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This chapter provides an overview of five modes of intellectual property (IP) protection – patents, designs, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets – available in the United States, the European Union, and Japan. After describing the purposes of and principal differences among the five types of IP protection and outlining the advantages of each form, the chapter provides country- and region-specific information. The authors highlight the aspects of IP law in which international harmonization has, or has not yet, occurred, and offer insights into the relative advantages of various national and regional IP protection systems.

This chapter provides an overview of the five main modes of intellectual property (IP) protection – patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and designs – available in the United States, the European Union, and Japan. After describing the purposes of and principal differences among the five types of IP protection and outlining the advantages of each form, the chapter provides country- and region-specific information. The authors highlight the aspects of IP law in which international harmonization has, or has not yet, occurred, and offer insights into the relative advantages of various national and regional IP protection systems.

This chapter provides evidence on how young technology startups are employing intellectual property (IP) protection when innovating and competing in the United States. Although researchers and teachers of university technology transfer often think only in terms of patents and the Bayh-Dole Act, this chapter suggests that adopting a more nuanced view of IP rights is appropriate. After reviewing the primary non-patent types of IP protection available in the U.S. (copyright, trademark, and trade secret), we explain that while patents are often considered the strongest protection, for some entrepreneurs – particularly those operating in the U.S. software and Internet sectors – patents may be the least important means of capturing value from innovation. We present evidence from the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey to demonstrate that IP is used by U.S. startups in very different ways, and to different effects, across technology sectors and other company-specific characteristics. Contrary to the common assumption in academic discourse, we show that different forms of IP protection often serve as complements, rather than substitutes.

This chapter suggests that, while researchers and teachers of university technology transfer often think exclusively in terms of patents and the Bayh-Dole Act, we ought to adopt a more nuanced view of intellectual property rights (IPRs). In the text, I discuss the primary non-patent types of intellectual property (IP) protection, copyright, trademark, and trade secret, and argue that while patents are normally the “default” position when we think about protecting technologies and profiting from them, evidence suggests that patents are among the least important means of capturing value from innovation. Moreover, I suggest that while many consider that IP protections act as substitutes for one another, thinking about IPRs as complements is a more relevant approach to this issue. Adopting this more nuanced view better reflects reality and does a superior job of alerting our audiences to the opportunities available in the technology commercialization process.

In this chapter I put forward a framework to help us understand the underlying sources of national policy failures regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, the need for international coordination, and how the coordination should be done. I also analyze whether global harmonization of IPR standards is necessary or sufficient for achieving globally welfare-maximizing policies. Then I move on to analyze the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is a mighty effort to coordinate IPR policies across member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO). I discuss what TRIPS was supposed to do and what it has actually achieved, with reference to my theoretical framework. I explain that it is desirable for IPR to be included in world trade talks and be negotiated along with other trade issues. I offer analyses on the extensions of the basic model by introducing political economy and trade barriers, as well as allowing countries to discriminate against foreign firms. Finally, I comment on further potential extensions such as introduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) or licensing, parallel imports, cumulative innovations, subject matter of protection and costs of implementation. The main thrust of the basic model is that, provided that there is free trade and non-discrimination of foreign firms, there exist positive cross-border externalities as a country strengthens its IPR protection, since it raises the profits of foreign firms and the welfare of foreign consumers without causing any deadweight loss on foreign soil. This implies that national governments tend to provide too little IPR protection compared with the global optimum. The model also implies that a country with higher innovative capability and larger domestic market would provide stronger IPR. Thus, it is natural for the South to protect IPR less than the North in the absence of international coordination. These basic results largely continue to hold under various extensions.

This chapter provides a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical literature to date on the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and measures of innovation and international technology transfer. The chapter discusses the empirical implications of theoretical work, assesses the theoretical work based on the evidence available, and identifies some gaps in the existing literature.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of innovation protection mechanisms in four high-tech industries in Malaysia.

A questionnaire survey is administered to 339 managers working in four Malaysian high-tech industries.

