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We study here the effects of FTA on demand, consumer surplus, dealer profit, and tariff revenue depending on the degree of substitution between two goods and import competition structure in a two country’s static model. We consider monopolist dealer, and perfect competition in imports market. The base model is with a positive tariff and we compare the equilibrium with a zero tariff under FTA. The rankings in the consumer utility are such that it is i) the highest under perfect competition with FTA or without FTA, ii) second highest under monopoly with FTA, and iii) the lowest under monopoly without FTA.

I study the economic implications of the world oil market dominated by OPEC and non-OPEC major oil producing countries using a general equilibrium model of trilateral trade with oil duopoly. There are three countries and three goods, x, y, and oil (z). Home (H) is endowed with good x . Foreign (F) is endowed with good y and also produces oil (z). Middle (M) is an oil producing country and supplies oil only. I consider two types of oil market structure; (1) Cournot duopoly and (2) perfect competition. I find that Foreign is actually worse off under Cournot duopoly despite being a duopolist for wide range of parameter values that reflect real world situations. This is mainly due to reduced consumption of oil and reduced value of good y endowment under duopoly when Foreign is a net oil exporter or oil autarky, and is also due to worsening terms-of-trade effect under duopoly when Foreign is a net oil importer. Welfare reversal with higher welfare of Foreign under oil duopoly occurs only under highly unrealistic parameter values, and hence the main results of the study remain robust.

The author augments an otherwise standard business-cycle model with a rich government sector and adds monopolistic competition in the product market and rigid prices, as well as rigid wages a la Calvo (1983) in the labor market.

This specification with the nominal wage rigidity, when calibrated to Bulgarian data after the introduction of the currency board (1999–2018), allows the framework to reproduce better observed variability and correlations among model variables and those characterizing the labor market in particular.

As nominal wage frictions are incorporated, the variables become more persistent, especially output, capital stock, investment and consumption, which help the model match data better, as compared to a setup without rigidities.

The findings suggest that technology shocks seem to be the dominant source of economic fluctuations, but nominal wage rigidities as well as the monopolistic competition in the product market, might be important factors of relevance to the labor market dynamics in Bulgaria, and such imperfections should be incorporated in any model that studies cyclical movements in employment and wages.

The computational experiments performed in this paper suggest that wage rigidities are a quantitatively important model ingredient, which should be taken into consideration when analyzing the effects of different policies in Bulgaria, which is a novel result.

In this paper, the main focus is on supply and demand auction systems with resource pooling in modern supply chain from a theoretical modeling perspective. The supply and demand auction systems in modern supply chains among manufacturers and suppliers serve as information sharing mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to match the supply and demand such that a modern supply chain can achieve incentive compatibility and economic efficiency. The authors design such a supply and demand auction system that can integrate resources to efficiently match the supply and demand.

The authors propose three theoretic models of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according to the Vickrey auction principle. They are supply auction model with demand resource pooling, demand auction model with supply resource pooling, and double auction model with demand and supply resource pooling. For the proposed auction models, the authors present three corresponding algorithms to allocate resources in the auction process by linear programming, and study the incentive compatibility and define the Walrasian equilibriums for the proposed auction models. The authors show that the solutions of the proposed algorithms are Walrasian equilibriums.

By introducing the auction mechanism, the authors aim to realize the following three functions. First is price mining: auction is an open mechanism with multiple participants. Everyone has his own utility and purchasing ability. So, the final price reflects the market value of the auction. Second is dynamic modern supply chain construction: through auction, firm can find appropriate partner efficiently. Third is resources integration: in business practices, especially in modern supply chain auctions, auctioneers can integrate resources and ally buyers or sellers to gain more efficiency in auctions.

In the paper, the authors propose three theoretic models and corresponding algorithms of modern supply chain auctions with resource pooling according using the Vickrey auction principle, which achieves three functions: price mining, dynamic modern supply chain construction and resources integrating. Besides, these proposed models are much closer to practical settings and may have potential applications in modern supply chain management.