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This study aims to understand differences in perceptions of CEO compensation between working adults and business students in the USA before and after reading CEO pay information.

Participants completed a survey about their perceptions of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation before and after reading CEO compensation information that included the median CEO-to-employee ratio and salary in 2021.

Working adults and business students had similar levels of concern about CEO compensation. Participants were more concerned with CEO compensation after reading information about CEO pay but also believed CEO pay was more justified, contrary to equity theory (Adams, 1965). Among the student and adult samples, women and noninvestors were more likely to have concerns about CEO compensation than other participants.

Individuals may not understand the components of CEO compensation, and the size of CEO salaries may be difficult to comprehend. Educators and the media should consider presenting CEO compensation information in a different way, for example, how long it takes a CEO to earn as much as an average employee does annually, for the public to understand how much more CEOs are paid than their employees.

Little research exists on CEO compensation understanding and concerns. This research opens the opportunity for future studies on CEO compensation, for example, that consider variables other than CEO pay (e.g. equity and other forms of compensation) and what individuals believe CEOs do that justifies their high compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.

A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.

Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.

The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.

Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.

Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this study aims to examine Japanese IR managers’ perceptions of the influence of foreign shareholders on Japan’s corporate governance reform and stakeholder-based system. The paper examines tensions, conflicts and collaborations among different stakeholders involved in corporate governance changes in Japan, especially in the areas of firm ownership, employment relations and boards of directors. The paper explains why convergence does not happen in some large Japanese companies by investigating Japanese managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in multiple corporate contexts.

The author conducted in-depth interviews with ten IR managers at large, listed Japanese companies in Kyoto and Tokyo and two managers at foreign investment banks in Tokyo, between 2018 and 2021.

This paper explores five themes that emerged from my interviews: Chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) mixed perceptions of foreign investors, the effectiveness of CEO compensation and outside directors, managers’ reluctance to accept stock price-driven business strategies, foreign investors’ engagement vs investments in index funds and gender patterns, including the effectiveness of token female outside directors. The Japanese companies the author looked at incorporated foreign shareholders as consultants and adopted a few major shareholder-based customs, such as CEOs communicating with investors, having outside directors, increasing CEO compensation and slimming down unprofitable parts of the business via restructuring and downsizing. Simultaneously, they resisted a few major shareholder-based practices. Foreign shareholders’ pressure revealed tensions and contradictions between the Japanese stakeholder system and shareholder primacy-based customs.

This paper is one of the few qualitative studies that explores Japanese IR managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in corporate governance reform, with a particular focus on ownership, employment relations and board members. This paper provides examples of tension, conflict and cooperation between Japanese managers and foreign investors, as seen through the eyes of Japanese IR managers. Examining changes in Japan’s stakeholder-based system of corporate governance reform enables us to better understand the processes by which, with vigorous pressure from government and foreign shareholders, a non-western country like Japan may adopt shareholder-based customs and how such a change may also lead to institutional changes.

This paper aims to verify whether the integration of sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance and whether corporate governance characteristics enhance the relationship between sustainability compensation and firms’ non-financial performance and to expand the domain of the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is based on a sample of companies listed on the Milan Italian Stock Exchange from the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index over the 2016–2020 period. Regression analysis was used by using data retrieved from the Refinitiv Eikon database and the sample firms’ remuneration reports.

The findings of this paper show that embedding sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance. The results of this paper also reveal that specific corporate governance features can improve the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is limited to Italian firms included in the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index; however, the findings are highly significant.

The findings provide regulators with useful insights for considering the integration of sustainability goals into executive remuneration. Another implication is that policymakers should require – at least – listed firms to fulfil specific corporate governance structural requirements. Finally, the findings can provide investors and financial analysts with a greater awareness of the role played by executive remuneration in the long-term value-creation process.

This paper contributes to addressing the relationship among sustainability, remuneration and non-financial disclosure, drawing on the stakeholder–agency theoretical framework and focusing on Italian firms. This issue has received limited attention with controversial results in the literature.

Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies due to severe pay inequality. The authors thus accounted for the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa pertaining to the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected asset managers, chief executive officers, chief financial officers and remuneration committee members of listed financial services companies to gauge their views on the impact of shareholder activism endeavours on remuneration governance. The qualitative data was analysed by conducting thematic analysis.

