Search results

Cryptoassets have recently attracted the attention of national and international financial regulators. Since the mid-2010s blockchains have increasingly been adapted to automate and replace many aspects of financial intermediation, and by 2015 Ethereum had created the smart contract language that underpins the digitization of real assets as asset-backed tokens (ABTs). Those were initially issued by FinTech companies, but more recently banks active on international capital and financial markets, and even central banks, for example, the Bank of Thailand, have developed their own digital platforms and blockchains. A wide variety of real and financial assets underpins ABTs, viz., real-estate, art, corporate and sovereign bonds, and equity. Consequently, owing to the significant market capitalization of cryptocurrencies, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published two consultative papers delineating its approach on cryptoasset regulation. In this study, the authors analyze the mechanics of ABTs and their potential risks, relying on case studies of recent issuance of tokens in equity, real-estate, and debt markets, to highlight their main characteristics. The authors also investigate the consequences of the increasingly oligopolistic structure of blockchain mining pools and Bitcoin exchanges for the integrity and security of unregulated distributed ledgers. Finally, the authors analyze the BCBS’ regulatory proposals, and discuss the reaction of international financial institutions and cryptocurrency interest groups. The main findings are, firstly, that most ABTs are akin to asset-backed securities. Secondly, nearly all ABTs are “off-chain/on-chain,” that is, the underlying is a traditional asset that exists off-chain and is subsequently digitized. The main exception is the World Bank’s bond-i that is genuinely native to the blockchain created by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and has no existence outside it. Thirdly, all ABTs are issued on permissioned blockchains, where anti-money laundering/anti-terrorist funding and know-your-customer regulations are enforced. From a prudential regulatory perspective, ABTs do not appear to pose serious systemic risks to international financial markets. This may account for the often negative reactions of banks, banking associations, and cryptocurrency interest groups to the BCBS’ 2021 proposals for risk-weighted capital provisions for cryptoassets, which are viewed as excessive. Finally, we found that issuance of ABTS and other smart contracts on permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum could potentially generate financial instability. A precedent involving Ethereum and The DAO in 2016 shows that (i) there is a significant accountability gap in permissionless blockchains, and (ii) the core developers of blockchains and smart contract technology, and Bitcoin mining pools, exercise an unexpectedly high- and completely unregulated-amount of power in what is supposedly a decentralized network.

Recently East Asian policymakers have focused on facilitating corporate bond market development through a host of financial market reforms including greater foreign participation in the domestic markets as issuers and investors. However, the alternate approach – the encouragement of domestic issuers to further tap international markets – remains largely ignored. The objective of this study is to investigate these issues in the context of reform undertaken by Thailand following the Asian Crisis of 1997. As a small and open economy, Thailand was forced to become more receptive to foreign investment and capital market participation. We raise the significance of bond return volatility and skewness as an impediment to greater involvement by international investors. Empirical analysis highlights the time-varying nature of both variance and skewness of bond returns, which can only be overcome through government policy that focuses upon stabilizing the macroeconomic environment and not simply enhancing domestic and regional financial market infrastructure.

Guided by Ericson’s counter-law analytic, the focus of this paper is how peace bonds erode traditional criminal law principles to govern uncertainty and provide applicants with a “freedom from fear” (Ericson, 2007a). Peace bonds permit the courts to impose a recognizance on anyone likely to cause harm or “personal injury” to a complainant. This paper conducts a critical discourse analysis to answer the question: how and to what extent are peace bonds a form of counter-law? Facilitated by the erosion of traditional criminal law principles and rationalized under a precautionary logic, proving that a complainant is fearful through a peace bond can result in the expansion of the state’s capacity to criminalize and conduct surveillance.

It is shown in the literature that the Arellano–Bond type generalized method of moments (GMM) of dynamic panel models is asymptotically biased (e.g., Hsiao & Zhang, 2015; Hsiao & Zhou, 2017). To correct the asymptotical bias of Arellano–Bond GMM, the authors suggest to use the jackknife instrumental variables estimation (JIVE) and also show that the JIVE of Arellano–Bond GMM is indeed asymptotically unbiased. Monte Carlo studies are conducted to compare the performance of the JIVE as well as Arellano–Bond GMM for linear dynamic panels. The authors demonstrate that the reliability of statistical inference depends critically on whether an estimator is asymptotically unbiased or not.

This paper estimates the conditional hazard baseline (term-structure) of the hazard rate to default at the time of bonds’ issuance by using two hazard models–one ignoring and another allowing unobserved heterogeneity (UH) in the hazard rate. Following Diamond (1989) one can predict a declining hazard rate to default due to adverse selection and moral hazard. After controlling for UH caused by adverse selection and time-series shocks, the hazard rate shows to be increasing over time and hence the moral hazard effect cannot be confirmed.