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Given some similarities in the banking industry and economic condition across Vietnam, China and India, the purpose of this paper is to estimate and compare the cost and revenue efficiency of banks across these three countries over the period 1995–2011.

This study employs the meta-frontier of Battese et al. (2004) and O’Donnell et al. (2008) which envelops the three country-frontiers to measure the cost and revenue efficiency of banks in these three countries.

This study finds that Chinese banks adopt the most advanced cost-reducing and revenue-increasing technology when providing banking products to their customers, followed by Indian banks. Indian banks are as cost-efficient as Chinese banks, but more cost-efficient than Vietnamese banks. Indian banks are as revenue-efficient as Vietnamese banks, but less revenue-efficient than Chinese banks. Over the analysis period, banks in the three countries have employed the more advanced technology in reducing costs, and they have become more cost-efficient. Nonetheless, for revenue side, the improvement in revenue efficiency and adopted technology are observed only in Chinese banks. The main source of meta-cost and meta-revenue inefficiency of these banking systems stems from undertaking inferior technology rather than managerial ability. Results from comparison across bank types show that state-owned banks (SOBs) are more cost and revenue-efficient than privately owned banks, with Indian and Chinese SOBs being the most cost- and revenue-efficient, respectively.

To improve meta-cost efficiency, Chinese and Indian banks would constitute a relevant benchmark for Vietnamese banks, while to improve meta-revenue efficiency, Chinese banks would be considered as a relevant benchmark for Vietnamese and Indian banks.

This is the first study which utilizes meta-frontier to compare cost and revenue efficiency and technology across banks in Vietnam, China and India.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of competition on credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and insolvency risk in the Chinese banking industry during the period 2003-2013.

This study uses a generalized method of moments system estimator to examine the impact of competition on risk. In particular, translog specifications are used to measure the competition and insolvency risk.

The results show that greater competition within each bank ownership type (state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks) leads to higher credit risk, higher liquidity risk, higher capital risk, but lower insolvency risk.

This paper is the first piece of research testing the impact of competition on different types of risk in banking industry and it further contributes to the empirical literature by using a more accurate competition indicator (efficiency-adjusted Lerner index) and a more precise insolvency risk indicator (stability inefficiency).

Much of the criticism directed toward banking in China revolves around self-dealing in relationships between bankers and their clients. Corruption, nepotism, high levels of non-performing loans, and the inefficiency of government-directed lending have all been laid at the door of embedded guanxi networks. While valid to an extent, this criticism ignores two important, related points: guanxi networks bring disciplining mechanisms as well as the potential for corruption, and those mechanisms may improve banking governance.

Employing theory from relationship banking, information economics, and the business ethics of guanxi, I examine how monitoring by netizens will lead to greater disclosure.

Relationship banking in a Chinese context – with the influence of guanxi in banking – further increases reputational costs when self-dealing is uncovered. Costs of bad banking behavior are increasing just as benefits from staying rich increase. Increased disclosure affects chances of staying rich as disclosure increases the chance that a corrupt relationship will lead to loss of wealth and reputation.

This paper presents a theoretical construct informed by selected examples. An empirical analysis of netizen monitoring leading to improved banking governance would provide additional support for the theoretical construct.

Bankers, financiers, and government officials must be aware of monitoring by netizens, which forces more ethical financial contracting.

Rather than weakening financial system governance, guanxi may begin to strengthen the disciplinary measures inherent in relationship banking as information disclosure increases and private sector monitoring grows.

This paper provides an extension to private monitoring theory in financial contracting which may be applied to netizen monitoring in other regions and countries.

This study aims to test the impacts of risk-taking behaviour, competition and cost efficiency on bank profitability in China.

A two-step generalized method of moments system estimator is used to examine the impacts of risk, competition and cost efficiency on profitability of a sample of Chinese commercial banks over the period 2003-2013.

