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The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

The financial crisis that hit countries worldwide in 2007 tested and tried deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) and their ability to protect consumers’ bank deposits. The crisis also served as a reality check for regulators, institutions and the general public alike. Against this backdrop, there was a significant rationale by governments and regulators to protect consumers and at the same time maintain financial stability through expansion of coverage offered in existing DGS arrangements or setting up such a scheme where this was not already in place.

Consumers need other possible safety net in addition to the already set-up lender-of-last resort facilities provided by central banks, banking supervision regulations, assistance granted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank and also the recently enacted EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

In this chapter the authors evaluated whether the launch of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) as a single deposit guarantee in Europe which is now being recognised as one of the three main pillars, together with the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms, would enhance depositors’ protection in times of banking crisis and also reinforce financial stability in the EU as part of the proposed Banking Union.

The chapter made reference to academic literature and also recent EDIS political dossier to outline the developments. Apart from political insensitivity to the proposed EDIS, the chapter also concluded that the introduction of EDIS raises questions about moral hazard amongst banks in the EU, issues on bank’s contributions during the transition period and difficulty in comparing banks across EU countries through banks’ deposits and risk profiles.

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to determine the significant difference between the performance of the Indian banks in pre coronavirus disease (COVID 19) and post COVID 19 periods. Further, it explores the impact of COVID 19 on the profitability of the Indian banks by investigating variation between the non-performing assets (NPAs) and the net profit of the banks during pre and post COVID 19 periods.

Need of the study: The COVID 19 outbreak has affected various industries including Indian banks which reported an increase in NPAs, and demand for credit which in turn impacted profitability. This study was carried out to examine the impact of COVID 19 outbreak on Indian banking sector.

Methodology: This study uses different banks’ NPA and net profits performance to examine the effect of COVID 19 on banks’ overall performance. The data have been collected from secondary sources, commercial websites, and websites of Indian banks (private and public sectors). t-Test was used to analyse the data.

Findings: Among public sector banks, Canara Bank was found to have a significant difference in net profit in the pre and post COVID 19 periods. In private sector banks, HDFC Bank showed a significant difference in the net profit in pre and post COVID 19 periods. For NPAs, all private banks showed no significant difference in pre and post COVID 19 period results.

Implications: The study revealed that both private and public sector banks in India were mildly affected by pandemic and most of them are significantly reporting no difference in net profit and NPAs during pre and post COVID 19 periods.

Islamic and cooperative banks – including credit unions – are broadly similar in that they both share risk with savers. However, risk sharing goes along with ownership control in cooperatives, whilst Islamic banks share risk with borrowers also, and full downside risk with depositors. Islamic banking is consistent with mutual ownership, which may ease some of the governance and efficiency concerns implied by Shari’ah constraints. Greater risk sharing among cooperative bank stakeholders, along the lines of products offered by Islamic banks, may strengthen cooperatives’ financial resilience.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.

Recent institutional scholarship has discovered new possibilities for change in both the accumulation of incremental transformations and in the skillful action, institutional work, and creative activities of political and institutional entrepreneurs. Lurking behind stability and change lie actors who can act reflexively within and with existing institutions, and who do so on a routine, rather than exceptional basis, redeploying, recombining, and transposing extant systems to solve problems of identity and control. This paper probes the potentials and limits of those possibilities – and the prospects for reform in American banking – via a case study of the Bank of North Dakota and efforts to transpose its hybrid model of state and community logics into other states. The analysis first finds a full range of institutional labors and skillful activities emphasized by recent work as the foundation for transposition. It finds crisis; the presence of multiple logics; the mobilization of boundary spanning networks; the use of conferences and theorization to sustain independent discourse and collective identities; skillful framing; and substantial editing and recombination to fit the model with receiving states’ institutions. It then juxtaposes these conditions with outcomes in the states, developing some implications for actor-centered institutionalisms, current preoccupations with mechanisms, and state-level strategies for financial reform.