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Despite their salience as tools for understanding society–environment relationships, coupled natural and human (CNH) systems approaches have consistently failed to offer realistic pictures of the political processes that shape efforts to create sustainable societies. Engagement with William R. Freudenburg’s work on political inequalities in the regulation of natural resources and its incorporation into CNH work would address this source of weakness. Over the course of two decades, Freudenburg introduced a set of concepts that describe the political mechanisms through which politically powerful polluters prevent environmental policy reforms. Freudenburg and Gramling’s last book, about the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, integrates Freudenburg’s political concepts into a CNH analysis and produces an explanation for the oil spill that is exceptional in its empirically accurate treatment of the role of political inequalities in shaping environmental outcomes. Future progress in CNH systems analyses hinges to a great degree on its ability to portray power dynamics in realistic ways. The Freudenburg–Gramling book on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill shows us how to do so. It represents an intellectual legacy which Bill Freudenburg would have been proud of.

Granting mortgages to customers likely to become insolvent was widespread in Spain during the housing bubble that burst in 2007, resulting in an unprecedented rate of home repossessions. The practice was usually legal, but if power relations, structural determinations, and asymmetrical access to information are taken into account, it appears abusive and socially harmful. Several sorts of people were involved in it: bank staff who, under pressure from managers, took advantage of their long-standing relationships with customers; real estate agents and mortgage brokers who saw a business opportunity in people’s aspiration to home ownership; and investment banking executives who devised sophisticated financial products aimed at masking risk. For them, selling risky mortgages was not only a profitable business but also a way to comply with norms, values, and expectations at play in their social settings. This chapter will show how mortgage lending and its evaluation as wrong or acceptable by actors in different social positions has a relational nature, and is based on diverging moral economies that guide economic action in the framework of neoliberalism.

This chapter examines the roles and challenges for the Irish economy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Celtic Tiger and the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Specifically, it does review the role that Government, the Central Bank of Ireland, and the Financial Regulator had before, during and after the collapse of both the Irish banking system and property market. This chapter explains the drivers behind the growth of the Celtic Tiger and the sources of leverage that amplified the severity of the subsequent collapse. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the changes that have since been made and provides a review of the lessons that can be obtained from the collapse.

The results presented in this chapter are based on analysis of secondary sources and a literature review to determine conceptual and theoretical frameworks for identifying the specific issues that the Irish economy endured since the 2008 economic crisis and the red flags and signals that were either missed or ignored.

Combined with the subprime collapse of 2007 and the international sovereign debt crisis evident since 2008, Ireland and the actions of its regulators and policy makers undoubtedly generated not only a catalyst to financial ruin, but also an incubator to aid its severity. The precise drivers that created the Celtic Tiger remained unchanged and played a significant role in the subsequent collapse. Banks were leveraged towards the Irish property market and the role of leverage in financial markets created mispricing, to which the basic principles of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) failed. This miscalculation of risk was severe and destructive for the real economy. The reward for this error was a place in history as an ‘I’ in the derogatory term ‘PIIGS’.

This chapter could be used as teaching material for undergraduate and masters programmes in economics and finance. It provides a response to further understand the behaviour of the Irish economy during the development of the Celtic Tiger and the subsequent financial collapse that enveloped the Irish state.

This chapter discusses the role of leverage throughout a financial system and the necessity for financial monitors to promote an environment of sustainability and financial endurance; that which can survive an international financial crisis event.

This chapter analyses the recovery of the Danish economy from the crisis of the 1980s, its elevation to a bit of an ‘economic miracle’ or at least an ‘employment miracle’ from 1995 to 2005 and its subsequent decline during the financial crisis, which revealed more long-standing problems that precluded a quick recovery. The solution of Denmark's structural balance of payment problems in the early 1990s paved the way for long-term prosperity, and Denmark managed the challenges of globalisation and deindustrialisation almost without social costs. However, an accumulation of short-term policy failures and credit liberalisation facilitated a credit and housing bubble, a consumption-driven boom and declining competitiveness. In broad terms, the explanation is political; this includes not only vote- and office-seeking strategies of the incumbent government but also ideational factors such as agenda setting of economic policy. Somewhat unnoticed – partly because of preoccupation with long-term challenges of ageing and shortage of labour – productivity and economic growth rates had slowed down over several years. The Danish decline in GDP 2008–2009 was larger than in the 1930s, and after the bubble burst, there were few drivers of economic growth. Households consolidated and were reluctant to consume; public consumption had to be cut as well; exports increased rather slowly; and in this climate, there was little room for private investments. Financially, the Danish economy remained healthy, though. Current accounts revealed record-high surpluses after the financial crisis; state debt remained moderate, and if one were to include the enormous retained taxes in private pension funds, net state debt would de facto be positive. Still, around 2010–2011 there were few short-term drivers of economic growth, and rather unexpectedly, it turned out that unemployment problems were likely to prevail for several years.

This chapter examines the impact of sectoral indebtedness on GDP in Czechia, initially a low-indebted small open economy in which debt dynamics are becoming a major concern. The impact of household debt, non-financial corporation debt and public debt is analysed with the use of local projections based on instrumental variable estimations. The results show a more pronounced influence of household debt compared to non-financial corporation and government debt. Initially, increasing household debt stimulates short-run economic activity, but in the medium run, it limits household consumption and negatively affects output. This negative impact gradually turns into a positive effect in the long run. Non-financial corporation debt has a negative short- to medium-run impact but can have a small positive effect in the long run due to the prevalence of tradable industries. Public debt initially has a short-run negative impact, but then gradually becomes positive. Overall, the findings have implications for macroeconomic policies and the importance of monitoring financial stability.

Given the growing interest in social movements as policy agenda setters, this paper investigates the contexts within which movement groups and actors work with political elites to promote their common goals for policy change. In asking how and why so-called outsiders gain access to elites and to the policymaking process, I address several contemporary theoretical and empirical concerns associated with policy change as a social movement goal. I examine the claim that movements use a multipronged, long-term strategy by working with and targeting policymakers and political institutions on the one hand, while shaping public preferences – hearts and minds – on the other; that these efforts are not mutually exclusive. In addition, I look at how social movement organizations and actors are critical in expanding issue conflict outside narrow policy networks, often encouraged to do so by political elites with similar policy objectives. And, I discuss actors’ mobility in transitioning from institutional activists to movement and organizational leaders, and even to protesters, and vice versa. The interchangeability of roles among actors promoting social change in strategic action fields points to the porous and fluid boundaries between state and nonstate actors and organizations.