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This study aims to demonstrate the need for further examination of legal judgments and the exercise of discretion in policing.

A factorial vignette survey with traffic stop scenarios based on US Court of Appeals decisions was administered to 396 police officers across six states. Officers were asked to indicate their assessment of the presence of reasonable suspicion and the likelihood that they would extend the stop for investigatory purposes.

Officers' reasonable suspicion judgments are significantly influenced by the vignette facts and align with court ruling expectations. However, even in the presence of reasonable suspicion, responses indicate a limited use of officer discretion to extend the stop.

Analyses of officer decision-making often rely on large datasets with easy indicators of location, officer demographics and citizen demographics, but rarely consider the facts of individual cases. This study suggests more experimental research is needed to consider the impact of case facts on officer judgments and discretionary activity.

Against a backdrop of money laundering scandals in the banking industry, this study aims to assess anti-money laundering (AML) reporting obligations of bankers in the UK. By evaluating the effectiveness of the current suspicious activity report (SAR) regime, this study seeks to use the senior management functions of the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SMCR) to achieve the goals of AML law within the banking sector.

This study firstly evaluates the efficiencies of the available risk-based sanctions aimed at making the banks the gatekeeper for money laundering. It points out the three-fold deficiencies of the SAR regime in the UK. Lastly, it discusses and examines the merits of multiple proposals for reformation.

It is argued that the risk-based sanctions have failed to achieve their goals to deter banks from abusing their products and services to facilitate money laundering activities. In revealing the three-fold deficiencies of the SAR regime – theoretical flaws, practical inapplicability and institutional culture – this study argues for both the retainment of the current regime and the repositioning of regulation focus on the reformation of institutional culture, particularly within large or multinational corporates, in terms of their commitment to fulfilling AML obligations.

This essay has concluded that the regime has correct tools under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and the SMCR to address problems associated with AML reporting obligations imposed on the banking sector.

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) is the focal point of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), a radical reformulation of policies governing government intelligence activities within US borders. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, long-standing informational norms for the production, use, and circulation of domestic intelligence records containing personal information are being replaced with far less restrictive norms, altering a status quo that had been in effect since mid-1970s. Although the NSI represents an unprecedented expansion of human resources dedicated to the collection and production of domestic intelligence, it is not well known in privacy advocacy community. This chapter considers these and other terms in the context of relevant US law and policy, including the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, Executive Order 12333, and 28 CFR Part 23. In addition to describing the federal (ISE-SAR) standard, the chapter examines the critical role of guidance in the logic of suspicious activity report (SAR) production, and the problematic role finished ISE-SARs seem to play in the matrix of federal and state-level watch lists. The program, if not properly regulated, could pose a considerable threat to personal privacy and the life chances and self-determination of all US persons. The chapter considers this threat in terms of Nissenbaum's (2010) “contextual integrity,” a theory of context-relative informational norms.

The subject of this article is the prevention and control of money laundering in South Africa. In particular, it focuses on the reporting obligations under existing legislation and the proposed Money Laundering Control Bill.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential impact of measures taken in accordance with powers introduced by Schedule 7 of the Counter‐Terrorism Act 2008 on banks and their customers.

The paper analyses the legal provisions setting out these powers and comments on their scope; discusses the guidance issued with respect to these provisions by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, as well as other commentary on these provisions; examines the remedies available to those affected by the measures taken in exercise of the Schedule 7 powers; and comments on the use made of these powers to date and the relevant outcomes.

The paper concludes that while the Schedule 7 powers are useful in permitting a targeted response to money laundering and terrorism financing, they can be needlessly damaging to business unless used in a proportionate and risk‐sensitive manner.

The paper analyses critically the first judicial review decision made in respect of the exercise of Schedule 7 powers.

This paper aims to show how financial services firms determine whether customer transactions or behaviours meet the threshold for suspicious activity reporting mandated by the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and how suspicious activity reporting is executed in practice.

Semi-structured interviews have been carried out among compliance professionals in UK financial services.

Two issues related to suspicious activity reporting have been identified. Firstly, a widespread misunderstanding about the tipping-off offence under s. 333 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 has been identified, which appears to be a root cause for poor quality as well as over-reporting of suspicious activity. Secondly, issues related to the notice and moratorium periods used by the UK’s National Crime Agency appear to deter reporting of suspicious activity related to live transactions.

The paper makes suggestions for changes financial services firms and the UK’s National Crime Agency can make to improve the effectiveness of suspicious activity reporting.

The paper provides valuable insights which can be used to limit the flow of criminal funds, improve the quality of suspicious activity reporting and enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.

The aim of this paper is to examine some of the recent changes to the old anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing law, which is now known as the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. The paper will highlight the newly consolidated money laundering offences and the newly created offences including structuring of transactions or “smurfing”. Also, the transgression of cross-border movement of cash and negotiable instruments and tipping off about a money laundering disclosure will be assessed.

