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The purpose of this paper is to explore the demand for conditional accounting conservatism from equity shareholders in state-controlled firms.

This study presents empirical investigation of firms listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2013.

The first finding is the extent of conditional conservatism in state-controlled firms increases when the leverage ratio decreases. It is also found that the high control rights held by the government in state-controlled firms are associated with high conditional conservatism. In addition, further analyses document the an offsetting effect between high control rights and firm leverage; a reinforcing effect between high control rights and year of incorporation after 1992; and a substituting effect between high control rights and dividend payments.

These findings suggest that the demand from equity shareholders, in addition to the debt demand, can be an important determinant of conditional conservatism and examination of these differing sources of demand can enhance the understanding on accounting conservatism in state-controlled firms.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether negative reports by state-controlled media affect firms’ CSR performance. Negative reports by state-controlled media indicate the signals of deteriorating relationships between firms and the government and then generate greater political pressure on firms, which may force firms to engage in more CSR activities. This study first examines the influence of negative reports by state-controlled media on CSR performance. Then, we further figure out whether the degree of dependence on the government exhibits an impact on the relationship between negative reports by state-controlled media and firms’ CSR performance.

The sample for this study is based on all Chinese A-listed firms from 2010 to 2020. The study employs CSR scores data released by HEXUN to measure firms’ CSR performance. HEXUN is one of the most professional institutions that sell CSR-related products. Following You et al. (2018) and An et al. (2022), the authors identify the nine most popular media consisting of state-controlled media. The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is adopted for regression, and various robustness tests are conducted including using alternative measures, expanding the regression model and instrumental variable method.

The empirical results show a significant positive relationship between negative reports by state-controlled media and firms’ CSR performance. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect of negative reports by state-controlled media on firms’ CSR performance is stronger for firms with mandatory CSR disclosure requirements, firms with political connections and firms with more severe financial constraints. Furthermore, improved CSR performance resulting from negative reports by state-controlled media indeed helps repair firms’ relationship with the government and thus leads them to attain government benefits, such as more government subsidies and lower tax rates.

This study finds that media reports issued by state-controlled media can be treated as signals of the relationships between firms and the government, which generate political pressure to push firms to take CSR as a strategic management tool to repair their relationships with the government. It helps policymakers and investors more comprehensively understand firms’ incentives behind their improved CSR performance and develop more effective policies. This study focuses on firms’ overall CSR performance. We anticipate that future research can extend the analysis of the impact of negative reports by state-controlled media on specific aspects of CSR investment.

This study illustrates the significantly positive effect of negative reports by state-controlled media in promoting CSR performance. It fills the research gap in studying the role of state-controlled media in CSR, especially for emerging markets. Moreover, the study also contributes to the strand of literature on strategic CSR management.

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government control and firm value in China.

Government might extract social or political benefits from a state-controlled firm, thus decreases firm value. However, government’s monitoring on firm management reduces managers’ agency problem, which increases firm value. We first build a game-theoretic model to prove the existence of optimal government control given these two roles of government, and we then employ the OLS regression method to test the theory predictions using the length of intermediate ownership chains connecting the listed state-owned enterprises to their ultimate controllers as the measure of government control.

We find that firm values first increase then decrease as government control weakens. Moreover, we find that government usually retains a stronger control over state-owned enterprises than the optimal level. In addition, we show that government control can be further weakened in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, which serve as a substitution of government monitoring.

Our results demonstrate that government control in China is still a necessary but costly mechanism to mitigate agency costs, especially when corporate governance system is underdeveloped.

We identify the substitution effect between government control and corporate governance using a unique measure of government control.

State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms.

The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011–2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares.

The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition.

While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs.

Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management.

The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms.

This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies.

Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards.

The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately controlled firms in China, and whether related party transactions (RPTs) add to or subtract from their relative performance, measured by return on assets (ROA).

Univariate and multivariate analyses of a sample of 90 firms that were listed in China between 2007 and 2009 (comprising 45 SOEs and 45 privately controlled firms matched on industry and size).

The authors find that SOEs engage in more tunneling, but find no evidence that privately controlled firms engage to a greater degree in either tunneling or propping. During this period, SOEs outperformed privately controlled firms by almost 4.5 per cent in terms of ROA (unadjusted for RPTs), but their performance advantage was completely offset by tunneling by about 6 per cent of ROA such that they underperformed privately controlled firms by a net 1.5 per cent of ROA.

The research is limited by a relatively small sample size, and in measuring the value of RPTs as the total value of the transactions (which is observable) instead of the difference between the transaction prices and arms-length prices (which would be preferable but is not observable).

The economics of investing in Chinese firms with different controlling interests and RPTs may be of interest not only to investors and other stakeholders in Chinese firms listed domestically, but also to international investors in overseas and cross-listed Chinese firms.

This paper synthesizes research from ownership on performance and RPTs on performance, to disentangling the relative effects of ownership control and RPTs on the performance of Chinese publicly listed firms.

