Application – Uniform-price auctions appear to perform at least as well as other auction designs with respect to discovery of efficient market prices when there are unexpected and unannounced changes in willingness to pay for permits.
Burtraw, D., Goeree, J., Holt, C., Myers, E., Palmer, K. and Shobe, W. (2011), "Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions", Isaac, R.M. and Norton, D.A. (Ed.) Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 14), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 11-36. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-2306(2011)0000014004
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