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The management issues of this article, and the author is attempting to address these issues, are as follows: What is the optimal decision of each entity in the closed-loop supply chain for the cascading utilization of power batteries under three government measures: no subsidies, subsidies and rewards and punishments? How do different measures affect the process of cascading the utilization of power batteries? Which measures will help incentivize cascading utilization and battery recycling efforts?

The paper uses game analysis methods to study the optimal decisions of various stakeholders in the supply chain under the conditions of subsidies, non-subsidies and reward and punishment policies. The impact of various parameters on the returns of game entities is tested through Matlab numerical simulation.

The analysis discovered that each party in the supply chain will see an increase in earnings if the government boosts trade-in subsidies, which means that the degree of recycling efforts of each entity will also increase; under the condition with subsidies, the recycling efforts and echelon utilization rates of each stakeholder are higher than those under the incentive and punishment measure. In terms of the power battery echelon’s closed-loop supply chain incentive, the subsidy policy exceeds the reward and punishment policy.

The article takes the perspective of differential games and considers the dynamic process of exchanging old for new, providing important value for the practice of using old for new behavior in the closed-loop supply chain of power battery cascading utilization.

This paper explores how the existence of a second-hand market can affect remanufacturing decisions for durable goods in the presence of patent protection.

The authors construct a dynamic decision model between a durable goods original manufacturer and a durable goods remanufacturer considering the characteristics of the multi-cycle uses of new durable goods and remanufactured durable goods.

The results show that (1) the second-hand market compresses the cost space of a durable goods original manufacturer and a remanufacturer; (2) when the second-hand market exists, the optimal pricing of new durable goods is reduced, the optimal pricing of remanufactured durable goods is increased and the patent cost of each unit of durable goods increases and (3) the presence of the second-hand market will increase the original manufacturer's and remanufacturer's profits.

The research conclusion has certain reference value for the production strategy selection of each enterprise in the process of patented product remanufacturing and the government's fiscal policy formulation at each stage of the remanufacturing industry's development.

To maximize the network total profit by calculating the difference between costs and revenue (first objective function). To maximize the positive impact on the environment by integrating GSCM factors in RL (second objective function). To calculate the efficiency of disassembly centers by SDEA method, which are selected as suppliers and maximize the total efficiency (third objective function). To evaluate the resources and total efficiency of the proposed model to facilitate the allocation resource process, to increase resource efficiency and to improve the efficiency of disassembly centers by Inverse DEA.

The design of a closed-loop logistics network for after-sales service for mobile phones and digital cameras has been developed by the mixed-integer linear programming method (MILP). Development of MILP method has been performed by simultaneously considering three main objectives including: total network profit, green supply chain factors (environmental sustainability) and maximizing the efficiency of disassembly centers. The proposed model of study is a six-level, multi-objective, single-period and multi-product that focuses on electrical waste. The efficiency of product return centers is calculated by SDEA method and the most efficient centers are selected.

The results of using the model in a case mining showed that, due to the use of green factors in network design, environmental pollution and undesirable disposal of some electronic waste were reduced. Also, with the reduction of waste disposal, valuable materials entered the market cycle and the network profit increased.

(1) Design a closed-loop reverse logistics network for after-sales services; (2) Introduce a multi-objective multi-echelon mixed integer linear programming model; (3) Sensitivity analysis use Inverse-DEA method to increase the efficiency of inefficient units; (4) Use the GSC factors and DEA method in reverse logistics network.

The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.

This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.

The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.

The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.

Rapid innovation and developments in personal electronic technology have encouraged users to change users' devices more frequently than ever, which has resulted in creating a massive increase in the amount of electronic waste. The study focuses on identifying the barriers to closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in the electronic industry.

A framework for analyzing the relationships among CLSC adoption barriers is designed. The authors adopted the decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) technique to determine the critical barriers of electronic CLSC from the opinion of experts in the field.

The outcome from the analysis suggests that cost barriers, financial barrier, process barriers and supplier-side barriers are the main causal factors that prevent the adoption and implementation of e-waste CLSC. The causal relationship indicates that financial barrier is the most influential factor, while phycological barrier is the most flexible barrier to the adoption of e-waste CLSC.

This study is restricted to CLSC adoption barriers in the electronic industry by evaluating 36 sub-barriers grouped into 8 main dimensions related to different members of the supply chain.

Closed-loop adoption barriers have been proposed to understand the crucial barriers to implementation of CLSC in the electronic industry. The cause-and-effect relationship indicates the critical factors to be improved to increase adoption of e-waste CLSC, helping managers and regulatory bodies to mitigate the problem areas.

This study contributes to the literature on CLSC by adopting a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) technique which captures the critical barriers of e-waste CLSC adoption in Indian scenario.

This study attempts to determine the optimal pricing and warranty strategies for remanufactured products offered by independent remanufacturers (IRs). Specifically, it takes into account price competition and warranty service competition between the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and IR, ultimately providing recommendations on the selection of warranty service modes for IRs.

This study considers two warranty modes for IRs: in-housing and outsourcing. Based on game theory, this study identifies the conditions under which the warranty service for remanufactured product is outsourced to retailers in IR-remanufacturing mode. Furthermore, this study investigates how this strategic decision affects closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) operations by comparing the two modes in terms of profit, consumer surplus (CS), quantity and overall social welfare (SW).

