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The European Union (EU) is not a state, though it has some statelike attributes; it is not an empire, though it includes many former European imperial powers; and it is not a federation, though Euro-federalists seek to make it one. There is, however, no need to argue that the Union is a singularity, nor to invent novel terminology, such as that deployed by “neo-functionalists” and “intergovernmentalists” to capture its legal and political form. The EU is a confederation, but with consociational characteristics in its decision-making styles. This conceptualization facilitates understanding and helps explain the patterns of crises within the Union.

Existing work on multi-level governance (MLG) has concentrated on decentring of the state (e.g., Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994). The hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public service in Britain. Political Quarterly, 65(2), 138–141; Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability. London: Open University Press; Rhodes, R. A. W. (2008). Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organisation Studies, 28(8), 1243–1264); growth of non-state actors in governing (e.g., Crouch, 2004; Jessop, B. (2004). Multi level governance and multi-level metagovernance-changes in the European Union as integral moments in the transformation and re-orientation of contemporary statehood. In I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), Multi level governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press); classifying different types of governance (e.g., type 1 and type 2 MLG – see Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Ongaro, E., Massey, A., Holzer, M., & Wayenberg, E. (Eds.). (2010). Governance and intergovernmental relations in the European Union and the United States: Theoretical perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). The purpose of the chapter is to complement these approaches by focusing on politics and political strategies in multi-level systems.

The chapter draws on an extensive literature in governance and political accountability and on political dynamics, management and strategies within multi-level state systems. Although in international context, particular accentuation is placed on the UK case.

There are three broad findings. First, while the growth of MLG and in particular supra state activities and institutions have undermined conventional conceptions of political accountability, more nuanced interpretations are provided; as are cases of successful popular challenge to a seemingly inevitable application of neo-liberal new public management driven approaches to public service provision, as witnessed in examples of public service de-privatisation and re-municipalisation. Second, as seen in the United Kingdom, political strategies in a multi-state system are presented in terms of zero sum or alternatively win-win scenarios. In Scotland, for example, though there have been difficulties for state wide parties in managing multi-level politics in the devolved arena, yet in that arena win-win strategies have been played out; and in Northern Ireland with a contextual backdrop of conflict, there is also evidence of win-win political actions. Third, some general findings are presented which outline a range of centrifugal and centripetal forces found in some European countries and how these affect the choice of political strategy.

Using original mass public surveys in nine East European, European Union (EU) member countries (2007), I develop a micro-level approach linking individuals’ perceptions of inequality and corruption. Merging an instrumental variables approach with an emerging body of comparative scholarship, I demonstrate that individuals’ perceptions of inequality can be seen to contribute to their perceptions of corruption based on individuals’ normative concerns of the failure of democratic institutions to address issues related to inequality. Thus, for these countries, this region, the EU, as well as other new democracies, we can better understand these potential threats to the development of stable, sustainable democracy.

In 1969, Warren Nutter left the University of Virginia Department of Economics to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Nixon administration. During his time in the Defense Department, Nutter was deeply involved in laying the groundwork for a military coup against the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende. Although Nutter left the Pentagon several months before the successful 1973 coup, his role in Chile was far more direct than the better-known cases of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Arnold Harberger. This chapter describes Nutter’s role in Chile policymaking in the Nixon administration. It shows how Nutter’s criticisms of Henry Kissinger are grounded in his economics, and compares and contrasts Nutter with other economists who have been connected to Pinochet’s dictatorship.

Political transition to democracy is hampered by human rights abuses by the military junta against ethnic minorities that constitute a third of the country's population. Human rights violations are unprecedented in terms of human suffering, extra judicial killings, torture, forced labour and displacement, rape and rapine. The situation has further deteriorated due to a bloody conflict between the armed opposition groups from ethnic minority states and central authorities. Armed opposition groups are demanding a greater autonomy, which the military government has been denying. Although the military government signed over a dozen cease-fires with armed groups, there has been no real progress to reach a permanent political solution. As a result, human rights abuses are on the increase, especially in Shan, Kayin (Karen), Kayah (Karenni), and Mon minority states where the military junta's army is engaged in counter-insurgency operations against armed groups.

How are we to make sense of the attitudes of Social Democratic parties towards decentralisation? What do they think about what is a legitimate territorial allocation of power? What factors shapes this view? And what makes Social Democratic parties change their minds? This article addresses these questions by way of competing ideological traditions, the external strategic incentives and internal constraints. Empirically, the article presents a comparative case-study analysis of Social Democratic parties in four countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom). On the basis of this analysis, I argue that the positioning of Social Democratic parties on decentralisation is influenced by strategic incentives created by the structure of political competition, whereas the policy shifts are more often produced by factors that are internal to the party. A decentralist policy shift is always associated with the capacity of regionalist parties to set the agenda by exerting pressures on Social Democratic parties. In addition, Social Democratic parties tend to shift their policy while in opposition to distinguish themselves from their centralist mainstream rival in government. The dominant mechanism found across four countries was one in which regional branches persuade the central party leadership to adopt a pro-decentralist position. This chapter illustrates how Social Democratic parties have an instinct for ‘adaptation and control’ in the face of social-structural changes, and it demonstrates that the prevalence of different ideological traditions will vary according to external strategic incentives and, crucially, by the party's internal ability to follow those incentives.

While the concept of legal culture has been receiving a growing attention from scholars, this research often overemphasizes the similarity of the opinions held by different segments of population. Furthermore, the relationship of migration and the change of legal-cultural attitudes has not received particular attention. Drawing on 70 in-depth interviews with the immigrants of the early 1990s from the former Soviet Union to Israel and the secular Israeli Jews, this chapter provides a comprehensive account of the various aspects of legal culture of these groups. The second important finding is the persistence of the legal-cultural attitudes and perceptions over time.