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In order to allow flexibility in the enforcement of the tax law, the language used is often intentionally vague and ambiguous. This enables the government to implement the intent of the lawmakers in administering that law. However, interpreting these vague and ambiguous laws requires tax professionals to face planning situations that are complex and uncertain. Due to an increase in civil litigation, the importance of tax professionals making defensible decisions has been magnified in recent years. Carnes, et al. (1994) report that tax partners with Big‐Six accounting firms spend about 30 to 45 percent of their time resolving ambiguous tax questions. Therefore, tax professionals could benefit from models or systems (i.e., decision support systems, expert systems, artificial intelligence) that provide decision direction when facing ambiguous tax situations. One such area in which tax professionals must assist their clients is the determination of what levels of compensation are reasonable for owner‐employees of closely‐held corporations (Hagan, et al. 1995).

This study aims to investigate the relationship between boardroom gender diversity (BoGD) and risk-taking by property-liability (P-L) stock insurers from an analytical framework that control for organizational form and ownership structure. It relies on the behavioral agency model, the resource dependency theory and the concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW).

This study builds on an unbalanced panel of 2,285 firm-year observations from 232 European and US P-L stock insurers covering the period 2010–2019 and measure risk-taking by using four proxies: total risk (TR), upside risk (UpR), downside risk (DwR) and default risk (DR). Reverse causality and endogeneity concerns are treated by applying different approaches.

Findings suggest that BoGD mitigates the TR, DwR and DR but does not interfere with the UpR, which conceptualizes firm expectations to enhance patrimony and safeguard SEW for heirs, especially in family-owned insurers. The findings hold in various robustness checks including endogeneity and alternative specifications of BoGD and risk-taking.

This study contributes to practice by contrasting the role of female directors’ bevahior when assuming risk, which seems significantly different depending on the risk-taking specification and the organizational form. The author advises policyholders and policymakers to look at closely on BoGD and ownership structure as they affect insurance company risk-taking.

This study takes a more direct approach to highlight the BoGD’s effect on corporate risk-taking by focusing on the insurance sector which is characterized by risk and uncertainty bearing. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to consider the full range of the stock organizational forms and the degree of family control in displaying this effect in both widely traded and closely traded insurers and to assess risk-taking from both market-based and accounting-based aspects.

To analyse the net present value (NPV) rule for corporate investments incorporating shareholder personal taxes, under the classical system of taxing corporate profits.

The after‐tax payoffs to shareholders are calculated, comparing immediate distribution as dividends of corporate funds available for investment with future after‐tax dividend distributions if corporate funds are invested.

Shareholders will disagree on the optimal corporate NPV rule. If, as in widely held public companies, corporate management are unaware of the marginal personal tax rate of shareholders, then the only rule which will accept investment projects that no shareholder would want the company to reject, is the rule which discounts after‐corporate‐tax cash flows at a before‐tax discount rate.

The analysis is based on the classical system of taxing corporate profits. A number of countries have adopted an integrated system of corporate taxation. The analysis may or may not extend to such alternative systems.

Simplifies the choice of NPV rules for corporate management, under a classical tax system.

The widely held view that after‐corporate‐tax discount rates should be used in discounting after‐corporate‐tax cash flows is shown to be inadequate.

This paper aims to investigate the motivations behind the publication of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, and particularly the effect of information asymmetry between firms and their owners.

A natural experiment contrasting the CSR reporting of private vs public firms is used to test whether the degree of information asymmetry is a significant factor in the decision to publish CSR reports. Using a hand-collected sample of the 239 largest US private companies matched with publicly-traded firms, the effect of these inherently different information environments on CSR reporting is tested through logistic regression. Factors suggested by stakeholder and legitimacy theories are tested for their differential impact on private vs public firms’ decisions to publish a CSR report.

Results indicate that private firms are less likely to publish a CSR report than similar public firms. Public firms also follow Global Reporting Initiative guidelines more frequently, consistent with signaling report quality to dispersed investors. A subsample of private companies facing greater information asymmetry is found to be similar to public firms in their reporting behavior, reinforcing the link between information asymmetry and CSR disclosure. Further analysis suggests that non-owner stakeholders play an important role in private companies’ CSR reporting decisions.

In addition to accounting and governance scholars, the findings should interest private firm managers preparing for an initial public offering (IPO), as the evidence suggests that CSR reporting is used to communicate information to dispersed investors. The insight into reporting motivations should be useful to accountants engaged in CSR consultation and assurance.

With the growing attention paid to the CSR performance of firms, demonstrated by the growth in socially responsible investing, the study provides evidence that effective communication of CSR information to investors may play a key role in CSR-engaged firms’ disclosure strategies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the CSR reporting decisions of a large sample of publicly-traded and privately-held firms. The results add to our understanding of what motivates firms to publish CSR reports, highlighting the importance of information asymmetry between the firm and its owners.

This paper aims to explore the differing attitudes of salaried chief financial officers (CFOs) that can be associated with agency theory and stewardship theory. CFO attitudes are investigated because CFOs typically face additional agency conflict in their roles as overseers of the financial and accounting functions that are responsible for the production of numerical information used as a basis for incentive compensation.

A qualitative field study of 14 large privately held Austrian manufacturing companies was conducted. The findings rely on information retrieved from 18 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals from these companies.

The findings reveal a number of contextual factors that influence stewardship and agency attitudes of salaried CFOs. CFOs, who mainly report formally to owners, perceive more control in the hands of the owners. Short-term management appointments appear to facilitate agency-like behavior, whereas the existence of owner–managers and the typical CFO's maturity in terms of age and wealth seem to nurture stewardship behavior.

