Search results

The purpose of this paper is to describe the competences needed for managing competitive bidding in the Finnish healthcare and to understand the management of competitive bidding holistically, considering the challenges the management faces from being embedded in focal nets and the wider network.

The phenomenon is examined from the perspective of networks. This focus acknowledges the fact that competitive bidding changes the dynamics of the network and therefore requires new competences from the actors. The study applies qualitative methods.

Competitive bidding connects effects, interests, resources and actors together. It changes the dynamics of the net and the network. Thus, new competences are required. Three major competence areas were detected: relationship management competences, net management competences and purchasing competences.

The conclusions shed light on the combination of competences needed in managing competitive bidding in healthcare networks.

When developing a new product, a buying firm solicits revenue sharing bids from two competing suppliers. Bidding behaviors of suppliers do not always align with predictions from rational agent models due to task uncertainty and bounded rationality, which could result in non-optimal supplier offers and ultimately hurt buying firm interests. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned issues.

The authors built an analytical model that considers the impact of supplier technological risk, buyer–supplier coordination cost and supplier loss aversion on the optimal bid of the supplier. Next, using limited information processing capacity as a theoretic lens, the authors explore antecedents to the size of a focal supplier's bidding error, the absolute difference between the actual bid and the optimal bid. The authors used quantitative lab experimental data to test the hypotheses.

(1) Bounded rational bidders often fail to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant competitive information when placing bids, (2) loss aversion of a bidder significantly affects not only levels of bids, particularly for bidders with competitive disadvantages, but also sizes of the bidding error and (3) competitive information that has clearer performance implications are more influential in reducing sizes of bidding errors.

The results provide a comprehensive view of the bidding behaviors of a bounded rational supplier in an innovation outsourcing context with competition. With the results, managers now have a better understanding of behavioral influencers behind non-optimal supplier bids in an innovation outsourcing context.

Insufficient time allocation for the bidding period occurs, causing drawbacks to both parties, the client and the bidder. Hence, this study aims to evaluate the time allocated for preparing a bid proposal as per the National Competitive Bidding (NCB) in the Sri Lankan context.

The study has adopted a mixed method approach and expert interviews and document review to detect, analyse and validate the issues, and solutions based on NCB along with the adequacy of the allocated bidding period used as main data collection tools. Both qualitative and quantitative data were analysed through manual content analysis and inferential analysis respectively.

Overall, 24 local issues with the existing competitive bidding process and solutions for each were identified. Among the 24 local issues, it was unanimously agreed by all interviewees that three specific issues require attention and improvement. These issues are related to the standard and incompleteness of bidding documents, inaccurate BOQ quantities measured by the consultant or the main contractor, and the excessive number of bidding document amendments by the consultant. It was revealed that a maximum of 42 calendar days (6 weeks) is sufficient for the bidding process while a minimum of 21 calendar days (3 weeks) is insufficient.

The findings of this study would be recommended that Information and Communication Technology Agency (ICTA) understand the necessity of revising the NCB reference to the time allocated for the preparation of bids. By recognising the importance of sufficient time allocation for bid preparation, this research serves as a practical guide for authorities involved in policy formulation, aiding them in implementing revisions that align with the dynamic requirements of bidding procedures.

Discusses how a repetitive competitive bidding model, developed previously, can be adapted to the differing features of the situation. Focuses, first, on identifying the implications for decision analysis of the strategic nature of repetitive bidding and then on the impact of data to aid in winning a tender. Uses a real example from the construction industry which, for confidentiality reasons, is called Whernside Ltd. States the company is one operating a world‐wide spread of construction and development activities such as; civil engineering, private housing, property development, building, dredging, mining, mechanical engineering, foundation engineering and concrete products manufacture. Tabulates the company's turnover and profit in detail, and demonstrates that if bidding activity is to be continued, the formulation of a long‐term strategy must aim to set a perspective in the prescription of individual bids, so the long‐term accrued benefits are, in some sense, optimal. Documents the tactical bidding decision structure using figures by aid of explanation and goes into great detail by way of pinpointing the bid process. Concludes that from the discussion conclusions may be drawn and the three main ones paragraphed and spelt out with recommendations.

Public construction authorities need to evaluate the level of competition in the submitted bids for a certain project before awarding the contract. A lack of adequate competition is a reason for rejecting all bids and reissuing an invitation to bid for the project. This paper aims to present an analysis of the adequacy of competition in public construction projects.

The paper uses five competition indicators to correlate the level of competition effect obtained with the number of contractors competing for the project. The analysis is based on the bid opening results for 917 public construction projects in Jordan that include 6,309 bids, with an average number of 6.88 bids per project.

The results illustrate that there is an improvement in the competition effect over the five analyzed competition indicators as the number of bidders increases. However, the rate of improvement decreases with the increase in bidders. The empirical analysis performed does not support the proposition that an optimum number of bidders exists in competitive bidding for construction projects or the proposition that a higher number of bidders may lead to higher bid prices. However, the indicators developed in this study found that at least 5 bidders are recommended and after 8 bidders, the rate of improvement continues at much slower rate.

The current research presented a multifaceted method for assessing the minimum number of bidders needed to ensure a competitive bidding process. Moreover, the research used actual data from 917 public projects.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and evaluate bidding competitiveness and success rate of contractors bidding for public construction projects (PCPs). Additionally, this research determines the effect of work sector, contractor’s classification category (experience), project size and number of bidders on contractors’ bidding competitiveness, and the influence of work sector and classification category on their success rate.