The paper uses a doctrinal legal research and secondary data, with the new AML/CFT legislation as the primary source. For comparative analysis, legislations in the UK, Australia and New Zealand are also examined. Secondary sources include case law, articles in academic journals, books and online databases.

The review of the AML/CFT law is timely and indicates the Malaysian government’s efforts to adhere to international standards set by the financial action task force. However, it is imperative that the Malaysian government addresses the remaining instrumental and normative deficiencies in the AML/CFT law to ensure that the recent legal changes are sufficiently comprehensive to prevent and regulate money laundering and terrorist financing within Malaysia.

This paper is a useful source of information for legal practitioners, academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators, researchers and students.

This paper aims to enlighten the shortcomings of the EU Whistleblowing Directive 2019/1973, which could interfere negatively with its successful national implementation. In focus is the tension between companies potentially attempting to hide misconduct and disgruntled employees taking advantage of generous protection under the directive.

With an extensive literary basis, this paper explores articles of the EU Whistleblowing Directive 2019/1973 under five areas of the so-called “weakness.” With view to Germany and Austria, the difficulty of implementing the directive is highlighted and likewise with view to Switzerland, a potential solution is presented.

The Whistleblowing Directive 2019/1973 overshoots its target by protecting whistleblowers without considering the wider public interest. There are specific points of arbitrary definition which demand resolution to ensure a successful national implementation.

This is a multifaceted discussion of a highly contentious ethical debate. Through an exploration of specific points of the Directive, it is possible to present why there are points of contention in the first place, and also the difficulty of implementing the principle of proportionality. The issue at the heart of the matter is balancing the protection of trade secrets with the fundamental necessity of whistleblowing as a means of last resort.

Few articles have been published on counter‐terrorist finance (CTF) policies in the UK and fewer still have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness. This paper seeks to examine both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the UK's CTF policies from open‐source materials and in doing so considers the credibility of many of the claims by those who have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness in light of the data gathered.

The paper presents an analysis of the UK's CTF regime.

There have been just over 100 convictions under terrorism legislation offence in Great Britain alone since 11 September 2001 resulting in at least ten individuals being convicted of a CTF offence. In terms of assets frozen or seized, Robinson appears to have a point when he argued that: “when you look closely at those frozen assets, you discover that most of them have been unfrozen”, given the tens of millions of pounds returned to the Afghan Government.

This paper will be of interest to academics, politicians, practitioners interested in the use of CTF policies.

The legal profession is vulnerable to abuse for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that vulnerability justified updated global recommendations that urge countries to require lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals – including sole practitioners, partners and employed professionals within law firms – to identify, assess and manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with their services and to ensure that they have appropriate mechanisms in place to provide risk assessment information to competent authorities. Those recommendations proved contentious, with concerns raised by both legal academics and legal professional bodies about the implications of certain aspects of the requirements for the principle of lawyer–client confidentiality. Despite those concerns, many countries have introduced or amended regulatory regimes to extend their application to the legal sector to comply with the FATF’s standards. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate surrounding the extension of AML/CTF obligations to the legal profession.

This paper considers three jurisdictions – the UK, Israel and Australia – at different stages in their journey towards compliance with the FATF’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards for the legal profession. While the UK has a long-established and well-embedded AML regulatory framework for legal professionals, Australia remains non-compliant with the FATF standards. Israel occupies a position between these two ends of the spectrum: following criticism of the omission of lawyers from its AML/CTF regime, Israel implemented due diligence rules for the profession. In 2018, Israel was found to be partially compliant with the relevant FATF recommendations.

It argues that although there are challenges involved, there are also important benefits. Therefore, Australia should act to implement its proposed changes sooner rather than later. Its persistent failure to appropriately address globally recognised areas of vulnerability leaves Australia open to integrity abuse. In addition, if the government delays addressing this issue until pressure from the FATF (such as deadlines for compliance and, if necessary, a finding of non-compliance) forces it to comply, this may tarnish Australia’s reputation, threaten its access to international financial markets and adversely affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of its AML/CTF regime.

Originality in this context refers to the distinctiveness and uniqueness of a paper’s content and approach. In this case, the originality lies in the fact that there is no other existing paper that addresses the topic of three common-law jurisdictions at various stages of their progression towards aligning with the FATF AML/CTF standards, specifically within the context of the legal profession. Furthermore, the timeliness of this paper is underscored by the fact that multiple jurisdictions are currently deliberating their positions on the focus of this paper. This adds to its originality and relevance, as it addresses a gap in the literature while also contributing to the ongoing discourse surrounding compliance with FATF’s standards.