Deadlock is a rather undesirable phenomenon and must be well solved in flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). This paper aims to propose a general iterative deadlock control method for a class of generalized Petri nets (GPN), namely, G-systems, which can model an FMS with assembly and disassembly operations of multiple resource acquisition. When given an uncontrolled G-system prone to deadlocks, the work focuses on the synthesis of a near-optimal, non-blocking supervisor based on reachability graph (RG) analysis.

The concept of a global idle place (GIP) for an original uncontrolled G-system is presented. To simplify the RG computation of an uncontrolled G-system, a GIP is added temporarily to the net model during monitor computation steps. Starting with one token and then by gradually increasing the number of tokens in the GIP at each iteration step, the related net system is obtained. The minimal-covered-set of all bad markings of the related net system suffering from deadlock can be identified and then removed by additional monitors through an established place-invariant control method. Consequently, all related systems are live, and the GIP is finally removed when the non-blockingness of the controlled system is achieved. Meanwhile, the redundancy of monitors is also checked.

A typical G-system example is provided to demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed method. Experiments show that the proposed method is easy to use and provides very high behavioral permissiveness for G-system. Generally, it can achieve an optimal or a near-optimal solution of the non-blocking supervisor.

In this work, the concept of GIP for G-systems is presented for synthesis non-blocking supervisors based on RG analysis. By using GIP, an effective deadlock control method is proposed. Generally, the proposed method can achieve an optimal or a near-optimal, non-blocking supervisor for an uncontrolled G-system prone to deadlocks.

This paper examines the impact of state control on stock price crash risk given whether and how ownership structure affects stock price crash risk is relatively underexplored.

The sample includes 2,285 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis and endogeneity is addressed with instrumental variable estimation and by testing how stock price crash risk is affected when the ultimate controller changes from a private-owned company to a state-owned enterprise.

The authors find that state control is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. The mechanism analysis shows that state control reduces stock price crash risk through the implementation of conservative corporate policies. Furthermore, the impact of state control is more pronounced with more intensive state involvement, e.g. in strategic industries and when a company's ultimate controller is a non-corporate government agency or the central government.

This paper enriches the literature on the controversy of the role of state control and the results of this study highlight the importance of the conservatism of state control on reducing stock return tail risk. The authors also add to the literature on the importance of the policy-risk sharing effect of state ownership.

This study tests the signaling and tunneling models of dividend policies by examining the relationship between the ownership structure and the dividend payout in a setting where strong institutional governance and weak firm-level governance coexist.

Chinese American Depository Receipts (ADRs) listed in the US offer an excellent opportunity to study dividend policy where strong institutional governance and weak firm-level governance coexist. Using a sample of 161 Chinese ADRs from 2004 to 2018, this study examines the relationship between the firm's ownership structure and cash dividend policy.

This study shows that high levels of controlling shareholder ownership and high levels of state ownership are associated with high dividend payouts. A high level of controlling shareholder ownership has a negative effect on its firm value. Dividend payments in those firms mitigate the negative effect, consistent with the signaling (substitution) model. A high level of state ownership is beneficial to its firm value. However, high dividend payment in those firms decreases the benefit, supporting the tunneling model.

This study covers 161 Chinese ADRs listed in the US with a total market capitalization of over $2 trillion and reveals that dividend tunneling could occur in Chinese government controlled ADRs. Findings in this study would offer valuable insights for US investors and regulators.

This paper extends the tunneling hypothesis to the topic of dividend policy in a setting where strong institutional governance and weak firm-level governance coexist. This study shows that tunneling through dividends can happen among Chinese government controlled ADRs in the US. It also complements the literature by extending the examination of the dividend tunneling model from a relatively small universe of master limited partnership (Atanssov and Mandell, 2018) to a larger universe of Chinese ADRs listed in the US with a total market capitalization over $2 trillion US dollars.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an exploration on how important are “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of family-controlled corporations in Malaysia. Three important groups of block-holders are identified for the purpose, namely the “foreign institutional investors”, the “domestic institutional investors” and the “government”.

The sample was drawn based on the companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. All the relevant block-holders’ ownership data are hand-collected from the annual reports published by the listed corporations and descriptive statistics together with regression analysis are employed.

Overall it is found that the presence of a second block-holder in family-controlled corporations leads to better performance compared to the corporations where the controlling families act as the sole block-holder. Moreover, this study finds that the identity of the block-holders with the extent of their ownership is important in explaining the performance. Specifically, “foreign institutional investors” and “government” are found to be significant in terms of the extent of their equity holdings and the performance of these corporations, respectively. Conversely, no such relationship is found in the equity holdings of “domestic institutional investors” and the corporation performance. Such finding may imply the possible limited ability and constraints faced by the “domestic institutional investors” in Malaysia to exert effective monitoring and pressure on the management for enhanced corporation performance.

Many studies researched the influence of family ownership on the performance of family-controlled corporations but there are limited studies conducted on the influence of “other block-holders” in affecting the performance of these corporations. This paper is an attempt to provide an initial exploration on how important are these “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of these corporations in the context of a small emerging economy, Malaysia.