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The article focuses on the role that ‘confidential information’ plays in relation to the work of board-level worker representatives, and their interaction with other worker participation mechanisms. Thus, the purpose of the paper is to explore the implications of confidentiality of board-level information for effective worker participation. The main argument is that if board-level worker representatives are excessively constrained by confidentiality provisions, their capacity to work effectively is brought into question.

A qualitative research was undertaken on a sample of 12 public limited companies in Slovenia. In each company, three interviews were conducted: with the CEO or board member, with a board-level worker representative and with a works councilor, who was not a board-level worker representative (36 interviews in total). Each of these interviewees has a particular role, and interest, in handling confidential information. Thus, a method of triangulation by groups was employed. The interviews were conducted at the company premises during October and November 2017. The results were analysed by the content analysis method.

This research confirms that in the majority of companies, nearly all of the material and information discussed by the board is deemed to be ‘confidential’. Consequently, communication between board-level worker representatives and the works council is rendered difficult, if not impossible. The results indicate an urgent need to redefine the concept of confidentiality and to reinforce the level of communication between management boards and works councils.

The research is limited to one country, which, by no means, is fatal, as international comparisons, although of greater breadth, often lose some depth of analysis (especially, for example, where there are differences in legal contexts). Although the issues discussed in the paper are of relevance to all those with an interest in worker participation mechanisms, they cannot be generalised mostly due to national specificities.

The question of confidentiality as between the board, board-level worker representatives, works councils, trade unions and other form of worker representation, despite its importance, has been raised quite rarely in research. In this research, three groups of stakeholders (CEO/board member, board-level workers representative and works council members) have been covered, with the aim to extend the understanding of how confidentiality obligations impact relationships between these.

The purpose of this paper is to study how employee representatives in European Works Councils (EWCs) treat confidential information and how such strategies might improve the EWC functioning.

Building on interviews of several case studies of EWCs, this paper brings together insights from industrial relations and occupational psychology literature.

The results show that through actively challenging the management, an EWC can reduce the amount of information labelled as confidential and become freer to communicate with their rank and file. Actively challenging management, however, does not seem to impact the openness of the management to give early and complete information.

The paper is based on several case studies, which limits the generalisability of the findings. The results, however, indicate that research is required on how challenging confidentiality can incite managements to provide earlier information.

The research show clearly the potential but also limitations for employee representatives in actively challenging the management over what information is confidential.

This study studies a universally difficult topic for employee representatives: how to handle confidential information. The findings show that EWCs have little levers to force management to provide early information. For this, more structural change is needed.

This study is the first to focus exclusively on the issue of confidentiality in EWCs. This is a central concern for employee representatives, but research, until now, has not given much insight in which strategies work.

A policy of surveillance which interferes with the fundamental right to a private life requires credible justification and a supportive evidence base. The authority for such interference should be clearly detailed in law, overseen by a transparent process and not left to the vagaries of administrative discretion. If a state surveils those it governs and claims the interference to be in the public interest, then the evidence base on which that claim stands and the operative conception of public interest should be subject to critical examination. Unfortunately, there is an inconsistency in the regulatory burden associated with access to confidential patient information for non-health-related surveillance purposes and access for health-related surveillance or research purposes. This inconsistency represents a systemic weakness to inform or challenge an evidence-based policy of non-health-related surveillance. This inconsistency is unjustified and undermines the qualities recognised to be necessary to maintain a trustworthy confidential public health service. Taking the withdrawn Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between NHS Digital and the Home Office as a worked example, this chapter demonstrates how the capacity of the law to constrain the arbitrary or unwarranted exercise of power through judicial review is not sufficient to level the playing field. The authors recommend ‘levelling up’ in procedural oversight, and adopting independent mechanisms equivalent to those adopted for establishing the operative conceptions of public interest in the context of health research to non-health-related surveillance purposes.

The paper examines the disclosure of information within public contract awards under EU law. EU Public Procurement rules have several objectives that may at some times be conflicting with each other. A certain level of transparency of public procurement procedure is necessary in order to fight corruption, enhance trade opportunities and ensure effective legal remedies. On the other hand, too much transparency may have certain anti-competitive effects. The national laws regarding disclosure of information vary in different EU member states. In Finland the EU law principle of effective remedies has been interpreted as requiring full transparency among the bidders. The transparency rules under EU law and certain Member States' national laws are analysed. As a conclusion, it is suggested that the rules on disclosure should not be left solely to the discretion of member states as the over-transparent approach taken by certain member states may negatively affect the markets both on a national and EU level.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the human factors triggering information leakage and investigate how companies mitigate insider threat for information sharing integrity.

The methodology employed is multiple case studies approach with in-depth interviews with five multinational enterprises (MNEs)/multinational corporations (MNCs).

The findings reveal that information leakage can be approached with human governance mechanism such as organizational ethical climate and information security culture. Besides, higher frequency of leakages negatively affects information sharing integrity. Moreover, this paper also contributes to a research framework which could be a guide to overcome information leakage issue in information sharing.

The current study involved MNCs/MNEs operating in Malaysia, while companies in other countries may have different ethical climate and information sharing culture. Thus, for future research, it will be good to replicate the study in a larger geographic region to verify the findings and insights of this research.

This research contributes to the industry and business that are striving toward solving the mounting problem of information leakage by raising awareness of human factors and to take appropriate mitigating governance strategies to pre-empt information leakage. This paper also contributes to a novel theoretical model that characterizes the iniquities of humans in sharing information, and suggests measures which could be a guide to avert disruptive leakages.

This paper is likely an unprecedented research in molding human governance in the domain of information sharing and its Achilles’ heel which is information leakage.

In the realm of public and consumer awareness a more open attitude of government towards confidentiality is needed, whereas in the industrial sphere confidentiality is needed to maintain a healthy competitive and innovative spirit. The difficulty in defining confidentiality is discussed and cases in which confidentiality works for and against the public interest. Specific reference is made to the use of confidentiality in the oil business.

The principle of offshore financial confidentiality is a controversial issue in offshore law. On the one hand, offshore jurisdictions view confidentiality in financial matters as an essential ingredient in the offshore industry which deserves to be protected. On the other, onshore states are increasingly hostile to confidentiality and have been willing to take drastic measures to undermine it.

In a previous monograph a discussion took place on the implied terms at common law which were connected with the employer's duties. It is now proposed to consider the obligations of the employee which are implied by the common law. A discussion and an analysis is proposed of each of the following common law implied duties, namely a duty of care by the employee in carrying out his work; a duty of fidelity where an evaluation of its various aspects will take place and a duty of obedience. The employee's inventions and discoveries will then be treated.

The handling of conflicts of interest has become an increasingly important concern for modern professional advisers, in particular lawyers, accountants, brokers and financial advisors. This concern has become exacerbated because of the convergence of a number of factors, namely the bureaucratisation of many areas of professional advisory work, the emergence of megafirms and large national and multi‐national partnerships dealing with this work, coupled with a customer base dominated by large corporations and governments. Indeed, it is the demand of these customers that partly accounts for the emergence of larger advisory firms. However, the outcome of this process has inevitably created severe conflicts of interest problems for such conglomerate professional practices and large advisory firms, problems that they have attempted to contain through the use of what has become commonly known as Chinese walls.