Most of the asset managers and financial services representatives preferred proactive, private engagement on pay concerns, given the impact thereof on voting outcomes, and ultimately director remuneration practices and policies. Independent remuneration committees have a prominent role in facilitating engagements with investors to ensure fair remuneration.

The consequences should be clearer if organisations receive substantial votes against their pay policies and implementation reports. South African regulators can consider the “two-strikes” rule to ensure that action is taken in response to shareholder voting on director remuneration matters.

Representatives of asset managers and listed financial services investee companies offered valuable insights on remuneration governance deliberations in an emerging market. This in-depth analysis highlights the importance of proactive engagement to ensure that corporate leaders are paid fairly.

This study aims to explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and stock price crash risk in India. Furthermore, it seeks to analyse how insider trades may moderate the impact of CEO power on stock price crash risk.

A study of 236 companies from the S&P BSE 500 Index (2014–2023) have been analysed through pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in the baseline analysis. To enhance the results' reliability, robustness checks include alternative methodologies, such as panel data regression with fixed-effects, binary logistic regression and Bayesian regression. Additional control variables and alternative crash risk measure have also been utilised. To address potential endogeneity, instrumental variable techniques such as two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and difference-in-difference (DiD) methodologies are utilised.

Stakeholder theory is supported by results revealing that CEO power proxies like CEO duality, status and directorship reduce one-year ahead stock price crash risk and vice versa. Insider trades are found to moderate the link between select dimensions of CEO power and stock price crash risk. These findings persist after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, and the results remain consistent across alternative methodologies and variable inclusions.

This study significantly advances research on stock price crash risk, especially in emerging economies like India. The implications of these findings are crucial for investors aiming to mitigate crash risk, for corporations seeking enhanced governance measures and for policymakers considering the economic and welfare consequences associated with this phenomenon.

Agency theory motivated this study, posing that leverage mitigates the agency problem. The aim was to examine whether leverage influences the relationship between executive-employee pay gaps (EEPGs) and firm performance. The study was conducted in the mining and retail sectors between 2012 and 2021.

Two EEPGs were featured based on their executive fixed pay and variable incentives accumulation. Proxies of firm performance were headline earnings per share; return on assets; earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; and return on stock price. Data were collected from 76 JSE-listed firms in the retail and mining sectors and analysed using the two-step generalised method of moments.

The results revealed the hybrid implication of the pay gap for firm performance in the retail and mining sectors of South Africa, depending on the performance measures emphasised. More importantly, the study shows that with the moderating effects of leverage, firms can improve their performance while shrinking the pay gap.

The results have implications for policy addressing income inequality, debt management, executive compensation and regulatory reforms in South Africa concerning productivity and remuneration decisions.

The article provides specific literature for retail and mining industries on pay gaps, shows that it is possible to reduce the pay gap without compromising performance and suggests a new measure of performance that is more attuned to pay gap effect measurement.

This research aims to examine and understand the rationales and modalities behind the use of disclosure before, during and after a corporate governance scandal involving CPA Australia (CPAA).

Data beyond CPAA's annual reports were collected, such as news articles, media releases, an independent review panel (IRP) report, and the Chief Operating Officer's letter to members. These disclosures were manually coded and analysed through the word counts and word trees in NVivo. This study also relied on Norbert Elias' conceptual tool of power games among networks of actors – figurations – to model the scandal as a power game between the old Board, the press, concerned members, the IRP and the new Board. This study analysed the data to reveal a collective and in fieri power balance that changed with the phases of the scandal.

A mix of voluntary, involuntary, requested and absent disclosures was important in triggering, managing and ending the CPAA scandal. Moreover, communication and disclosure fulfilled a constitutive role since both: mobilised actors, enabled coordination among actors, contributed to pursuing shared goals and influenced power balances. Such a constitutive role was at the heart of the ability of coalitions of figurations to challenge and restore the powerful status quo.

This research introduces to accounting studies the collective and in fieri dimensions of power from figurational theory. Moreover, the research sheds new light on using voluntary, involuntary, requested and absent disclosures before, during and after a corporate crisis.

This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.

This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.

The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.

Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.

This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.