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Contracting practice and theory is based upon a legal framework which impedes the attainment of value, defined as quality and cost containment. The manufacture of complex, highly technical infrastructure is especially impeded. Constraints of the legal framework are being overcome through innovative infrastructure contracting practices which maintain competitiveness and accountability, and simultaneously foster collaboration among the participants. Some of these innovations are discussed along with five projects which utilized one or more of them. A management framework for contracting based on a competitive/collaborative model is offered which emphasizes value, cooperation, long-term relationships, accountability and stewardship.

This paper aims to analyze Brazil’s legal and institutional arrangements for the design, implementation and accountability of public procurement for innovation (PPI) and to investigate how this apparatus has been adjusted, modified and even replaced to enable its use in innovation policies.

It is a descriptive analysis of the legal framework for PPI in Brazil supplemented with case reports of ongoing PPI contracts.

Despite the significant advances in the PPI legal framework in Brazil, this instrument’s implementation is still limited. A disconnection between PPI and innovation policy goals and legal-institutional constraints are reasonable answers to this problem.

Law is closely related to the design, implementation and control of public policy tools. However, there is still a tine understanding of how the legal framework can corroborate or constrain new mechanisms to state purchase power, such as PPI.

Public procurement is the most crucial tool of demand-side policies for innovation, and it is implemented according to the legal framework in each country. This paper adds to the law and innovation research agenda, providing an overview of the Brazilian PPI legal framework and how it is going so far.

The performance of public–private partnership (PPP) projects depends on how the project has been structured. The traditional PPP option analysis for structuring project scope and size relating to the bundling of functions concerning a single component of the value chain will need to be extended to handle multi-component sectors such as municipal solid waste (MSW) in formulating the project scope. This analysis is currently missing in the extant literature. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Through a comprehensive literature review as the methodological backbone, this study develops a testable holistic framework for the procurement of MSW PPP projects that examines how various factors of bundling affect the performance of the PPP projects.

Using transaction cost economics, agency and auction theories, the review identifies that innovation, maturity, quality specifiability, scope, competition, information asymmetries and transaction attributes have a significant influence on the performance and success of the PPP projects.

Alternative supply chain management possibilities and firm-level organisational ways can be predicted using this framework to strategize the solutions for the municipal infrastructure. Based on this contribution, future research can test the framework to increase the knowledge of bundling theory about how to structure network infrastructure PPP projects.

Studies on how to bundle/unbundle the projects having components of the value chain are in a nascent stage. The present study attempts to extend the body of knowledge on PPP to the complexity of bundling both the functions and components of the value chain in structuring the PPP project scope.

While anecdotal evidence suggests that performance-based contracts (PBCs) may foster innovation in buyer-supplier relationships, the understanding of the underlying mechanisms is limited to date. The purpose of this paper is to draw on transaction cost economics and agency theory to develop a theoretical model that explains how PBCs may lead to innovation.

Using data on 106 inter-organizational relationships from the Dutch maintenance industry, the authors investigate how the two main features of PBCs – low-term specificity and performance-based rewards – affect incremental and radical innovation.

The authors find that term specificity has an inverse-U-shaped effect on incremental innovation and a non-significant negative effect on radical innovation. Furthermore, pay-for-performance has a stronger positive effect on radical innovation than on incremental innovation. The findings suggest that in pursuit of incremental innovation, organizations should draft contracts with low, but not too low, term specificity and incorporate performance-based rewards. Radical innovation may be achieved by rewarding suppliers for their performance only.

The findings suggest that in pursuit of incremental innovation, organizations should draft contracts with low, but not too low, term specificity and incorporate performance-based rewards. Radical innovation requires rewarding suppliers for their performance only.

This paper aims to answer the question: how do clients and BPO service providers work together to foster dynamic innovation? Dynamic innovation is a process by which clients incent providers to deliver many innovations each year that improve the client's performance in terms of operational efficiency, process effectiveness and/or strategic impact.

The paper is based on research conducted in 2011 and 2012 and includes 202 survey responses and 48 in-depth interviews in 24 client organizations.

The most effective innovation incentives are mandatory productivity targets, innovation days, and gain-sharing at the project level. Threat of competition and special governance arrangements for innovation also positively influence innovation. The least successful incentives for innovations were found to be innovation funds, gainsharing at the relationship level, what has been called “pain-sharing”, and benchmarking.

The 24 BPO relationships do not represent a random sample, but rather a convenience sample. The authors aimed to understand emerging best practices from high-performing BPO relationships, thus the paired interview samples are purposefully biased towards higher-performing relationships.

Delivering innovations requires a process the authors call AIFI – acculturating, inspiring, funding, and injecting. The research finds that leadership pairs are key drivers of the dynamic innovation process. Leadership pairs jumpstart the dynamic innovation process by starting with innovation incentives. Even so, just having one right leader makes a positive difference. The positive difference is stronger if that leader is on the client side rather than the provider side. With no right leaders, the practices that the authors describe are less efficacious but still have positive impacts on the levels of innovation experienced.

In the ITO and BPO literatures, researchers have under-examined the more strategic drivers of outsourcing, including innovation. This research examines the process and practices that deliver dynamic innovation in client organizations.

New business models, such as life‐cycle contracting, challenge the narrow and static understanding of contracts with hard and precise terms. The aim of this paper is to examine how flexibility could be incorporated into contracting processes.

The data of the paper have been gathered applying the triangular method; first, by interviewing key personnel participating in contracting at eight Finnish firms; second, examining contract and other documents of those companies; and third, studying earlier research on contracting practices. Theoretically, the paper is based on relational contract and proactive approaches to law on the one hand and on organizational studies based on new institutional economics on the other.

