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The purpose of this paper is to examine the differences in consumers' attributions of blame for service failures and its affect on their expectations for recovery in both online and offline settings.

A sample of non‐student adults participated in a 2 (service type) by 2 (shopping medium) experimental design testing the affects of on‐ and offline shopping on consumers' attributions of blame for a service failure. Specifically, regression is employed to test the effects of on/offline medium on blame and expected service failure recovery in both the airline and banking industries.

Empirical support is found for the hypotheses that online subjects blame themselves more for service failures, and, in turn, expect less of a recovery than offline consumers. The on/offline medium is shown to have a mediated effect on expected service failure recovery through blame in the airline data. In the bank data, on/offline medium has a significant affect on blame, and blame has a significant affect on expected service failure recovery, though on/offline medium does not show a mediated affect on expected service failure recovery.

Because online customers tend to blame themselves more for service failures, managers may be able to offer less of service failure recovery online than offline. Furthermore, online customers may be more willing to recover for themselves, thereby saving the firm money and placing customers more in control of their service experience.

This study allows for the possibility of consumers' blaming themselves for service failures and, to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine how attribution for service failure affects expected service failure recovery in both on‐ and offline settings. Managers should find our results useful in developing service failure recovery strategies.

While third-party food delivery continues to increase in popularity, surveys suggest nearly a quarter of deliveries suffer from service failures. With the limited research on third-party food delivery, we explore the important questions of (1) where customers place blame in the case of service failures with third-party food delivery (i.e. the platform or the restaurant) and (2) does this depend on the type of service failure? Drawing on blame attribution theory, signaling theory, and an exploratory study, we demonstrate that customers typically perceive such mishaps to be the responsibility of the restaurant rather than the delivery platform itself. We also examine the effect of visible service failure preventative actions taken by the restaurant on blame attribution and re-order intention.

We conducted two online scenario-based studies to explore customer blame attribution in the case of third-party food delivery service failure. First, an exploratory study approach (N_{Study1 = 512}) was taken to provide additional support for the hypothesis development. An experiment (N_{Study2 = 252}) was then conducted to examine the hypothesized effects.

First, the results of an exploratory study demonstrate that customers attribute service failures such as wrong items, missing items, cold food, or leaking containers to restaurants over third-party food delivery platforms. Second, the results of an experimental study suggest inclusion of an observable cue indicating preventative action, such as time-stamp information indicating when an order was received and packaged for delivery, increases customer re-order intention through the underlying mechanism of blame attribution.

We contribute to the underexplored area of third-party food delivery service failure and to our understanding of blame attribution in service failure scenarios. Further, we demonstrate a practical method to shift the blame away from restaurants for service failures that are outside of the establishment’s control.

When companies face a crisis, they sometimes deliver blame-shifting communications, trying to shift blame onto another actor to protect their reputation. While previous research has considered how different features of the message affect its persuasiveness, little is known about whether specific senders can blame more effectively. This paper aims to contribute to research in this domain through an investigation of the sender’s social perception as a critical moderator to the persuasiveness of blame shifting.

The authors conduct four between-subjects scenario experiments to test the research hypotheses. In each experiment, participants are presented with a realistic crisis scenario and the crisis communications delivered by the company. The authors assess the extent to which perceptions of the sender influence the message’s ability to reduce negative word-of-mouth intentions and to increase purchase intentions.

The authors show that blame shifting is more likely to be effective when deployed by senders that are small (Study 1) or have a positive CSR track record (Study 2). Furthermore, The authors find that even large senders can successfully deploy blame shifting if they can benefit from being known for their CSR programs (Study 3). Finally, the authors show that the effect of blame shifting depends on the receiver’s level of concern about the crisis: stakeholders significantly concerned by the crisis reject blame-shifting communications (Study 4).

Further research should examine the impact of information about brand competence on blame-shifting effectiveness. Further research is also needed to explore sender effects for other defensive crisis communication strategies such as denial or the use of excuses or justifications.

The study offers critical information for marketers considering the use of defensive crisis communications strategies such as blame shifting.

