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Collateral consequences (CCs) of criminal convictions such as disenfranchisement, occupational restrictions, exclusions from public housing, and loss of welfare benefits represent one of the salient yet hidden features of the contemporary American penal state. This chapter explores, from a comparative and historical perspective, the rise of the many indirect “regulatory” sanctions flowing from a conviction and discusses some of the unique challenges they pose for legal and policy reform. US jurisprudence and policies are contrasted with the more stringent approach adopted by European legal systems and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in safeguarding the often blurred line between criminal punishments and formally civil sanctions. The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to contribute to a better understanding of the overreliance of the US criminal justice systems on CCs as a device of social exclusion and control, and (2) to put forward constructive and viable reform proposals aimed at reinventing the role and operation of collateral restrictions flowing from criminal convictions.

Pledging collateral to secure loans is a prominent feature in financing contracts around the world. Existing theories disagree on why borrowers pledge collateral. It is even more challenging to understand why in some countries collateral coverage exceeds, for example, 300% of the value of a loan. This study looks at the association between collateral coverage and country-level governance and various institutional proxies. It investigates the economic implications of steep collateral coverage and sketches policy options to lower ex-ante asymmetric information and ex-post agency problems. Within this framework, should a lender collect the debt forcibly on default and liquidated assets fetch prices below outstanding loan values, the lender’s loss is covered through credit insurance, which would significantly reduce the need for steep collateral coverage. This proposal may increase level of private credit, investment and growth; particularly, in a number of developing countries where collateral spread is the main inhibitor of finance.

Faced with the financing problem of small-medium enterprises (SMEs), China has attempted to establish as many as third party's collateral institutions. The paper aims to study the design of collateral arrangements including collateral fee rates, risk sharing, collateral capital requirements, types of collateral institutions and recollateral institution, etc.

The paper extends the model of Holmstrom and Tirole to develop the analytic framework of the theory of financing collateral. From the perspective of contract design, the paper establishes a moral hazard model focusing on the minimum capital requirement of the borrower under the condition of risk neutral and limited liability, while considering the structure of lender-collateral institution-borrower.

According to the research, only under certain conditions can third party's collateral arrangements tackle the financing problems of SMEs. Diversification, anti-collateral and linked-transactions are three means to improve financing conditions, but the most important way is efficient monitoring by collateral institutions, especially when it has relative advantage over the lender. In order to improve financing conditions of SMEs, China should rely more on efficient monitoring by banks not on excess development of collateral institutions, meanwhile relax rigid collateral supervision policies. Collateral institutions should be industry-specific, association or transaction-related type.

First, from the perspective of contract design, the paper analyzes the comprehensive institutional arrangements of third party's collateral considering mutual relationships of component elements and develops the analytic framework of the theory of third party's collateral, especially points out necessary conditions of its efficient arrangements. Second, the paper studies various efficient financing mechanisms under the institutional arrangements of third party's collateral and focusing on the role of monitoring and monitors, and the paper also has important policy implications, i.e. the paper should develop specific collateral institutions and promote monitoring role of credit institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether guarantees characterised by different degrees of relationship lending (particularly referring to collateral and guarantees provided by Mutual Loan Guarantee Institutions) are able to convey some entrepreneurial orientation (EO) dimensions from firms to banks.

Exploiting data from a survey of Austrian and Italian SMEs, the empirical analysis is based on a sample of 328 small business firms. To test the signalling hypothesis, the authors used logistic regressions to assess the explanatory power of EO dimensions on the presence of several types of guarantees.

The analyses suggest that collateral cannot signal any EO dimension, even when controlling for the strength of the bank – firm relationship. Furthermore, SMEs are able to mitigate their financial risk through collateral only in a multiple bank – firm relationship. Lastly, innovativeness, competitive energy and aggressiveness allow SMEs to obtain external guarantees (mutual guarantees, bank guarantees and public guarantees, respectively), helpful in order to promote credit access.

The mediation role of collateral and external guarantees on EO – credit access relation should be analysed in future research. Since the role of guarantees can change among different bank lending technologies, further studies should carefully consider lender’s characteristics. Lastly, the use of loan data in respect of the firm data can help to better separate the effect of loan and firm attributes on the collateral.

The study suggests how managers and entrepreneurs should manage the financial risk through collateral in different situations (one–to–one and multiple bank – firm relationship). Furthermore, depending on the level of innovativeness, competitive energy and aggressiveness, a firm should request a specific type of external guarantees in order to increment the credit availability, to maximise the possibility of success and to improve its performance.

To the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyse whether EO affects the request for guarantees instead of credit access. This can be helpful especially when the banks involved in the relation apply a transaction lending technology.

The purpose of this paper is to establish whether or not the absence of registered property titles is a barrier to credit access amongst small to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana.

The study involved the conducting of surveys amongst credit officers of financial institutions in Ghana; participants were from both microfinance institutions and universal banks. To achieve the aim of this study the survey was designed to study the attitudes of credit officers towards the use of property as security for SME credit. Their experiences in handling such issues were captured through a series of closed ended questions. Participants were randomly sampled and the data analysed descriptively using SPSS.

The results amongst other things show that most formal lenders accept landed property for collateral purposes irrespective of whether they are covered by registered property titles or not. Also found were differences existing between traditional banks and the microfinance institutions.