Further (quantitative) research is needed to corroborate the findings in this study, which are derived from a qualitative research approach. Further research on agency and stewardship behavior should also include the view of principal with respect to agent actions, as this paper shows that principal opinion strongly affects the way agents perceive control.

The findings suggest that the behavior of company owners can influence and change a manager's agency or stewardship attitude. Owners who desire a culture of stewardship should set long-term goals and facilitate long-term management appointments. Moreover, owners can lower a manager's perceived level of owner control by adopting an active role in management.

This paper is the first to analyze stewardship and agency attitude of salaried CFOs in privately held companies. It, therefore, adds to the current literature on the role of the CFO, as well as to the literature on governance issues in privately held firms.

Crime, fraud, and corruption, are all nouns that pertain to the act of deception that depicts an intention to increase an opportunity in one's favor in an unlawful manner that pertains to an organization's interest and goals. Such offenses are numerous and quite costly and are now a commonplace criminal behavior within corporations. Motivations and purposes for corruption may be subjective but the legality of corruption is not. Thus, the rhetorical interpretations of corruption may be analyzed through two distinctive paradigms, the social behavioral science paradigm and the legality paradigm. This paper seeks to address this issue.

Court cases were analyzed, 70 major American corporations, in addition to a study of the largest industrial firms focused upon a two‐year period.

Based on the above samples, it was found that corporate corruptions are extremely common, but taboo to admit. The limitations to this study are accessibility, participants, and whistle‐blowers.

Implementing organizational guidelines (OG) is one appropriate and objective method in addressing corporate corruption and to confirm corporate compliance. While implementing the OG is objective, the process of implementing the OG is subjective. Subjectivity derives from opportunistic interpretations of the imperfect OG. Objective interpretation and objective implementation of the OG will confirm corporate compliance, and it is the CEO's responsibility to oversee this process.

Demonstrates how the human resource element of a small business can be accounted for by Economic Value Added (EVA), as used in the incorporation of equity costs in the valuation of divisions of large companies. Commends the EVA approach as providing a more consistent valuation estimate in the light of an increase in the proportion of human capital.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an exploration on how important are “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of family-controlled corporations in Malaysia. Three important groups of block-holders are identified for the purpose, namely the “foreign institutional investors”, the “domestic institutional investors” and the “government”.

The sample was drawn based on the companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. All the relevant block-holders’ ownership data are hand-collected from the annual reports published by the listed corporations and descriptive statistics together with regression analysis are employed.

Overall it is found that the presence of a second block-holder in family-controlled corporations leads to better performance compared to the corporations where the controlling families act as the sole block-holder. Moreover, this study finds that the identity of the block-holders with the extent of their ownership is important in explaining the performance. Specifically, “foreign institutional investors” and “government” are found to be significant in terms of the extent of their equity holdings and the performance of these corporations, respectively. Conversely, no such relationship is found in the equity holdings of “domestic institutional investors” and the corporation performance. Such finding may imply the possible limited ability and constraints faced by the “domestic institutional investors” in Malaysia to exert effective monitoring and pressure on the management for enhanced corporation performance.

Many studies researched the influence of family ownership on the performance of family-controlled corporations but there are limited studies conducted on the influence of “other block-holders” in affecting the performance of these corporations. This paper is an attempt to provide an initial exploration on how important are these “other block-holders” in explaining the performance of these corporations in the context of a small emerging economy, Malaysia.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the profitability of different ownership forms of banks. The two ownership forms are corporations that elect to be taxed as a Subchapter S corporation (limited to 100 shareholders) as opposed to those corporations that do not make this election. The impact this election has on the dividends paid to the investors is examined.

This paper uses Call Report Data on Wisconsin banks as collected by SNL Securities as its database. The research methodology uses two measures of performance: dividend ratio and accounting return on assets (ROA). The dividend ratio is defined as dividends as a percentage of net income (dividends/net income). Accounting return on investment is net income as a percentage of total assets (net income/total assets) and is a measure of profitability. A number of regressions were created with these as the endogenenous variables and a heteroskedasticity‐corrected ordinary least squares (OLS) model was used.

Subchapter S banks were found to be more profitable (as measured by ROA). However, when taxes are taken into account, there is no practical difference in profitability between the two types of corporate structure.

By limiting the analysis to Wisconsin, a single state, confusion that may be caused by both state laws (personal and corporate) and local corporate cultures is avoided.

The practical implications of this research can guide the federal government in determining whether this form of stock ownership is a device that reduces or increases federal tax revenues. It can also provide insight to the stockholders of these banks into the differences in profitability these corporate forms offer.

While earlier literature has reviewed the concept of Subchapter S corporations and its theoretical impact, little research has been conducted that tests the actual results. Due to the private nature of the corporate form (these types of corporations are often not publicly traded and have no incentive to reveal private financial records), this original research is the result of the public nature of banks that provide a rich dataset for us to examine.

The paper presents an overview of perspectives on corporate governance grounded in the Common Law legal traditions of the UK and the USA. It further discusses whether that perspective is suitable for global application.

The paper presents personal observations on the operational dynamics of rules and practices of corporate governance as necessary functional supports for large scale financial capitalization of enterprise under conditions of modern industrialization.

The paper concludes that the US perspective on corporate governance is rationally related to objective requirements of financing enterprise and that, as capital markets become larger and more liquid around the world, the corporate governance regimes will, in the main, come to resemble the US model. Though cultural variations on the US pattern are compatible with the purposes of corporate governance to constrain abuse of power in private corporations.

The implication of this paper is for the implementation of corporate governance regimes in emerging market countries, i.e. that flexibility is permissible but a focus on transparency and accountability under all circumstances is required.

The contribution of the paper is to provide a framework for balancing the rules and practices of US corporate governance with the cultural styles and patterns of different national regulatory settings.