The study extends the understanding of how sender effects influence blame-shifting communications. The analysis allows us to clarify why this strategy is effective for certain senders and certain receivers while, for others, it tends to backfire. Blame shifting backfires for large senders unless they can boast a strong CSR record.

This study investigated a new attributional phenomenon in a brand scandal setting in which consumers tend to blame the top management of a brand, even though it was the frontline parties that caused the scandal. The authors termed this phenomenon upward blame attribution (UBA), shedding light on whether consumers in a host country indicate a higher UBA for a multinational (vs domestic) brand scandal, which in turn reinforces their revenge and impairs their reconciliation reactions, and whether these effects are contingent on consumer animosity.

Two experimental studies were conducted with real and fictitious brand/product and country stimuli with 1,399 Chinese participants.

Both studies verified UBA and found that Chinese consumers' UBA is higher for multinational (vs domestic) brand scandals, which drives their stronger desire for revenge and weaker desire for reconciliation. Moreover, consumers with high (vs low) animosity toward a multinational brand's home country reported a higher UBA for the multinational (vs domestic) brand scandal, which in turn reinforces their desire for revenge and impairs their desire for reconciliation.

The study provides new insights into host-country consumers' more severe UBA and responses toward multinational versus domestic brand scandals and the amplifying role of consumer animosity in these processes. It also has implications for mitigating host-country consumers' UBA and negative responses to multinational brand scandals.

This study contributes to the blame attribution literature by verifying consumers' UBA and the country-of-origin (COO) literature by revealing host-country consumers' higher UBA, stronger revenge desire and weaker reconcile desire toward multinational (vs domestic) brand scandals. It extends the knowledge regarding consumers' blame attributions toward the top management of a multinational (vs domestic) brand in scandals and the impact of such attributions.

During a brand crisis, consumers construct attributions to understand the cause of the crisis and to assign blame, with attributions of blame to firms consequently lowering brand attitudes. The purpose of this paper is to explore attributions of blame in performance- versus values-related brand crisis. Do consumers assign different levels of blame to values- versus performance-related brand crises?

The authors conducted three experimental studies, plus one pilot study, with American, British and Australian participants in which they manipulated the type of brand crisis as values- or performance-related to determine the extent to which consumers attribute blame to the firm and the effects of those attributions on consumers’ brand attitudes.

Findings indicated that consumers assign more blame to firms for a values-related brand crisis than for a performance-related brand crisis.

The findings of this study explain how consumers are harsher towards firms that violate some moral or social standards than those that exhibit product defects.

For branding and public relations officials, finding greater internal attribution for values-related brand crises offers implications for how and what information about such crises ought to be conveyed to manage consumer response and brand reputation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the findings are the first to explore attributions in blame toward values- and performance-related brand crises.

The authors aim to explore how perspective-taking and attribution of blame lead to side-taking by human resource professionals (HRPs) when making judgements and handling complaints of sexual harassment.

Employing qualitative methodology, the authors used semi-structured in-depth interviews with 35 HRPs from 30 companies in Sri Lanka. Attribution theory and perspective-taking were used as theoretical lenses.

In handling complaints of sexual harassment incidents, HRPs take the perspectives of the alleged perpetrator, complainant, or the company and attribute the blame to the alleged perpetrator or the complainant. Irrespective of the gender of the HRPs and the perspective they take, they would most often blame the female complainants due to sexual harassment myths and misperceptions and traditional sex-role beliefs. Thus, they either take the side of the alleged perpetrator or the company, explicitly/implicitly or intentionally/unintentionally.

The central originality of this research is the finding that HRPs take sides in resolving complaints of sexual harassment and perspective-taking and attribution of blame by HRPs lead to this side-taking in organisational settings.

Supervisor incivility and organizational gossip are two examples of dark organizational behaviors. Norm of reciprocity theory suggests that employees may develop revenge intentions after exposure to such behaviors while attributing blame to others. This study aims to empirically investigate the mediating effect of blaming others on the impact of supervisor incivility and negative organizational gossip on revenge intention.

