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This paper aims to unfold the intricate relations between private law design, the structure of organizations for collective action and cultural values and orientations that practically guide interpersonal interactions in Chinese society.

Drawing upon the Hofstede Insights National Culture survey (The Culture Compass) data and some judicial rulings in China, this paper examines the legislative development and judicial approach to settle condominium disputes to explain and address the cultural orientation for future legal reform. This paper examines how the law reflects and responds to the cultural and social variations/interactions among the stakeholders, namely, local government, developers, homeowner associations, condo owners and property management agents.

Culture plays a significant role in shaping how condominiums are governed in China. This analysis can highlight the role of cultural factors that influence the success or failure of condominium governance and suggest ways in which governance structures can be adapted to reflect the legal culture of the community better. The emphasis on social harmony, respect for authority, relationships and networks and knowledge and expertise all contribute to a unique approach to condominium governance that reflects the values and priorities of Chinese society.

While much has been written on the importance of property rights to economic development, relatively little seems to be understood about processes of change in complex property systems, particularly in China, a socialist-transforming country. Specifically, there is a lack of reliable knowledge about the intricate relations between the structure of organizations for collective action and cultural orientations that practically guide interpersonal interactions in Chinese society. The question at the heart of this research relates to the condominium rules most suitable for an emerging Chinese private property market.

This study aims to combine two fraud-related streams of the literature on guanxi and overconfidence into an integrated framework, which is the fraud triangle, to interpret the mechanism of fraud commission and detection.

A bivariate probit model with Partial Observability (POBi Probit) is applied. Moreover, the POBi Probit model is adjusted to the Chinese context. The China-specific POBi Probit model is constructed using data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2014, with a total of 15,109 firm-year observations.

Overconfidence induces fraud commission and worsens fraud detection; overconfidence mediates the relationship between fraud and guanxi; the “white side” of guanxi comes from alumni networks, while the “dark side” is derived from relatives-based networks; overconfidence induces fraud commission in accounting and disclosure and benefits the detection of disclosure frauds. Guanxi suppresses fraud commission in management and disclosure, however, it worsens fraud detection given fraud in management and disclosure; overconfidence induces fraud commission in both state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOEs, and benefits fraud detection in SOEs. Guanxi suppresses fraud commission and worsens fraud detection in SOEs and city-owned firms.

There are two drawbacks of the partial observable bivariate probit (POBi-Probit) method that must be mentioned here. On one hand, the ex ante variable selection is one of the most difficult parts of applying the POBi-Probit model and different variables are included in different studies. On the other hand, the POBi-Probit model might not converge if too many variables are included. Thus, many widely accepted factors can be included in the model. Thus, this study initially sets the POBi-Probit model based mainly on Khanna et al. (2015) and then adjusts the model for the Chinese context (e. g. considering government ownership) according to Yiu et al. (2018) and Zhang (2018) and the local study of Meng et al. (2019). Considering the observability of fraud, on one hand, the observability of fraud commission is a widely accepted limitation, especially when accounting opacity comes across with regulatory efficiency (Yiu et al. (2018). On the other hand, the observability of relationships is another obstacle to this study. Future studies can go further by revealing the presently unobservable relationships using Big Data technology.

This paper theoretically and practically contributes to the literature on both corporate fraud and corporate governance. Theoretically, by introducing integrated principal-agent resource-reliance theory (IPRT) and upper echelon theory (UET), this paper broadens the framework of fraud triangle theory (FTT) and testifies the availability of the broaden FTT in the transitional and emerging-market context of China. Practically, this paper provides evidence that guanxi and overconfidence are two of the factors affecting corporate fraud. Thus, this paper provides a governance approach opposing corporate fraud in China, which may help the other emerging economies in transition.

Based on the brief historical review, the purpose of this paper is to expound the target and bottom line for the farmland institutional reform of in China, analyze the “Chinese scenes” and historical heritage of farmland institutional arrangement, evaluate the policies and their effects over the last four decades and outline the keynotes and possible direction of the future reform.

The paper builds the analytical clue of “institutional target – institutional heritage – policy effort – realistic dilemma – future direction” and review and forecast the Chinese farmland institutional reform.

The farmland institution is an important issue with Chinese characteristics. Over the last four decades, the farmland institutional reform in China has focused on “stabilizing the land property rights” and “promote the farmland transfer.” As the study indicates, the promotion of farmland transfer has not effectively improved the scale economy of agriculture and stabilizing land property rights by titling may restrain the development of farmland transfer market because farmland transfer is of special market logic.

It depends on the revitalization of farmland management rights to resolve the transaction constraint of personal property and its endowment effect in farmland transfer. And, classifying the land management property to involve farmers into the economy of division can be reference for the reform of traditional agriculture worldwide.

Over the past four decades, China has strived to make the market mechanism play a decisive role in resource allocation under the conditions of adhering to the basic socialist economic system. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

On this matter, this paper proposes a three-phase transition hypothesis for the Chinese institutional change models, namely, a de facto path, which gives potential to a successful incremental transition of a centralized country from planned economy to a market economy, lies in the incremental transitions of the institutional change models from a supply-oriented model at initial reform to a middle-proliferation model and to a demand-induced model along with the gradual establishment of exclusive property rights, thereby completing the transition to a socialist-market-economic system.

The Chinese economic model’s unique connotation is the reason why the solution to this model often baffles both the traditional political-economic logic and western mainstream institutional change theory.