The paper finds that credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, security risk and insolvency risk significantly influence the profitability of Chinese commercial banks. To be more specific, credit risk is significantly and negatively related to bank profitability; liquidity risk is significantly and positively related to return on assets (ROA) and net interest margin (NIM) but negatively related to return on equity (ROE); capital risk has a significant and negative impact on ROA and NIM but a positive impact on ROE; there is a significant and negative impact of security risk on bank profitability (ROA and NIM). It is found that Chinese commercial banks with higher levels of insolvency risk have higher profitability (ROA and ROE). Finally, higher competition leads to lower profitability in the Chinese banking industry, and Chinese commercial banks with higher levels of cost efficiency have lower ROA. In other words, the structure–conduct–performance paradigm rather than the efficient–structure paradigm holds in the Chinese banking industry.

This is the first paper to investigate the impact of different types of risk, including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, security risk and insolvency risk, on bank profitability. This is the first study which uses more accurate measurements of efficiency and competition compared to previous Chinese banking profitability literature and which tests their impact on bank profitability. The findings not only provide a general picture on the risk, efficiency and competition conditions in the Chinese banking industry, but also give valuable information to the Chinese Government and to the banking regulatory authorities to make relevant policies.

The Chinese banks have increased their market entry to Russia since their initial entry in 1993 and have expanded their banking business operations in Russia significantly. The banking sector interaction between China and Russia has received great attention and interests from businesses as well as policy-makers. This chapter describes the main activities of Chinese banks in Russia, assesses their achieved results, and discusses their opportunities for further development of banking interactions of the Chinese banks and the Russian banking sector in the future.

China's accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) opened its financial markets to foreign banks in December 2006. In addition to foreign banks’ expertise and experience in modern banking activities, they also appear to have the interest, competitiveness, and regulatory advantages of competing with Chinese banks in the traditional Renminbi (RMB) business. Such competition will lead to a loss of RMB deposits and loans from local banks. Given that Chinese banks are currently ridden with large non-performing loans and low capital adequacy, the foreign bank entry will exert further pressure on the banks’ profitability and solvency. Without larger regular bailouts from the central government and fundamental changes on the roles of Chinese banks, China may experience a banking crisis in the post-WTO era. We propose two types of policy changes that may improve banks’ competitiveness and reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of China's contemporary banking regulatory system, with particular focus on regulatory control of foreign banks trading in China. The paper addresses three aspects of Chinese banking regulation: what does China regulate; why does China regulate; and how does China regulate. Much of the discussion is concerned with China's regulatory agencies particularly with the role of the CBRC as the principal regulator in China's banking sector.

In the first instance the paper presents an overview of banking regulatory models gained from a review of theoretical literature in the area. Then through a wide ranging review of Chinese publications, both academic and official, the paper seeks to relate the course of regulatory reform in China, both in terms of compliance with orthodox regulatory theory, and the unique regulatory requirements of the Chinese banking system.

The paper recognises that China has embraced the need for banking regulation with the establishment of an institutional structure that is responsive to both banking supervision and government policy. Within that structure the role of the CBRC, the pervasive manner in which that agency operates, and the content of its regulatory output have been identified and critically reviewed.

In its review of the modernization of China's banking regulatory system, the paper achieves originality from the author's research into, and critical reflections on Chinese generated literature, both institutional and academic, which is then communicated in a manner that will be understood by readers familiar with Western banking regulatory theory.

Purpose – Investigate the causes and consequences of foreign financial institutions' divestments in China's banking sector which is an example of cross-border transactions by institutional investors.

Methodology – Use a sample of 26 foreign financial institutions' strategic investments in Chinese banks. Ten of those investments are divested after the global financial crisis. We investigate determinants of the divestment, business cooperation after the divestment, and Chinese banks' stock price reactions to the divestment announcement.