The authors find that in most industries, patents are considered as the most effective innovation protection mechanism, while lead time is considered as least effective. In firms with private and foreign ownerships, patents and in firms categorized as “others” “moving quickly down the learning curve” are considered as the most effective protection mechanisms. It also emerges that “being first to market (lead time)” is considered as the least effective protection mechanism under all ownership structures. Further, young and middle-aged firms report patents, while old firms report secrecy as the most effective innovation protection mechanisms.

This paper restricted analysis to the high-tech sector in Malaysia, and thus, the findings are not generalizable to other industries. Second, this paper took into consideration only four innovation protection mechanisms. The authors suggest that future research should investigate the issue at hand in other industries and consider other innovation protection mechanisms to have a holistic view of how Malaysian firms view different innovation protection mechanisms.

In addition to providing inputs for policy-making, the results of this paper are expected to help practitioners in deciding on the right kind of innovation protection mechanisms for their innovations based on their industry, ownership structure and firm age.

This paper is the first of its kind conducted in the Malaysian high-tech sector and as such is expected to help policy-makers to design and implement effectively innovation protection policies.

This chapter reviews the economics literature on the development aspects of a substantially strengthened global regime of intellectual property rights (IPR). In this regime developing countries must adopt tighter standards governing patents, copyrights, and related policies, in order to protect global innovation. Some analytical literature finds that these changes could improve prospects for technology flows to poor countries, helping to integrate them into the global knowledge economy. Other authors raise deep concerns about whether these policy shifts will restrict growth through raising the costs of imitation, innovation, and acquiring international technologies. Poor countries may face permanently higher costs, raising questions about both the efficiency and equity implications. The chapter considers first the role of a balanced IPR regime in an overall economic development policy. This balance could involve widely varying protection standards at differing levels of economic development, growth, and social preferences. This situation is especially true in the world economy, where poorer countries may prefer to free ride on available international technologies. Much of the theoretical literature takes this view, suggesting that harmonized global policies could reduce innovation and growth. More recent literature takes a broader view of the ability of IPR to build global technology markets and support international information exchanges. Ultimately these are empirical questions and the available literature differs considerably in analytical approaches and conclusions. Thus, the chapter analyzes contributions from theory, empirical analysis, and case studies regarding prospective improvements or impediments to economic development arising from IPR reforms. These issues are especially important in public health and nutrition. The chapter concludes with an overview of how the globalized nature of IPR protection could affect developing countries. The essential point is that policy governing patents and copyrights needs to be embedded effectively in an overall economic development strategy.

As a resource input in enterprise technological innovation, patents play an important role in influencing innovation performance. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fuzzy front end (FFE) patent management on innovation performance, and the mediating role of patent commercialization and the moderating effect of technological lock-in.

This paper adopts a questionnaire survey from a sample of 203 high-tech Chinese enterprises across multiple industries. Structural equation modeling and the hierarchical regression method were used to test the hypothesis.

The results show that the FFE of patent management, namely, patent acquisition and patent protection, positively affect innovation performance. Specifically, patent commercialization mediates the relationship between FFE patent management and innovation performance. Moreover, technological lock-in moderates the relationship between patent management and innovation performance.

This study puts forward suggestions relating to institution innovation and mechanism innovation for effective patent management in firms, and provides some guidelines for firms to efficiently utilize patents to improve innovation performance.

This paper provides certain empirical evidence for the study of organizational structure, strategic management, and knowledge governance. As the main participators in technology innovation, high-tech enterprises should utilize both inside and outside resources to acquire patents.

This paper aims to study the effects of the strength of patent enforcement on economic growth following the signing of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the role of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in mediating and enhancing this relationship.

Following a generalized method of moments methodology, use is made of a new longitudinal index measuring the strength of enforcement-related aspects of patent systems.

Stronger levels of patent enforcement have a significant positive effect on the economic growth of both developed and developing countries. Importantly, inward FDI flows have a mediating role in positively boosting this effect for all countries and particularly for developed countries.

This is the first empirical study of the role of the strength of patent enforcement (“law in action”) in stimulating economic growth, as previous empirical studies have focused on the effect of the strength of patent law protection (“law on the books”). The failure in the past to allow for “law in action” was mainly due to the lack of available data that could proxy for the strength of patent enforcement levels in a country. This study utilizes a newly published, longitudinal index that captures the strength of the enforcement-related aspects of patent systems.