The data were collected through 2,296 bidding attempts for 289 tender projects that were announced by the Government Tenders Department in Jordan between 2013 and 2016. The research uses bid competitiveness percentage (BCP) to evaluate contractors’ bidding competitiveness. Pearson correlation is used to investigate the correlation among variables. Hypothesis testing using ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effect of the abovementioned factors on contractors’ bidding competitiveness, and their success rate.

The results of the analysis indicate that contractors’ average BCP and success rate in Jordanian PCPs are 83.8% and 13.3%, respectively. The analysis also reveals that work sector, contractor’s classification category, project size and number of bidders significantly affect contractors’ bidding competitiveness, whereas classification category and work sector do not affect bidding success rate. Therefore, experience of contractors affects their bidding competitiveness, but does not affect their success rate.

The present research uses contractors’ bidding success rate as a measure to evaluate their bidding competitiveness for PCPs. The novel model of this research can be applied in any country, after considering local regulations, to measure and evaluate contractors’ bidding competitiveness, and success rate when bidding for PCPs. Also, contractors cannot depend on their experience (i.e. classification category) or increasing bidding attempts to win bids and improve bidding success rate, rather than enhance their bidding strategy.

Winning a bid will carry implications for capacity level of a construction firm. This paper aims to examine the impact of a winning bid on contractors' bid pricing strategies.

In identifying the specific types of bidding trends before and after a winning bid, the variations in bids are expressed as a function of time relative to winning bid – the “event” of interest in this study – using a piecewise mixed effects model. The bids analysed comprised series of bids with a winning bid in between, recorded from Hong Kong building contractors.

The results show that there is a relationship between bid price and bidding success. The bidders in general bid low for time periods before a winning bid and they are less competitive in time periods after a winning bid. However, by considering the individual bidders' characteristics that relate to differences in bidding competitiveness, it is shown that there is remarkable heterogeneity among the bidders in bid pricing decision for pre‐ and post‐winning periods. Nevertheless, the statistically significant bidding trends before and after a winning bid strengthen the notion that systematic changes in bidding behaviour over time do occur in reality in response to changes in firm capacity level.

This empirical investigation provides strong evidence on the systematic changes in bidding behaviour over time in response to changes in firm capacity level, supporting the need to incorporate firm capacity level in the future development of a suitable theoretical framework on construction bidding.

Contractors rely on effective pricing methods in order to translate potential business into reality for long-term survival of their firms. This involves effective utilization of bidding feedback information toward winning jobs with high profit potential. The purpose of this paper is to experimentally investigate student (inexperienced) bidders’ competitiveness under full and partial information feedback conditions when the number of competing bidders is large (n=12).

This paper adopted an experimental research design. The design used between-subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable with 120 students who enrolled in a cost-estimating course participated in the experiment.

The result shows that the variations in bids over time for both levels of information feedback are statistically significant. It is found that bidders with full bidding feedback information are more competitive than those with partial bidding feedback information. The bid-spread analysis and the identified effect of these two information feedback conditions on awarded contract sum, provide some further evidence that full information feedback condition would lead to lower average bids in construction bidding.

The implication of the findings for construction clients is that they should provide as much bidding feedback information as possible so that the bid prices will be competitive.

Given the ambiguity inherent in field data, this paper provides strong justification of using experimental research design in advancing the understanding of construction pricing under different information feedback conditions. In addition, it demonstrated the suitability of using student subjects in similar experiments in the context of construction bidding.

The purpose of the paper is to perform bid mark‐up optimisation through the use of artificial neural networks (ANN) and a metric of the selected bid mark‐up's derived entropy. The scope is to provide an alternative, entropy‐based method for bid mark‐up optimisation that improves on the analytical models of Friedman and Gates.

The proposed method enables the incorporation of bid parameters through the use of ANN's pattern recognition capabilities and the integration of these parameters with a mark‐up selection process that relies on the entropy produced by possible mark‐up values. The entropy metric used is the product of the probability of winning over the bidder's competitors multiplied by the natural logarithm of the inverse of this probability.

The case study results show that the proposed entropy‐based bidding model compares favourably with the prevailing competitive bidding models of Friedman and Gates, resulting in higher optimisation with regards to the number of jobs won, the monetary value of contracts awarded and the value of “money left on the table”. Furthermore, the method allows for the incorporation of several objective and subjective bid parameters, in contrast to Friedman's and Gates's models, which are based solely on the bid mark‐up history of a bidder's competitors.

While the proposed method is a useful tool for the selection of optimal bid mark‐up values, it requires historical data on the bidding behaviour of key competitors, much like the classic bidding models of Friedman and Gates.

The method is suitable for quantifying objective and subjective competitive bidding parameters and for optimising bid mark‐up values.

The reverse electronic auction is a new competitive bidding procedure adopted by the recently enacted European Community (EC) directives on public procurement. It is submitted that the electronic reverse auction has the potential to reduce the tension between the European Commission and national policies of procurement, as it can decrease contracting costs, increase transparency and achieve better economic outcomes as a result of increased competition. This paper relies on auction theory in order to support such statements. A comparison between the traditional sealed-bid method and the reverse auction is further provided.