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Traditionally, construction projects are awarded based on the lowest submitted tendering prices. However, this awarding method often causes problems on project delay, poor risk assessment and increased claims from variations. This paper aims to address these issues.

Nowadays, clients require tenderers to submit both bidding prices and contract duration. This bidding method is called an optimal price‐time bidding model, the details of which are investigated in this paper, using 24 Hong Kong private and public foundation price‐time contracts.

The results show that private foundation projects produce better time and cost savings when compared with public foundation projects, meaning that the former are generally more effective in using the optimal price‐time bidding model than in public foundation projects. To further explore the effectiveness of the price‐time bidding model, case studies from a private and a public foundation project are investigated to show that private foundation projects using the price‐time bidding model are more effective than public foundation projects.

This paper encourages contractors to consider both time and cost factors in tendering and construction processes, noting that high liquidated and ascertained damages (LAD) charges need to be applied. This can provide a “balanced environment” for contractors in the construction industry.

Essentially there are three types of competitive bids or price quotes: fixed price bids, cost‐plus markup bids, and incentive (risk‐sharing) bids. An “Expected Present Value” (EPV) model of competitive bidding is presented which establishes the requirements for the maximisation of the firm's expected present value of net worth. Reconciliation of the EPVC and the markup procedure allows an examination of the issues that must be considered in order that the firm's bid prices and quotes best serve the objective of net worth maximisation when information search costs are expected to be prohibitive. Observations suggest that firms do not attempt to maximise their net worth, preferring instead to pursue target rates of capacity utilisation and profitability. Therefore the EPVC model does not explain or predict the behaviour of all bidding firms. A behavioural model is suggested, based on the positive starting point of business practice. This enables firms to do what they do better. Based on what they already do, it holds few surprises or complexities and requires little information on complex issues and so obviates the need for substantial expenditure on search costs.

The invited tender‐bid procurement auction used by oil companies to procure intermediate inputs into oil gathering has to find solutions to several problems. Assesses the nature of these problems and the peculiarities of the operating rules designed to solve them. Develops an economic rationale for the rules, and discusses various advantages and disadvantages of the price‐discovery arrangement. Utilizes the transaction‐cost paradigm, some standard results from auction theory, and the concept of fuzzy information.

This paper gives a model of collusion formation and a method of measuring the degree of it among the traders/bidders in the agricultural commodity markets in India. The important assumption is that the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. The paper is based on full information in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The paper used the standard theory of optimization and the theory of auction and probability statistics.

This is a complete information model of cartel formation. The bidding is repetitive and continues forever in discrete time. Hence bidders behavior is observable. Using the proposed method, if the APMC measures for each market and publishes on a periodic basis, say weekly basis, then it will be easier to break the collusion in the market where relative collision is present. For example, if a farmer has three options to sell in three different markets, then the published data would help them to select the market where the degree of collusion is relatively lower. Moreover, the undesirable loss can be avoided based on the right choice of market. As a result, transaction costs will be optima.

The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

This research aims to contrast bid competitiveness with respect to the average bid auction (ABA) and the non-ABA bidding formats used by the Public Works Department (PWD) of Malaysia.

The research uses the ordinary least square regression and the Monte–Carlo simulation to point out significant predictors which affect the bid ratio and fitting probability distributions to bidding data, respectively.

This research shows that the bidding strategy adopted is dependent on the different formats used. In the ABA format, bidders are more likely to submit identical bid prices. In the non-ABA format, they bid according to the first-price auction strategy, which suggests greater variation between bid prices as a winning strategy and the reduction in the bid price to an estimated price ratio when more bidders bid.

Bidders lose more money when the distance between the project location and a firm’s operational office is greater. Best-fit probability density functions follow a gamma distribution for the ABA format and a Weibull distribution for the non-ABA format. The location and number of bidders affect bidders’ strategy to win.

This research presents empirical insights concerning the comparisons of different type of bidding formats practiced by PWD of Malaysia and its implications on the construction companies’ bidding behaviors especially when it comes to its economic consequences. The significant factors that affect the different auction mechanisms used can serve as a basis for improving the present methods employed by PWD and in other countries.

Real estate developers often operate in oligopolistic environments. Pricing strategies must be made in an interactive framework that makes empirical evaluation difficult. This study appeals to economic experiments to examine how developers price their properties, especially when there is an option to market pre‐completed units. In addition, the interaction between bidding for land and pricing the end product is examined. The results indicate that competitor actions are important considerations in pricing decisions. In particular, the profit maximizing pricing strategy depends critically on being competitive, not necessarily being the most aggressive. Interestingly, pre‐completed units sell only at prices that incorporate future price expectations, and successful bids tend to precipitate more aggressive pricing. Finally, competitive bidding and pricing strategies appear to the best profit maximizing strategy.

Choosing the best bid is a central step in any tendering process. If the award criterion is the economically most advantageous tender (EMAT), this involves scoring bids on price and quality and ranking them. Scores are calculated using a bid evaluation formula that takes as inputs price and quality, and their respective weights. The choice of formula critically affects which bid wins. We study 38 such formulas and discuss several of their aspects, such as how much the outcome of a tender depends on which formula is being used, relative versus absolute scoring, ranking paradox, iso-utility curves, protection against a winner with an extremely high price, and how a formula reflects the weights of price and quality. Based on these analyses, we summarize the (dis)advantages and risks of certain formulas and provide associated warnings when applying certain formulas in practice.

Commercial auctions of cultural goods are typically brokerage arrangements where potential buyers may consider pre-sale estimates (PSEs) in bidding. The economic theory suggests that PSEs should provide honest guidance – winning bids should, on average, equal PSEs – but available research from fine art and antique auctions finds otherwise. The authors examine this relationship for commercial auctions of fine wine – items which, unlike fine art and antiques, are widely traded so that bidders may more knowledgably interpret PSEs.

The paper examines the relationship of PSEs to winning bids econometrically for an iconic wine widely traded in several Chicago wine auctions, a novel setting for this analysis.

The relationship of winning bids to PSEs differs significantly between two neighboring auction houses, perhaps reflecting differences in how they do business; neither’s PSEs have a straightforward relationship to winning bids; PSEs have an influence on winning bids independent of a lot’s characteristics, reflecting perhaps an anchoring effect; the analysis suggests broad bidding strategies (with counter-strategies implied) and might guide auction house lot selection and ownership if more complete data became available.

The role and reliability of PSEs in auctions of other cultural goods, representing most of the literature, has limited application to auctions of fine wine whose markets differ categorically from those of other cultural goods.

Objective – This chapter examines the performance of the market to discover efficient equilibrium under alternative auction designs.

Background – Auctions are increasingly being used to allocate emissions allowances (“permits”) for cap and trade and common-pool resource management programs. These auctions create thick markets that can provide important information about changes in current market conditions.

Methodology – This chapter uses experimental methods to examine the extent to which the predicted increase in the Walrasian price due to a shift in willingness to pay (perhaps due to a shift in costs of pollution abatement) is reflected in observed sales prices under alternative auction formats.

Results – Price tracking is comparably good for uniform-price sealed-bid auctions and for multi-round clock auctions, with or without end-of-round information about excess demand. More price inertia is observed for “pay as bid” (discriminatory) auctions, especially for a continuous discriminatory format in which bids could be changed at will, in part because “sniping” in the final moments blocked the full effect of the demand shock.

Conclusion – Uniform-price auctions (clock and sealed-bid uniform-price, and continuous uniform-price) generate changes in purchase prices that are reasonably close to predicted changes. There is some evidence of tacit collusion causing prices to be too low relative to predictions in most cases. The worst price tracking was observed for discriminatory auctions.

Application – Uniform-price auctions appear to perform at least as well as other auction designs with respect to discovery of efficient market prices when there are unexpected and unannounced changes in willingness to pay for permits.

Unbalanced bidding can seriously imposed the government from obtaining the best value for the taxpayers' money in public procurement since it increases the owner's cost and decreases the fairness of the competitive bidding process. How to detect an unbalanced bid is a challenging task faced by theoretical researchers and practical actors. This study aims to develop an identification method of unbalanced bidding in the construction industry.

The identification of unbalanced bidding is considered as a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) problem. A data-driven unit price database from the historical bidding document is built to present the reference unit prices as benchmarks. According to the proposed extended TOPSIS method, the data-driven unit price is chosen as the positive ideal solution, and the unit price that has the furthest absolute distance measure as the negative ideal solution. The concept of relative distance is introduced to measure the distances between positive and negative ideal solutions and each bidding unit price. The unbalanced bidding degree is ranked by means of relative distance.

The proposed model can be used for the quantitative evaluation of unbalanced bidding from a decision-making perspective. The identification process is developed according to the decision-making process. The finding shows that the model will support owners to efficiently and effectively identify unbalanced bidding in the bid evaluation stage.

The data-driven reference unit prices improve the accuracy of the benchmark to evaluate the unbalanced bidding. The extended TOPSIS model is applied to identify unbalanced bidding; the owners can undertake objective decision-making to identify and prevent unbalanced bidding at the stage of procurement.