This hypothesis corroborates that China’s unswerving practice of economic reform has provided unprecedented opportunities and challenges for the development of economic theory. The Chinese model constitutes the source of innovation for the subject of Economics with Chinese Studies.

Since the core issue of Chinese economics is to elucidate the logical relationship between socialism and the market economy, it necessitates a robust foundation for microeconomic analysis to uncover the behavioral patterns and characteristics of microeconomic agents in a socialist market economy and identify the conditions and methods for the functioning of market mechanisms.

The core issue of microeconomics with Chinese characteristics is to identify the economic logic of how market mechanisms play a decisive role in resource allocation under the basic socialist economic system based on China's reform.

The core issue in building the foundation of microeconomic analysis of Chinese economics is addressing the compatibility issue between SOEs and a market economy.

In the author’s view, this can be achieved under the logic of classified reform so as to build the microeconomic foundation for the effective functioning of a socialist market economy.

To examine China's reforms and successes could have been replicated to other transition economies.

The applicability of the Chinese process as an alternative for transition economies involves an analysis of the necessary reforms regarding price liberalisation‐stabilisation; privatisation; institutions; monetary policy and the financial system; fiscal policy; international trade and foreign aid and social policy.

The transition process in China has maintained political‐ideological authoritarianism and state control of the whole economy. Therefore, it was not the “special initial conditions” of China that made the model inappropriate but, rather, the switch to a democratic political‐ideological‐economic structure in transition economies.

The paper contributes to the transition literature by demonstrating that the strategy was only rendered workable in China, as the governments of transition economies neither had the mandate nor wanted to reimpose tight state direction of the politics, ideology and economy.

The socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics is the scientific fruit of Xi Jinping thought on socialist economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era. People-centred philosophy is the core values of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee's governance of China with Xi Jinping as the core and has become the core values of the socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics. According to Xi Jinping thought on socialist economy with Chinese characteristics, it represents the interests of all people and determines the disciplinary attribute of the socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics, that is, people-centred economics. Xi Jinping has defined the essence of the socialism as eliminating poverty, improving people's livelihood and gradually realising common prosperity. That determines the main line of socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics is to liberate, develop and protect the productive forces and achieve common prosperity. This study aims to discuss the aforementioned statements.

Xi Jinping's scientific judgement on the new stage of development and the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has put forward the requirement of problem orientation for the study of socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics, involving the main contradiction facing Chinese society, high-quality development and modernisation. China's socialist basic economic system consists of a socialist market economy in which public ownership plays the leading role alongside other forms of ownership and distribution according to work is the mainstay, while other forms of distribution coexist alongside it. And this socialist basic economic system, marked out from three dimensions—production, distribution and exchange analysis, is the key of analysis of systems in the socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics. The economic operation analysis in political economy mainly involves resource allocation and the government's macroeconomic regulation and control.

The new thought and new practices about the role of the market and the government in the new era have opened up a new realm for the economic operation analysis in the socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics. The new development philosophy and new development paradigm define the content of the economic development theory in the socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics. The new development paradigm reflects the dual circulation theory of social reproduction.

The socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics is to study laws of economics in various aspects from economic system, economic operation, economic development to foreign economy and provide the basic principles of socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics. Its mainstream economic position will be consolidated continuously.

Is China′s “land use rights” legislation which distinguishes transferable “land use rights” and inalienable “land ownership”, a novel concept unknown to human kind before, or a pragmatic reversion to the private property rights system abolished by the communist revolution? Advocates the view that the latter is a more correct interpretation. As part of a “going capitalist” economic reform programme, such a reversion is manifested in the legal recognition of the leasehold tenure after the “responsibility system” in privatizing agricultural production had proved to be successful. As the development of private property rights is a prelude to market transactions, the Chinese land use rights reform should be conducive to the success of the economic liberalization policy of China, provided that there is a contemporaneous advance in the development of the rule of law and technical know‐how, such as valuation and land surveying.

This paper aims to apply the developmental state theory to examine the institutional arrangements that support the widespread adoption of the property‐led urban economic growth model and generate risks on property investment in Chinese cities.

This paper conducts institutional analysis on the behaviour of the Chinese state and examines results from major interview programmes and field investigations on six cities in China.

The Chinese state deviates from other developmental states and is polymorphous, i.e. lacking an effective central state to maintain the standard of governance and regulate the behaviour of local states. The weak central state is responsible for failures to implement national policies on land supply and housing price inflation, to nurture the development of professions like valuation, and to formulate policy on commercial property. The local states, on the other hand, intensify risks in property investment by poor plan making and implementation that create chaos in urban development and intensive competition among projects, and by poor data services and legal support for market operations. Such risks, however, seem to be played down by Chinese property professionals.

This paper uses the summarised opinions of interviewees who have varied expertise on different issues in China. Further research could be conducted on a number of fronts, say risk perception by different professions such as valuers or investors.

This is the first paper to apply developmental state theory to examine the roles the Chinese central and local governments play in using the property‐led growth model on the generation and intensification of property investment risks.

Describes the recent economic and land reforms in China, and the consequent changes in the emerging Chinese property market. Analyses the need for property management valuation skills in China in the light of problems of country size, regional differences, the scale of economic reforms and the speed with which they are being implemented, administration and the difficulty of educating a large number of property professionals.