Flexibility is often introduced to contracts with relational methods, relying on good personal relationships between business partners or negotiation power and negotiation skills. Contract documents often do not contain mechanisms for dealing with contingencies, or “soft” contract terms. The paper finds the following reasons that may explain this. First, firms heavily rely on model contracts to develop their own templates and the lack of contract models in new business areas hinders firms to develop their templates. Second, unfamiliarity with using soft elements makes it difficult to use them. Additionally, in some cases firms may prefer using relational capability.

The findings need verification from further multidisciplinary empirical research.

The findings support firms in developing their contracting capabilities to meet the requirements of the changing business environment and gain competitive advantage from well‐organized contracting.

This paper is one of the first empirical studies comprising also the legal approach.

The purpose of the paper is to discuss various contractual issues that could encourage industrial service innovations with special reference to improving operation and maintenance process effectiveness of complex and advanced production facilities in the capital‐intensive industries.

A case study was performed to study the influence of contractual relationships on industrial service innovations. The study focused on contractual relationships between service companies that sell operation and maintenance services to production facility operators in the Norwegian oil and gas industry.

The case study shows that service innovations are desired in most of the operation and maintenance contracts, but existing contractual relationships most often do not support innovations. Moreover, contract duration, contract type and control mechanisms can influence cooperation and collaboration during contract execution.

The findings are based on a case study with participants from the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The study is limited to knowledge and technology based services required to support operation and maintenance of advanced, complex and integrated production facilities. However, we believe that the study is of value for other capital‐intensive industries such as mining, energy, paper and pulp, chemical, etc.

The development of contracts that support industrial service innovations and create an environment for cooperation and collaboration could be of value to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of operation and maintenance processes in the capital‐intensive industries. Studies focusing on improving contractual relationships and service innovations for operation and maintenance services are scant.

This study aims to investigate how contractual vs. informal governance influences the performance of collaborative innovation projects considering their exploitation vs. exploration character.

Data are collected from a sample of 218 companies that have developed innovative projects in collaboration with other organizations. Regression models are estimated to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that contractual governance is the most effective for co-exploitation projects compared to informal governance. Specialization in either contractual or informal governance is more effective for co-exploration projects.

Developing collaborative innovation projects with other organizations is an alternative for firms to innovate either by exploiting complementary assets or by exploring new opportunities. Thus, the success of the collaborative innovation project is significantly affected by the way the collaboration is governed. On the one hand, for co-exploitation projects, companies should rely on contracts to improve their performance. On the other hand, for co-exploration projects, governance may specialize in either contracts or informal mechanisms to reach higher performance.

Despite previous studies analyzing the effect of contractual or informal governance on the performance of collaborative innovation projects, no research has focused on comparing simultaneously these effects, by using the innovation character of the project of co-exploitation or co-exploration as a moderator. Therefore, this paper explores comparatively the most effective type of governance mechanism for co-exploitation and co-exploration projects.

The paper argues that indirect capabilities – the ability to access other organizations' capabilities – are an important and neglected part of firm strategy in procuring complex performance (PCP) settings, and that this is especially so if these settings are treated as genuinely complex, rather than merely complicated. Elements of indirect capabilities are identified. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This is a theoretical paper, drawing on complexity notions and Penrose's analysis of endogenous innovation to drive a disequilibrium-oriented discussion of the capabilities required by firms in a PCP setting.

Six inter-related elements of indirect capabilities are proposed and discussed: IT infrastructure, boundary management practices, contracting, interface artefacts, valuing others' capabilities and relating direct to indirect capabilities. These are important in PCP settings and in other operations and supply settings characterised by complexity.

This paper reconsiders the way complexity has been treated in the PCP literature and develops an extended discussion of the notion of indirect capabilities. It potentially provides the basis for an operations and supply strategy more attuned to the demands of shifting inter-organizational networks.

Bundled mode of public–private partnership (PPP) procurement has been a widely advocated governance structure of infrastructure delivery. The purpose of this paper is to identify the various aspects of how this bundling phenomenon has to be played out in practice and examines the implications of such decisions.

A longitudinal case study with an Indian municipal solid waste (MSW) PPP project provides the necessary evidence on the identification of constructs which are deemed important in the decision making of bundling in PPP MSW projects. Transaction cost economics theory, agency theory and auction theory informed the development of theoretical constructs. The longitudinal case study used interviews, observations and documents analysis.

This study has highlighted the complexity inherent in bundling decision, arising out of the relatively scanty rationale by which stakeholders first developed. Not only they are very different from the practice, but also many assumptions are proved otherwise. Poor sectoral developments, hindrances arguably caused to innovation, increase in transaction cost and a decrease in the competition along with ex post characteristics such as unfavourable transaction attributes made bundling a too early proposition to Guwahati MSW project. This study suggests that strong liability of the bundling phenomenon was the above the rationale of typical PPP bundling benefits envisaged in the extant literature. It also shows that poor practice and decision making by immature clients would lead to project failure.

A cognitive map emerged from the study on the failure of Guwahati project. An empirical generalisation can be attempted using multiple contrasting case studies to make the theory more acceptable.

The case illustrated why naïve clients should not try PPPs in a bundled model. Accordingly, the developed framework would help the governments to create the right projects catalysing the bundling benefits and harness the full potential of private sector participation in future PPP projects.

The current study would be novel in advancing the theory of bundling in PPP projects. This would be of interest to academia and to industrial practice and policy.