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to test the measurement model. Structural equation model was used to test the research hypotheses based on data gathered in Turkey from restaurant employees in Mersin Marina selected by convenience sampling. Data set that consists of 239 questionnaires was subjected to CFA.

The findings show that negative organizational gossip and supervisor incivility increase to employees’ revenge intentions, and blaming others mediates the impact of supervisor incivility and negative organizational gossip no employees’ revenge intentions. In addition, blaming others mediates the impact of supervisor incivility and negative organizational gossip on employees’ revenge intentions.

Empirical study has not been encountered related to dark behaviors of (especially gossip, incivility, blame and revenge intention) restaurant managers and employees as a holistic model. Therefore, this paper contributes to organizational behavior literature. Moreover, this paper suggests to restaurant managers for supply to organizational peace.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the complexity of the network governance setting affects accountability practices. The authors pay particular attention to the organizational characteristics that may enable a common understanding of multiple accountability relationships, or lead to problems in reconciling competing forms of accountability, thereby appearing as blame game-type behavior.

The authors conducted a case study with 31 semi-structured interviews in a Finnish health care organization (FHC) that offers basic public health care services. The organization represents a co-operative arrangement with the main city and three smaller municipalities. The FHC has faced difficulties in balancing budget constraints with the provision of statutory care to citizens. This case is analyzed with the help of theories relating to accountability, the blame game, and dialogue.

The authors found that in the FHC operating under austerity constraints, attempts to reconcile financial, professional, and democratic accountability were made but, instead of dialogue and consensus, the different stakeholder groups resorted to defensive tactics in order to protect their resources, position, or sense of professional obligation. The authors suggest that in a context of network governance, accompanied by an increasing emphasis on financial accountability, organizational practices are susceptible to conflicting accountabilities and behavior characterized in this paper as a blame game.

The study contributes to the empirical studies on accountability in the new public governance context by analyzing the complex accountability relations between stakeholder groups with different agendas. The authors suggest organizational characteristics that may exacerbate conflicts between different stakeholder groups and prevent constructive dialogue. Furthermore, the study analyzes the composition of democratic accountability within the studied organization.

Using insights from attributions, planned behavior, and fairness theories, this study examines the effect of blame attributions of psychological contract breach on employees’ attitudes (affective organizational commitment) and behaviors (organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)). The purpose of this paper is to understand whether employees’ reactions depend on the attributions they make concerning who is responsible for the breach.

Cross-lagged design in which data were collected from 220 employees and their supervisors in a public company at two times. Moderated mediation was tested using the bootstrapping analysis outlined by Hayes (2012).

The results supported the authors’ predictions: employees’ blame attributions to the organization have a negative impact on OCBs (as rated by supervisors in time 2) through decreased affective organizational commitment, but blame attributions to the economic context act as a buffer to the relationship between blame attributions to organization and affective organizational commitment, with consequences for OCBs.

Attributions can also be made to concrete persons (i.e. supervisor, coworker, self) rather than to just the organization or context.

When hiring, recruiters should provide accurate and realistic promises to the candidates. When facing hard times, managers should provide additional information to employees and adjust their expectations to the current situation of the firm.

This study makes a unique contribution to the literature by questioning the “single story” perspective about reactions to psychological contract breach, in which it is assumed that employees always respond negatively to such event.

Examines the ways in which reporters from differing fields of work in a high‐risk environment (the Aviation Safety Reporting System in the USA) strive through narrative to present and maintain a coherent sense of self through face‐work involving blame acceptance or avoidance. Proposes not to locate specific and final locations for blame, but to instead recognize risk as an underlying factor in a discourse about error and blame in an increasingly global society. In the case examined discourses of blame varied in different worlds of work. Concludes that the approach taken of mapping blame options within different work worlds within a larger context can provide a foundation for ongoing risk assessment through the tracking of shifting blame options over time or the ways in which options are interwoven between work worlds. Maintains that this study may aid in the development of new approaches to risk.