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Social movements are made up of organized groups and individuals working together to accomplish shared objectives. Under what circumstances do active groups build and break their coalitions? Five conditions have been identified in the literature as influencing coalition formation: common identity, resources, organizational structure, historical connection, and institutional setting. Whereas coalition dynamics within a movement wave are best understood in terms of institutional opportunities and threats, further research is needed to determine how and to what extent these contextual elements influence coalitions. This chapter examines how threats posed by indiscriminate and selective repression affect the shape and structure of interorganizational coalitions during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) protests in Hong Kong. The analysis relies on an original political event dataset and an organization-event network dataset. These datasets were produced utilizing syntactic event coding techniques based on Telegram posts, which Hong Kong protesters used to distribute information, plan future actions, and crowdsource news. Furthermore, Telegram provides detailed information about state activities, event-level coalitions, and violent groups, which is difficult to access from other sources. This study investigates the coalition networks across the movement's four stages, each of which was marked by a particular type and degree of repression. The findings indicate that indiscriminate and selective repression have varied effects on coalition networks. A wide coalition disintegrates as a result of indiscriminate repression. Selective repression, however, leads to the formation of coalitions around activist groups targeted by repression.

The authors characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game.

In contrast to the existing literature, the authors do not assume that after splitting, players will adopt Markovian strategies. Instead, the authors assume that while the splitting country plays Markovian, the remaining coalition remains committed to the collective control of pollution and plays open-loop.

Within a full linear-quadratic model, the authors characterize the optimal strategies. The authors later compare with the outcomes of the case where the splitting country and the remaining coalition play both Markovian. The authors highlight several interesting results in terms of the implications for long-term pollution levels and the duration of coalitions under heterogenous strategies as compared to Markovian behavior.

In this paper, the authors have illustrated the richness of the simplications of enlarging the set of strategies in terms of the emergence of coalitions, their duration and the implied welfare levels per player. Varying only three parameters (the technological gap, pollution damage and coalition payoff share distribution across players), the authors have been able to generate, among other findings, quite different rankings of welfare per player depending on whether the remaining coalitions after split play Markovian or stay precommited to the pre-splitting period decisions.

This paper aims to extend the Shapley value (SV) into a discussion of Zakat, a Pillar of Islam. Lloyd Shapley was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012. This study shows that their relationship is significant for all nations, that of levelling up. An important but neglected paper by Datta (1939) showed insights provided by the Power Law, or as it is sometimes called, the Pareto distribution, into the role of Zakat in raising the income of all above the subsistence level. The Pareto distribution describes the prevailing tendency. The SV illustrates the interdependence perspective of Zakat with the Pareto distribution, wealth, income and poverty. Payoffs apply equally to both givers and receivers. For this study’s purposes, payoffs are considered as transferable utilities. They are formed by individuals who willingly cooperate in society rather than atomistic individuals who act independently. Zakat represents the recognition that society needs to be cooperative rather than individualistic; people cooperate in groups or societies to create value. SV implications and axioms are evaluated with an illustration.

This study extends Datta’s approach by introducing distribution weights into the SV. The authors set out the concept of weighted Shapley values that retain the elements of randomness and marginal contribution to a coalition contained in pure/true SVs and weights that follow a ley-Pareto distribution. This paper is a viewpoint work that relies primarily on the author’s qualitative interpretation.

The findings indicate that individual members of a coalition make multiple contributions that are often unrewarded. The contribution of one member of a coalition is dependent upon the contribution of others. The measure of contributions is payoffs, which have both monetary and non-monetary aspects; transferable payoffs or utilities are usually assumed. Furthermore, the significant agents in society or an organisation are stakeholders rather than the usual categories: managers, staff, shareholders, etc.

Contextualising these concepts within the Islamic values and principles that guide Zakat administration is crucial to ensure that the distribution of Zakat funds is fair, equitable and meets the needs of all eligible recipients. By applying these concepts appropriately, Zakat administrators can ensure that the Zakat system functions effectively and fulfils its religious obligation.

The novelty of this paper is that it blends the SV and the idea behind Zakat by introducing the idea of alternatives of Shapley weights. The link between the institution of Zakat and SV in terms of equality, poverty elimination and wealth distribution should be at the top of the research agenda.

This study aims to examine consumers’ responses to two types of loyalty programs: coalition and single-firm programs. This study explains the mechanism underlying the link between this program structure and consumers’ program evaluation by incorporating the type of firm offering the program (i.e. a more hedonic or a more utilitarian disposition), the type of rewards (i.e. presence/absence of experiential rewards) and consumers’ reactance.

Two online experiments were employed to test the proposed framework.