Small businesses are exposed to several challenges which hinder their growth and have potential to contribute to the overall agenda of poverty reduction. Prominent amongst these challenges is the difficulty in raising funds for investments purposes. Whilst some have attributed this to the lack of assets which could be used as collateral, others have argued that it is the result of the absence of formal property titles which have made land an unacceptable form of collateral. Previous studies have focused on the demand side however; the supply side is the focus of this study.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the consequences of the “safe harbor” provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code that were enacted from 1984 through 2005 and that protect certain financial contracts from standard bankruptcy procedures.

Qualitative methods are used to evaluate whether these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were successful in their stated goal of reducing systemic risk in the financial system. A model of systemic risk is presented verbally in order to frame the discussion.

Recent evidence indicates that the “safe harbor” provisions, in fact, destabilized the financial system by encouraging collateralized interbank lending, discouraging careful analysis of the credit risk of counterparties and increasing the risk that creditors will run on a financial firm.

This paper indicates that the rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code to favor financial firms has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the financial system. To put the financial system on more secure foundations, the author proposes that large complex financial institutions be prohibited from posting collateral on over the counter derivative transactions and that the repo‐related bankruptcy amendments passed in 2005 be repealed.

This paper proposes an original framework for understanding systemic risk which drives the results in the paper.

This study examines whether insider share ownership and personal share collateral affect corporate payout decisions.

This study estimates logit, Tobit and ordinary least squares regression models to explore how insider ownership is related to share repurchase probability, completion rates and the long-term performance following the repurchase announcements and how insider share collateral affects the above associations.

The results show that insider share ownership is negatively associated with the probability of announcing share repurchases and repurchase completion rates and is positively associated with the firm's post-announcement performance. This study further explores the incentive of insiders with high share collateral announcing share repurchases under a threat of margin call. For firms with a high percentage of insider share collateral, the results show that insider share ownership is associated with higher repurchase probability but is associated with lower repurchase completion rates and poorer post-announcement performance.

This study clarifies the interrelationships between insider ownership, insider share collateral and decisions in share repurchases and subsequent performance. This study provides evidence for both the convergence of interest and the entrenchment theories.

The purpose of this article is to determine the optimal use of collateral in order to maximize the borrower's wealth by reducing the interest rate payments. This analysis is to shed light on the fundamental question whether good or bad borrowers pledge more collateral.

The analysis bases on a simple firm value model similar to Merton's but with the additional feature that the borrower can bring in collateral. This article not only presents the case with perfect information between borrowers and lenders but also regards the consequences arising from asymmetric information.

A bad borrower, who is characterized by higher bankruptcy costs, riskier projects, and a lower contribution to the project value, typically pledges more collateral than a good borrower. These relationships base on the existence of perfect information between borrowers and lenders. If asymmetric information in terms of the project's riskiness or the contribution of the borrower to the project is present, these relationships invert and good borrowers tend to pledge more collateral. As a result, the allocation of information between a borrower and a lender is crucial for the optimal choice of collateral.

This research underlines the potential for firms to add firm value by pledging collateral because collateral reduces interest rates and therefore results in more attractive terms of the loan. On the other hand, further empirical research can be done to verify our theoretical finding that under perfect information bad borrowers pledge more collateral, while under asymmetric information primarily good borrowers use collateral.

This paper introduces a new motive for the use of collateral and explains – in contrast to many other theoretical models – why bad borrowers tend to pledge more collateral.

The paper's aim is to explain the rules the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has adopted for the segregation of cleared swaps customers' collateral as mandated by the Dodd‐Frank Act.

The paper discusses: the deliberations that led the commission to arrive at the legal separation with operational commingling model (“LSOC”) as the regulatory standard; the characteristics of the LSOC model; and the possible future enhancements to the segregation framework under consideration by the commission, including the guaranteed clearing participant model.

Although the commission has adopted the final rules that will implement LSOC as the segregation model for cleared swaps, a number of significant issues remain open and are likely to be revisited by the commission. Additional changes to the segregation framework may be proposed as the lessons of the MF Global Bankruptcy proceedings become evident.

Practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers is provided by the paper.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the compliance with the regulatory-driven changes to collateral management and OIS discounting indicating operational and technological challenges faced by global investment banks. As it transpires, collateral management strategies need to be revised to find optimal solutions for the regulatory-driven landscape. Furthermore, set against the regulatory background, this report tests the reliability of OIS discounting and current trends in interbank lending, as well as emergent issues with CSAs.

This paper is based on an exploratory, qualitative approach to investigate the regulatory-driven collateral management landscape.

The new regulatory framework was viewed by the surveyed banks as a factor influencing strategic planning and operations within collateral management. All surveyed banks pointed to the increased regulatory reporting. The interviewed banks highlighted inconsistencies in implementing the new regulatory framework across different countries. With reference to the positive factors influencing collateral management, the responses were mixed and depended on bank-specific opportunities spotted in the new collateral management landscape. According to the surveyed banks, complying with the new regulations has no pronounced impact on the liquidity. The financial scandals undermined the credibility of the LIBOR rate-setting processes and prompted changes to the regulatory framework in the banking sector. Against this backdrop, the interviewed banks considered various alternatives to LIBOR, often beyond the OIS rates. The departure from LIBOR entails operational challenges faced by the participating banks. Surprisingly, the factors that pushed the interviewed banks to OIS discounting were not linked to the regulatory change or reliability of OIS rates but general market trends that emerged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

The paper contributes to the widespread, albeit complex, discussion on how banks adapt to the rapidly changing environment in collateral management and risk operations.