Findings – The poor performance of foreign financial institutions, which is attributable to the global financial crisis, and the institutions' regulated low equity ownership are important causes of divestment (or whole divestment). In contrast, Chinese banks' poor performance does not cause foreign divestments. Foreign financial institutions that fully divest their equity stakes usually terminate their cooperative business, which was required by the strategic investment agreement. The Bank of China and the China Construction Bank, which experienced large H-share divestments, experienced large economic declines in A-share values.

Social implications – Foreign financial institutions' strategic investments created substantial shareholder value before the divestment. Banking sector developments that rely on foreign investments are vulnerable to economic downturns in developed countries.

Originality/value of paper – To the best of our knowledge, this is the first trial to analyze the impact of divestments on divested bank performance.

The purpose of this paper is to construct a measurement instrument to capture service quality in the Chinese corporate banking market.

To create the measurement instrument, Chinese Banking Service Quality (CBSQ), constructs are utilised from the generic service quality literature and Chinese business culture. In addition, 18 financial managers were interviewed to identify how other aspects of the Chinese banking market could be included in the new instrument. CBSQ was administered to 259 corporate customers in China. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were used to assist data reduction, test hypothesised models and refine scales.

Factor analysis identifies that service quality in Chinese corporate banking is measured by a nested model, consisting of two higher‐order constructs (i.e. functional quality and technical quality) and four lower‐order dimensions (i.e. reliability, human capital, technology and communication).

The data were collected from corporate customers in China, and hence the findings of this paper may not be generalisable to other contexts.

The presence of CBSQ is timely given the rapid development of the Chinese banking sector, allowing Chinese domestic banks and international banks to incorporate service quality issues into their strategic planning. Particularly, bank management could benefit from focusing their efforts on the four dimensions of CBSQ.

This research contributes to our understanding of service quality in the Chinese banking market by creating CBSQ – a model to capture the quality of service provision in corporate banking. The utility of CBSQ for academics and practitioners is discussed along with avenues for future research.

Wealth Management Products (WMPs) are the largest and most crucial component of China's Shadow banking, which are off the balance sheet and considered as a substitute for deposits. Commercial banks in China are involved in the issuance of WMPs mainly to; evade the regulatory restrictions, move non-performing loans away from the balance sheet, chase the profits and take advantage of yield spread (the difference between WMPs yield and deposit rate).

In this study, the authors investigate what bank related characteristics and needs; influenced and prompted the issuance of WMPs. By using a quarterly panel data from 2010 to 2019, this study performed the fixed effects approach favored by the Hausman specification test, and a feasible generalized least square (FGLS) estimation method is employed to deal with any issues of heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.

This study found that there is a positive and significant association between the non-performing loan ratio and the issuance of WMPs. Moreover, profitability and spread were found to play an essential role in the issuance of WMPs. The findings of this study suggest that WMPs are issued for multi-purpose, and off the balance sheet status of these products makes them very lucrative for regulated Chinese commercial banks.

Non-guaranteed WMPs are considered as an item of shadow banking in China, as banks do not consolidate this type of WMPs into their balance sheet; due to that reason, there is no individual bank data available for the amount of WMPs. The authors use the number of WMPs issued by banks as a proxy for the bank's exposure to the WMPs business.

From a regulatory perspective, this study helps regulators to understand the risk associated with the issuance of WMPs; by providing empirical evidence that Chinese banks issue WMPs to hide the actual risk of non-performing loans, and this practice could mislead the regulators to evaluate the bank credit risk and loan quality. This study also identifies that Chinese banks issue WMPs for multi-purpose; this can help potential investors to understand the dynamics of WMPs issuance.

This research is innovative in its orientation because it is designed to investigate the less explored wealth management products (WMPs) issued by Chinese banks. This study's content includes not only innovation but also contributes to the existing literature on the shadow banking sector in terms of regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the inclusion of FGLS estimation models, ten years of quarterly data, and the top 30 Chinese banks (covers 70% of the total Chinese commercial banking system's assets) make this research more comprehensive and significant.