Consumers commonly preferred a coalition program to a single-firm program. This preference for the coalition program was strengthened when a utilitarian-dominant firm offered the program. Additionally, consumers evaluated the program lower when a utilitarian-dominant firm provided experiential rewards. Furthermore, situational reactance toward the program mediated the effect of the program structure on the program evaluation.

This study’s findings suggest that firms should consider whether the value consumers predominantly perceive from the firms is utilitarian or hedonic when launching coalition programs. Consumers may not be pleased by the coalition programs offered by hedonic-dominant firms as much as those provided by utilitarian-dominant firms. Moreover, this study’s results help design reward options. Consumers may not well evaluate the inclusion of experiential rewards when offered by utilitarian-dominant firms. For utilitarian-dominant firms, rewards requiring less time and effort may be more suitable.

This research significantly contributes to the literature on loyalty programs. This study showed that consumers viewed single-firm and coalition programs differently and elucidated the mechanism behind the response.

Worldwide academia is going through a major transformation because of Open Science and Recognition and Rewards movements that are linked to big societal challenges such as climate change, digitalization, growing inequality, migration, political instability, democracies under threat and combinations of these challenges. The transformations affect the human resource management (HRM) and talent management of universities. The main focus of this chapter is on collaborative innovation and the way universities participate in coalitions and strategic alliances on national and international levels. These platforms not only discuss the transformations and support the academic changes but also act as talent pools and talent exchange. This chapter provides an overview of the current state of affairs with respect to Open Science and Recognition and Rewards in academia. Next, a theoretical foundation is presented on the concepts of collaborative innovation, coopetition and HRM innovation in general. The leaders or leading organizations in the HRM innovation models often can’t make it happen on their own, in particular in highly institutionalized contexts such as academia. The legitimacy of transformations requires coalitions of the willing and therefore strategic alliances on different levels. The coalitions in academia can also contribute to academic talent management through sectoral transformations (see Recognition and Rewards) and through the way these coalitions operate.

Social enterprises are embedded in ecosystems with multiple actors interested in the field’s growth. One way to enhance social enterprises is through public policies and developing countries like Brazil included this in the public agenda. After an important mobilization of private organizations and public managers, the Brazilian federal government implemented in 2017 the National Impact Investment and Business Strategy (ENIMPACTO) renamed in 2023 to National Impact Economy Strategy with the same abbreviation. Since its creation, ENIMPACTO saw significant modifications leading to a decree in 2023 extending its mandate, amplifying membership and changing its name to the National Impact Economy Strategy while maintaining the same acronym. This experience leads us to the following question: How was ENIMPACTO created and developed?

We used institutional arrangements and advocacy coalition theory to analyze the key elements that contributed to ENIMPACTO’s creation and its evolution through time. A qualitative, single-case study on the Brazilian experience implementing ENIMPACTO was conducted through semi-structured interviews with national strategy members, participant observation, document and data analysis.

We argue that advocacy coalition and institutional arrangements frameworks combined are needed to understand Enimpacto’s complexity. The strategy presented an extensive multiple-actor articulation involving shared beliefs that were also important to gather support on recreating and expanding Enimpacto when external events threatened its continuity. Yet, it presented important challenges on how to achieve consensus and alignment regarding important concepts and regulation strategy among the actors and manage the public policy governance and activities implementation.

We combine institutional arrangements and advocacy coalition frameworks and apply them to analyze a public policy composed of actors of multiple sectors that play an active advocacy coalition role. We also present empirical evidence that elements of the advocacy coalition framework add analytical elements to institutional arrangements literature and how they affect each other. We point to two important elements of the institutional arrangements framework (territoriality and subsidiarity) that were not initially considered by ENIMPACTO and were later incorporated because of tensions in the field. We provide empirical evidence of the incipient role that public administration can play in promoting social enterprises' agenda that might base similar strategies to boost social enterprises in other locations.

This paper aims to determine the conditions for the core of the Triple Helix game to exist. The Triple Helix of university-industry-government relationships is a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility. Then, the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus were used as indicators of the synergy within an innovation system. Whereas the Shapley value and the nucleolus always exist, the core may not.

The core of a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility exists only if and only if the game is convex. The paper applies the convexity condition to the Triple Helix game.

The Triple Helix game is convex if and only if there is output within the system; it is strictly convex if and only if all the three bilateral and the trilateral relationships have an output.

Convex games are competitive situations in which there are strong incentives towards the formation of large coalitions; therefore, innovation actors must cooperate to maximise their interests. Furthermore, a Triple Helix game may be split into subgames for comprehensive analyses and several Triple Helix games may be combined for a global study.

This paper extends the meaning of the Shapley value and the nucleolus for Triple Helix innovation actors: the Shapley value indicates the quantity a player wins because of the coalitions he involves in and the nucleolus the return for solidarity of an innovation actor.