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Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent of alteration institutional characteristics, i.e. legal origin and corruption levels, may have on the signaling effects of auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on initial public offering (IPO) initial returns in OECD countries.

Cross-sectional data composed of 6,182 IPOs from 30 OECD countries are used for 2003-2012. Ordinary least square with multiple linear regressions is used to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that the legal framework and corruption level of a country alters the signaling effects of underwriters’ reputation, auditors’ reputation and ownership retention in an IPO environment. These three variables mitigate information asymmetry, signal firm value to potential investors and ultimately decrease IPO initial returns. This relationship is more significant in the civil law countries. Corruption levels negatively moderate the relationship in the common law and Scandinavian civil law countries but have no significance in the German and French civil law countries, indicating the importance of the signaling variables in these two civil law countries.

This study examines the extent of the alterations that the legal framework and the corruption levels cause to the signaling relationship between auditors’ reputation, underwriters’ reputation and ownership retention on IPO initial returns in selected OECD countries.

Purpose – This study examines country-level attributes that impact on Corporate Governance Disclosure (CGD) depending on the emerging market country's legal system.

Methodology/approach – We evaluate CGD level using 749 annual reports (year ended 2006) in 57 emerging market countries. We develop a CGD determinants model that compares differences in country level attributes between common law and civil law emerging market countries. Our model builds on a multiple regression and assumes interaction between the origin of the legal system and country-specific attributes.

Findings – Common law emerging markets have substantially higher levels of CGD than civil law ones. CGD is positively associated with the size of the capital market for the entire sample of emerging markets and for the sub-samples of common law and civil law countries. Law enforcement also has a strong positive influence on CGD in common law emerging countries, whereas it has no influence on CGD in civil law emerging countries.

Practical implications – Providing CGD levels for emerging markets helps to a better understanding of the corporate governance characteristics that prevail in each country. Decision makers (international investors, market authorities, standard setters, etc.) should be aware of how country level attributes may interact with the legal system (common law or civil law) to influence CGD.

Originality of the paper – This is one of the few papers to present evidence of the impact of country level attributes on CGD. This study contributes to identifying the attributes that influence CGD with reference to common law and civil law emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interaction between legal origin and cultural distance and its impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the OECD.

Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used to evaluate FDI flows into OECD countries between 2003 and 2012. Estimations use fixed effects and clustered standard errors.

FDI flows from civil to common law countries are greater than vice versa. Further, cultural distance impacts FDI flows depending on the legal origin of the source country. Specifically, more FDI flows from civil and common law countries, when the host country has a higher (lower) power distance (individualism) score. Civil law countries send more FDI into countries with higher masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and indulgence scores and with lower long-term orientation scores. The opposite is the case with common law source countries. The findings remain robust for various changes to the sample selection.

The concepts of cultural distance and legal origin have been criticized. However, neither concept has been rejected; rather, both concepts persist as robust empirical research tools.

Scholars, managers and investors can gauge the impact of cultural distance on FDI flows based on the legal family of the source country. Further, policy makers might want to consider rebranding their countries in terms of cultural perceptions to show the attractiveness of specific cultural dimensions to foreign companies and investors.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that jointly investigates FDI, legal origin and national culture.

This study examines whether and how the legal origin of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) impacts corporate investment efficiency.

The study employs a large panel dataset of firms from 32 non-USA countries from 2005 to 2018. Financial and institutional ownership data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Global and Public Ownership databases in S&P Capital IQ, respectively. The study employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with year and firm fixed effects. In addition, two-stage least squares with instrumental variable regression (2SLS-IV) and propensity score matching (PSM) approaches were employed to address the potential endogeneity.

The findings of this study suggest that common- and civil-law FIIs differ in their monitoring capabilities to promote investment efficiency. The authors find evidence that increased equity ownership by common-law FIIs, not civil-law investors, strengthens the investment-Q sensitivity, resulting in higher investment efficiency. Consistent with the monitoring and information channel, the results further indicate that the positive impact of common-law FIIs on investment efficiency is stronger in host environments susceptible to agency conflicts and information asymmetry.

This study offers novel evidence on the heterogeneous monitoring role of FIIs with regard to their home countries' legal origins and their impact on investment efficiency in an international context.

This study investigates effects of corporate governance on the financial performance of family-controlled firms and how these effects differ between common law and civil law jurisdictions.

This study applies a number of corporate governance measures to the largest 243 publicly listed family-controlled businesses worldwide from 2009 to 2018. The corporate governance measures include board independence, board gender diversity, corporate governance index (CGI) and the percentage of family ownership.