Firstly, the provision strategy for IRs' warranty on remanufactured products depends mainly on the retailer’s warranty cost. If retailers have lower costs for warranties, IR opts to outsource the remanufactured product warranty to the retailer. Second, when retailers offer warranties at a lower cost, IRs prefer outsourcing remanufactured product warranty to retailers. In this way, it will maximize both the remanufacturer’s and retailer’s profits while achieving the optimal total profit for the entire supply chain. However, it’s not beneficial for the OEM. Third, the IR’s preference for warranty service provision strategy is influenced by customers’ acceptance of remanufactured product, customer sensitivity toward remanufactured product warranty and economies of scale in warranty service.

The findings offer operational insights into IR decision-making in selecting warranty service provision strategies for remanufactured products.

This study is among the first to examine warranty provision strategy for IRs in CLSC.

Asymmetric cost information exists between a supplier and a manufacturer regarding the manufacturer's process innovation for remanufacturing (PIR), which may hurt the supplier's profit. The authors therefore seek to develop a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts for channel information sharing.

Based on principal–agent theory, the supplier, acting as a Stackelberg leader, designs a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts to impel the manufacturer to disclose its private cost information on PIR (i.e. PIR efficiency). In addition, the authors compare the equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric and symmetric information to examine the effects of asymmetric PIR information on the production policies and profits of the supplier and the manufacturer.

The proposed contract menu encourages th4e manufacturer to spontaneously share PIR efficiency information with the supplier. Asymmetric PIR information may distort the output of new products upward or downward, but the output of remanufactured products may only be distorted downward. In addition, the manufacturer with high PIR efficiency gains information rent, and interestingly, the increase in the probability of low PIR efficiency amplifies its information rent. Finally, an asymmetric information environment may increase the threshold for the manufacturer to enter remanufacturing.

The authors probe the issue of the supplier's contract design by jointly considering remanufacturing, process innovation and information asymmetry. The paper expands the influencing mechanism of process innovation information in the remanufacturing field. The authors also observe new results that may offer guidance to decision makers.

The purpose of this study is to explore the interplay between the selection of selling formats of remanufactured products for a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) and the quality decision of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).

This study considers a remanufacturing supply chain, where the OEM sells new products through a platform retailer, but the products remanufactured by the TPR can be sold via a direct or indirect channel. The authors model a Stackelberg game and explore the optimal quality decision of the OEM and selling format choice of the TPR.

The OEM's optimal decision depends mainly on consumers' discounted utility coefficient and cost-scale factor of remanufactured products. A higher consumers' valuation of the remanufactured product will not result in a higher retail price, but may lead to an increase in new product's sales. Given the cost-scale factor, the TPR prefers to sell directly no matter what the value of consumers' discounted utility coefficient is. An all-win situation is achieved with selling directly when consumers' discounted utility coefficient is sufficiently large.

These results provide some support to the operational strategies of the OEM and TPR.

This study firstly endogenizes the quality decision and combines the selling format selection of the TPR and the quality decision of the OEM to explore the interplay between these two important decisions.

The purpose of this article is to investigate and analyze the interactions between economic and sustainable development elements in the context of remanufacturing in India.

To comprehend the hierarchical and contextual link among factors impacting remanufacturing in India, the study used interpretive structural modeling (ISM) and decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) methodologies.

The integrated ISM-DEMATEL approach identifies optimal utilization of the resources as the most crucial factor influencing remanufacturing in India, followed by reducing landfills, conserving energy and low cost. The study also reveals that optimal utilization of resources, reduction of landfills, conservation of energy and incorporated advanced technology impacts most of the factors but get affected by a few factors.

Industry practitioners and policymakers should consider the remanufacturing process to achieve sustainable and economic development. The government and other stakeholders can use the ISM framework and cause-and-effect diagram to classify the impact factors and their impact on the Indian economy and environment.

This study supports the process to save the landfills and curbing pollution, conserve energy and optimize utilization of the resources, generate employment and supporting the development of the economy. Remanufacturing will undoubtedly contribute to the development of an environment and economy in India that benefits both.

ISM and DEMATELs strategy offers a tiered model and a cause-and-effect relationship between the variables affecting remanufacturing in India.

This study aims to examine how fairness concerns and power structure in dyadic green supply chains impact retail price, supply chain profits and greening level decisions.

This study develops game-theoretic models considering fairness concerns and asymmetric power structures under an iso-elastic demand setting. The research paper employs the Stackelberg game approach, taking into consideration the fairness concern of the channel leader.

The findings indicate that under fairness, there is an increase in both wholesale and retail prices, as well as greening expenditures. Notably, when comparing the two models (manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg), double marginalization is more pronounced in the retailer Stackelberg setup than in the manufacturer Stackelberg setup. In a traditional supply chain with iso-elastic demand, the follower typically extracts higher profit compared to the leader; however, our results show that, under fairness conditions, the leader achieves higher profit than the follower. Additionally, our study suggests that supply chain coordination is unattainable in a fairness setup. This paper provides insights for managers on the optimal supply chain structure and the level of fairness to maximize profit.

This paper investigates the impact of a leader's fairness on the optimal decisions within a green supply chain, an area that has received limited attention previously. Additionally, the study investigates how fairness concerns manifest in distinct power dynamics, specifically, in the contexts of manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg.