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This study aims to examine the mechanisms that were being used to enhance board accountability of Ghanaian listed banks, and how board accountability can be improved.

The 2011 and 2016 annual reports of listed banks on the Ghana Stock Exchange were examined, and a survey questionnaire was sent to board members of nine banks.

The results show that the directors of Ghanaian listed banks prioritise a shareholder approach to accountability, with a shift towards stakeholders. Audit committees, external audits and internal audits were the main mechanisms used by these banks to enhance board accountability. Some of these mechanisms were not used effectively by a number of these banks.

Board accountability can be improved by appointing very competent people to the board, the national adoption of a mandatory code of corporate governance, regular rotation of external auditors and requiring non-executive directors to stand for re-election more frequently. Our research identifies weaknesses of accountability mechanisms and offers timely recommendations for banks and regulators to build stronger corporate governance systems.

This study obtained valuable opinions of the boards of directors, provides insights on boards of Ghanaian listed banks and contributes to the literature of corporate governance and accountability in Africa.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the differing ways in which nonprofit charter and traditional public school board members define the concept of accountability in the school or schools they oversee. The findings speak to the governing consequences of shifting oversight of public education from democratically elected bodies to unelected nonprofit governing boards.

The authors use originally collected survey data from democratically elected school board members and nonprofit charter school board members in Minnesota to test for differences in how these two populations view accountability. Open-ended survey questions are coded according to a previously used accountability typology.

The authors find that charter school board members are more likely than traditional public school board members to define accountability through high stakes testing as opposed to staff professionalization and bureaucratic systems.

The results speak to the link between board governance structure and accountability in the public education sector, providing new understanding on the way in which non-elected charter school board members view their accountability function.

Despite indications of scholarly interest, there are still gaps in the research of the concept of felt accountability, especially the felt accountability of board members. This paper aims to clarify the sources of accountability experienced by board members. Especially those in a non-executive capacity. How these sources can be accessed to enhance felt accountability and thereby governance effectiveness is explored.

Qualitative, exploratory research methods were used. In total, 15 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were completed with non-executive board members of Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies in South Africa. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse data.

The findings clarified the formal and informal sources of accountability experienced by non-executive board members. This included relational and structural mechanisms that can be used within corporate governance to enhance both types of accountability. Accessing the identified sources of accountability through appropriate mechanisms could increase the levels of felt accountability experienced by the individual non-executive board member, thereby strengthening accountability inside the boardroom and improving overall board effectiveness. The study also revealed a layer of implicit and explicit accountability.

The study was conducted solely in South Africa, with non-executive board members of Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies.

There is limited research that clarifies the sources of accountability experienced by non-executive board members. This study aims to address this gap in the literature by providing techniques on how to enable the clarified sources of accountability to improve governance effectiveness.

Corporate accountability is a complex chain of reporting that reaches from external stakeholders into the organization’s management structure. The transition from external to internal accountability mechanisms primarily occurs at the board of directors. Yet outside of incentive mechanisms, we know surprisingly little about how internal actors (management) are held to account by the representatives of external shareholders (the board). The purpose of this paper is to explore the process of accountability at this transition point by documenting the routines used by boards to hold the firm’s management to account. In doing so, we develop the understanding of the important transition between internal and external firm accountability.

An inductive, case-based approach identifies recurrent behaviour patterns in two matched boards over three video-taped meetings. Sequential analysis of coded group and individual behaviours provides insight into boards’ accountability routines.

The boards engaged in clear, recurrent accountability routines. Individuals on the boards play different roles in these routines depending on the issue before the board, allowing both directors and managers to hold each other to account. The outsiders (directors) both challenge and support the insiders (managers) during board discussions, switching their behaviours with different agenda items but maintaining a consistent group level of support and scepticism across the meeting. This allows for the simultaneous development of trust and verification at the group level, a necessary condition for effective accountability.

As board relationships and organisational context are highly variable, future research should concentrate on testing the generalizability of the results across different board and shareholder structures.

The results call into question the current governance focus on the independence of the individual director, as the authors identify that all directors appear to act as agents at one time or another in a meeting. Accountability at the boardroom level requires an effective group process not usually addressed in governance recommendations or regulation.

This study provides unique insights into board dynamics, documenting the accountability implications of group behaviours. By focussing on the group process, the authors highlight the potential mismatch of monotonic, individual-level approaches to governance and accountability prevalent in current agency approaches.

The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory.

The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory.

While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory.

The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach.

While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether the expectations and requirements contained within the corporate governance code have an impact on how accountability is perceived, understood and practiced by company board members in an emerging economy (Mauritius).

The paper relies on 24 semi‐structured interviews of board members in listed and non‐listed companies and also analyses the accountability implications present in the local code of corporate governance and relevant reports. The analysis is informed by the typologies of board accountability and process developed by Roberts in 2001 (socialising, individualising, sovereign and complementary) and is complemented by Pettigrew and McNulty's 1995 notions of minimalist and maximalist boards.

From a state which can largely be associated to the notion of sovereign governance and a minimalist board, the findings reveal a substantive change in the type of board accountability but it is one which privileges an individualising form of board interactions. A move to a more empowered “maximalist” board is also noted. Notwithstanding, the paper uncovers specific issues with the INED as an accountability mechanism in that there is much fuzziness on his/her role and motivations and whether INEDs can conceivably contribute to a socialising form of board accountability.

The paper responds to calls for more qualitative research on how boards actually operate in emerging economies, at a time when an increasing number of countries have adopted corporate governance requirements drawn primarily from the Anglo‐American model. This paper contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on corporate board processes and dynamics in non‐Western contexts.

To demonstrate transparency and accountability, the three boards in this study are required to meet in public in front of an audience, although the boards reserve confidential issues for discussion in private sessions. This study examines boardroom public accountability, contrasting it with accountability in board meetings held in private. The study adopts Erving Goffman's impression management theory to interpret divergences between boardroom behaviour in public and private, or “frontstage” and “backstage” in Goffman's terminology.

The research observes and video-records three board meetings for each of the three boards (nine board meetings), in public and private. The research operationalises accountability in terms of director-manager question-and-answer interactions.

In the presence of an audience of local stakeholders, the boards employ impression management techniques to demonstrate accountability, by creating the impression that non-executive directors are performing challenge and managers are providing satisfactory answers. Thus, they “save the show” in Goffman terms. These techniques enable board members and managers to navigate the interface between demonstrating the required good governance and the competence of the organisations and their managers, while not revealing issues that could tarnish their image and concern the stakeholders. The boards need to demonstrate to the audience that “matters are what they appear to be”, even if they are not. The research identifies behaviour consistent with impression management to manage this complexity. The authors conclude that regulatory objectives have not met their transparency aspirations.

For the first time, the research studies the effect of transparency regulations (“sunshine” laws) on the behaviour of boards of directors meeting in public. The study contributes to the embryonic literature based on video-taped board meetings to access the “black box” of the boardroom, which permits a study of impression management at board meetings not previously possible. This study extends prior impression management theory by identifying eleven impression management techniques that non-executive directors and managers use and which are unique to a boardroom context.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the accountability practices of the directors in New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives. An interpretation of their practices, which focus on the relationship between directors and their farmer-shareholders, is informed by Roberts’ (2001a) understandings of a socializing accountability.

The fieldwork consists of interviews with 23 directors, including all chief executive officers and chairmen, of six dairy co-operatives together with observations and document analysis. These co-operatives together comprise a significant portion of the regional dairy industry. The methodology draws from Eisenhardt’s (1989) qualitative approach to theory formation.

The authors find that these directors engage in a discourse-based, community-grounded and egalitarian form of socializing accountability. As such, their practices adhere generally to Roberts (2001a) hopes for a more considerate and humble relationship between an accountor and an accountee.

Findings add to the small pool of research on the lived experiences of co-operative boards and to a parsimonious literature in socializing accountability practices. The contributions of the study are in advancing real understandings of alternative forms of accountability, in evaluating the conditions in which these alternatives may be likely to arise and in anticipating the challenges and opportunities that arise therefrom.

The originality of the project arises from accessing the views of these industry leaders and, through their frank expressions, coming to understand how they achieve a form of a socializing accountability in their relationships with farmer-shareholders.

The purpose of this article is to report the findings from research into the governance of adult safeguarding policy and practice in England, with particular focus on interagency partnership arrangements expressed through Safeguarding Adults Boards.

The study comprised a systematic search and thematic analysis of English‐language literature on adult safeguarding governance, a survey of Safeguarding Adults Board documentation, and key informant interviews and workshops with professionals involved in adult protection.

The effectiveness of adult safeguarding governance arrangements has not been subject to prior formal evaluation and thus the literature provided little research‐led evidence of good practice. The survey and workshops, however, revealed a rich and complex pattern of arrangements spanning a number of dimensions – the goals and purpose of interagency working, the structures of boards, their membership, chairing and rules of engagement, their functions, and their accountabilities.

The research focus here is England, and thus does not incorporate learning from other jurisdictions. Whilst the research scrutinises the extent to which Boards practise empowerment, service users and carers are not directly involved in the fieldwork aspects of this study. In view of the absence of outcomes evidence identified, there remains a need to investigate the impacts of different forms of governance.

Drawing on this research and on governance frameworks in the context of related interagency fields, the article identifies standards to benchmark the approach to governance taken by Safeguarding Adult Boards.

The benchmarking framework will enable Safeguarding Adults Boards to audit, evaluate, and further develop a range of robust governance arrangements.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss why public sector reforms hybridize during implementation processes, consequences on accountability relations and practitioners’ and policymakers’ reactions to these changes.

The paper considers experiences from three initiatives related to the governance reform in the Norwegian hospital sector. Data were collected via interviews and document studies, and all three cases were longitudinal studies.

Unexpected consequences of reform initiatives and contextual changes are causing controls to hybridize and having profound effects on accountability relations. However, the gradually alignment of controls in a dynamic pattern of hybridization enables the balancing of conflicts in the chain of accountabilities. Hybrid controls are observed to emerge as stronger than the initial ideal control models. The longitudinal studies of control hybridization illuminate the sector’s survival in the long run, as they allow for adaptation to changes in contexts.

This work augments leaders’ understanding of how governmental strategies may follow diverse paths and yield results that diverge from intentions. Narrow accountability bases inhibit the government from implementing political decisions through agencies. Conversely, agents must relate to direct control from authorities. The predictability of agents’ decision space is reduced, and the control process becomes more ambiguous.

Through connecting what happens in agencies with accountabilities in the political level, it is possible to study the flexible nature of accountability relations and why controls hybridize. The paper underlines the need for longitudinal studies to describe complex patterns of reform initiatives.