The empirical evidence indicates that board independence improves financial performance; this positive effect is more pronounced in common law than civil law jurisdictions. Board gender diversity has a negative impact on financial performance under common law but a positive impact in civil law jurisdictions. Moreover, the CGI and family ownership structure are positively associated with financial performance, and no difference is found between the two jurisdiction types. In addition, family ownership negatively moderates CGI in civil law countries only.

This study provides new insight on the relevance of considering jurisdictional differences when examining the effect of corporate governance on performance. The study also addresses important concerns in family business research relating to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. Implications of these for research and practice are discussed in the paper.

Precontractual liability may be imposed when a party acts in bad faith to damage the other party, when a party negotiates in order to discover business secrets with no intention of reaching a final agreement, or when a party to a non‐binding letter of intent terminates negotiations during a later phase of negotiations without legitimate reason. The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of the duty to negotiate in good faith, either for Civil Law or Common Law system practitioners.

The paper describes the concept of good faith and fair dealing and its effects on the negotiation process. After establishing this description, we will analyze the differences in the interpretation and the application of the concept of good faith in the pre‐contractual procedure. The article explores the Civil Law approach for this matter, followed by the Common Law approach. In order to illustrate the Common Law System, we will focus on English and American Law, while we will look mainly at German, Brazilian and French Law to illustrate the Civil Law. In the conclusion, we will compare the approaches of the two systems.

The obligation of good faith in negotiation is found practically in all civil law system countries and generally provides a remedy for a wrongful conduct produced by a bad faith act. However, there is no general rule in Common Law requiring the parties to negotiate in good faith. We are in favor of applying a more expansive view of good faith obligations for international business transactions involving two or more different countries from these two different legal systems (civil law and common law), so as to apply them to the duty to negotiate arising from preliminary agreements and negotiations.Although there is no general rule about pre‐contractual liability in the common law system, we strongly believe that the existing body of case law and statutes may punish a party which engages in unfair conduct at the pre‐contract stage if the parties had signed a letter of intent or a memorandum of understanding, requiring them expressly and clearly to “act in good faith” and/or “to use their best efforts to reach an agreement”.

This article has discussed a relatively unexplored area related to the obligation of good faith in negotiation either for civil law and common law's practitioners. Our research has highlighted the complexity of this matter between these two legal systems, and has helped to the identification of the concept of good faith in a relation between two or more parties.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

Integrated reporting (IR) has been proposed to “reform” corporate financial statements, fill gaps in existing reporting practices and provide a better understanding of financial and nonfinancial information in an integrated manner. The purpose of this study aims to provide empirical evidence of the role of IR in mediating the effect of ownership structure on firm performance.

Structural equation modeling on panel data are used to study the impact of the role of IR in mediating the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. The present empirical study was based on a sample of 431 European firms belonging to common or civil law between 2012 and 2020.

Based on empirical results, this study shows that IR plays a mediating role in the relationship between ownership structure attributes (ownership concentration, institutional ownership and managerial ownership) and the performance of European common law firms. In civil law countries, it only has a mediating effect on the relationship between institutional ownership and performance.

This study provides evidence for IR, ownership structure and firm performance. This chapter highlights the global need for a generally accepted set of standards for sustainability and IR practices.

This paper aims to examine the link between financing patterns, information asymmetry and legal traditions in 37 countries during the 1990‐2004 period.

The analysis is based on three theories: the trade‐off theory, pecking order hypothesis and market timing hypothesis. The authors test the predictions of these theories/hypotheses using regression analysis. The econometric method used is panel data with firm and country fixed effects. The authors develop a modified pecking order model which controls for short‐ and long‐term debt level changes and simultaneously test the predictions of all theories.

Consistent with studies for US firms, the results show that firms across all countries adjust toward the target leverage, but with significantly different rate. The long‐term debt contribution in the rate of adjustment is 64 percent in common law countries and 51 percent in civil law countries. The ability of the model to explain changes in leverage ratios is higher in common law countries. The authors find support for market timing hypothesis but no support for pecking order of financing. These results support their conjecture that stronger investor protection, higher transparency and well‐developed financial markets in common law countries reduce the cost of recapitalization.

The limitation of this study comes from lack of data availability to measure contract enforcement, transparency, and corporate governance variables. Future research can incorporate these variables to explain the differences in capital structure decisions across countries with different legal systems.

The findings show that firms' capital structure decisions are not only a function of their own characteristics but also the result of legal and financial market development in which they operate.

This is the first study that sheds light about rate of adjustment to optimal capital structure and pecking order of financing in 37 countries with different legal traditions and financial market developments. The authors are not aware of any other study that uses a modified pecking order model in an international context.