Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions

Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability

ISBN: 978-0-85724-747-6, eISBN: 978-0-85724-748-3

ISSN: 0193-2306

Publication date: 2 May 2011

Abstract

Application – Uniform-price auctions appear to perform at least as well as other auction designs with respect to discovery of efficient market prices when there are unexpected and unannounced changes in willingness to pay for permits.

Citation

Burtraw, D., Goeree, J., Holt, C., Myers, E., Palmer, K. and Shobe, W. (2011), "Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions", Isaac, R.M. and Norton, D.A. (Ed.) Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 14), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 11-36. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-2306(2011)0000014004

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2011, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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