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This chapter on terrorism prevention provides the reader with an overview of the various terrorist prevention organizations within the United States at the federal, state, and local levels. It is divided into two different sections, the first providing a detailed description of various federal agencies involved in terrorism prevention and an overview of how state and local agencies fit within the federal framework. The second section of this chapter describes various efforts to integrate these disparate organizations into a cohesive effort to prevent terrorism activities. This chapter concludes with some suggestions for future consideration to help with the overall terrorism prevention effort.

Al-Qaeda is conventionally portrayed as a monolithic, hierarchical organization whose activities – coordinated by the network's leader Osama bin Laden – are the source of international terrorism today. Al-Qaeda is considered a radical tendency within the broader Islamist Salafi movement, legitimizing its terrorist operations as a global Islamist jihad against Western civilization. Al-Qaeda's terrorist activity today is considered, “blowback” from long finished CIA and western covert operations in Afghanistan.

The conventional wisdom is demonstrably false. After the Cold War, Western connections with al-Qaeda proliferated around the world, challenging mainstream conceptions of al-Qaeda's identity. Western covert operations and military – intelligence connections in strategic regions show that “al-Qaeda” is a network whose raison d’etre and modus operandi are inextricably embedded in a disturbing conglomerate of international Western diplomatic, financial, military and intelligence policies today. US, British, and Western power routinely manipulates al-Qaeda through a complex network of state-regional and human nodes. Such manipulation extended directly to the 9-11 hijackers, and thus to the events of 9-11 itself.11This paper advances an original argument based partially on research in Ahmed (2005), supplemented here with significant new data and analysis. Also see Ahmed (2002).

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) is the focal point of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), a radical reformulation of policies governing government intelligence activities within US borders. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, long-standing informational norms for the production, use, and circulation of domestic intelligence records containing personal information are being replaced with far less restrictive norms, altering a status quo that had been in effect since mid-1970s. Although the NSI represents an unprecedented expansion of human resources dedicated to the collection and production of domestic intelligence, it is not well known in privacy advocacy community. This chapter considers these and other terms in the context of relevant US law and policy, including the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, Executive Order 12333, and 28 CFR Part 23. In addition to describing the federal (ISE-SAR) standard, the chapter examines the critical role of guidance in the logic of suspicious activity report (SAR) production, and the problematic role finished ISE-SARs seem to play in the matrix of federal and state-level watch lists. The program, if not properly regulated, could pose a considerable threat to personal privacy and the life chances and self-determination of all US persons. The chapter considers this threat in terms of Nissenbaum's (2010) “contextual integrity,” a theory of context-relative informational norms.

In this chapter, I suggest three conceptual tools developed by William R. Freudenburg and colleagues that characterize the failure of institutions to carry out their duties – recreancy, atrophy of vigilance, and bureaucratic slippage – are of use beyond environmental sociology in the framing of the September 11, 2001 disaster. Using testimony and findings from primary materials such as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry hearings and report (2002, 2004a, 2004b) and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) alongside insider accounts, I discuss how Freudenburg’s tools have the potential to theorize institutional failures that occur in national security decision making. I also suggest these tools may be of particular interest to the U.S. intelligence community in its own investigation of various types of risk and failures.