing on vertical relationships, this study emphasizes the horizontal cooperation and competition relationship between platforms and local governments in an urban agglomeration. Thus, the vertical effects of government subsidies on platforms can be investigated. Another innovation is the social welfare policy goal, which is an important index for the development of urban agglomerations.
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