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A hedge-fund strategist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the “new normal” that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is—the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Spain, and Ireland and those in Germany—how would they evolve over the next year? Was the dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates likely to persist, or would the coming year see a continuation of the modest reconvergence that has occurred since mid–2012? He knew many factors influenced long-term interest rates; he would have to use his entire toolkit to address this issue. The evidence was in no way clear-cut. Some factors pointed toward lower German rates, some toward higher, some toward a widening of euro zone spreads (even a dissolution of the euro zone as we know it?), and some toward reconvergence.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

This public-sourced case describes the latest restructuring efforts by Deutsche Bank (DB) and gives a short history of prior restructuring efforts from the decade before. In July 2019, Christian Sewing, the new CEO of DB, announced a series of measures that included, among others, the elimination of global equity trading, the layoff of 18,000 employees, the creation of a “bad bank” to transfer noncore assets, and the suspension of dividends until 2022. The case describes key decisions a bank CEO makes when a bank needs to change course to return to profitability and growth. The case offers an opportunity to debate these key decisions, as well as discuss some of the prior ones during earlier restructuring efforts, and put the students in the CEO's shoes: What would you do and why? The case also describes key banking performance metrics (e.g., ROE, ROA) and other critical variables such as those reflecting capital health (Tier 1 ratio), as well as gives an overview of the bank business model and factors impacting bank profitability and value.

The learning outcomes of this study are to gain an understanding of the banking regulations and their impact on banking performance, to understand the intermediation role of banks by channelizing depositors’ savings and providing loans to borrowers, to explain an impact of a recent regulatory change in the Indian banking that directly impacts their financial performance, to critically evaluate the different financial ratios to analyze the performance of a bank and to build a DuPont analysis framework for banks.

The case serves as a primer on banking regulations in India and provides insights into banking performance. Banking regulations play an important role in maintaining financial stability, specifically in emerging economies like India. The protagonist of the case is Salil Kumar who presented his internship project to the review committee of Stock Investment Company on April 16, 2021. However, he had to rework and present his final project within seven days on the basis of the feedback received from the committee. Kumar faced the dilemma of bringing together a comparative study across two banks, namely, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI Bank) and State Bank of India (SBI) and building a DuPont framework covering the different aspects of banking performance. The case exemplifies the intricate regulatory landscape in India within which banks operate and highlights the recent alterations introduced by the Reserve Bank of India. For instance, the framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) was introduced in 2014 and subsequently adopted in August 2015. The D-SIB framework provides inherent guarantee to large banks such as ICICI Bank and SBI. This ensures government backup in the event of any failure, thereby securing financial stability. The case study is suitable for banking and financial accounting courses taught in postgraduate management programs. Once the case is studied, the students are expected to understand the basics of banking, regulations, impact of regulations on banking performance and financial measures.

The case provides valuable insights into the intricate dynamics of the banking industry, offering a critical perspective for analysis. A well-structured teaching note would serve as a valuable tool for instructors, allowing them to facilitate engaging classroom discussions and effectively guide students toward achieving the desired teaching objectives.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 1: Accounting and Finance.

Marketing, strategy.

This case is suitable for post graduate and executive development students.

The case provides perspectives of customer centric practices of Yes Bank which has the objective of becoming the best quality bank of the world in India. The case study outlines how Yes Bank has become the fastest growing bank by its strong focus on customers through its committed and innovative employees. The customer centricity develops strong existing relationships and focuses on providing exceptional customer service, leading to better financial performance.

These include: highlighting the characteristics of customer centric organizations; discussing how Yes Bank practised customer centricity despite the limitation of being a new bank with no experience; describing the key differentiators and comparing with those of other banks; and establishing the relationship between customer centric practices with financial performance.

Teaching notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.

This case invites students to evaluate, based on given materials, the causes, consequences, and potential resolutions of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The premise of a business professor preparing a slide presentation dramatizes an analysis of the financial crisis. Reviewing his data, much of it in graph form, the professor ponders the central role of banks and the impact of risk management, leverage, and incentives. His main thesis is that the fundamental issue surrounding this crisis was the misjudgment of the risks taken, with the result that risk management failed to do its job of curtailing and managing risk as expected.

In response to the potential collapse of large financial institutions in 2007, the U.S. government committed trillions of dollars to loans, asset purchases, guarantees, direct spending to provide fiscal stimulus, expansionary monetary policy, and bailouts of various private financial institutions. The bailouts were especially controversial because public money was used to protect private financial institutions and their wealthy executives while ordinary citizens received no such protection. One outcome of the government's response was the proposal to enact into law the Volcker rule, which prohibited banks from engaging in proprietary trading, or trading for their own---not their clients'---benefit. Proprietary trading was believed to generate up to 10 percent of total trading revenues, which would have exceeded $5.9 billion in 2010 for the six largest American banks alone. If the Volcker rule were to become law, government agencies, including the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, would write the detailed regulations that would implement the law. These agencies employed civil servants but were run by political appointees with technical backgrounds. After issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking the agencies would solicit comments from the public, which would help shape the regulations. Executives of large banks needed to decide how to respond to this potential change in their business environment.

After analyzing the case, students should be able to: Understand and map out the various interests at work in shaping a regulation Develop a nonmarket strategy for a company facing a potential regulatory change Predict the likely outcome of a proposed regulation

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

In 2014, after nearly 150 years as one of Portugal's most wealthy and powerful families, the Espirito Santo family completely lost control of its empire, which included Banco Espirito Santo, Portugal's largest bank by market capitalization and second-largest private-sector bank in terms of assets, along with stakes in numerous financial, non-financial, privately held, and publicly traded companies. During the European financial crisis of 2010 to 2014, many of the family's companies required capital investment. To avoid family equity dilution, the family's patriarch, Ricardo Espirito Santo Silva Salgado, engaged in a creative money-go-round structure whereby Banco Espirito Santo would legally raise short-term commercial paper with high interest rates and sell them to third parties that were partially owned by the Espirito Santo family. These third parties then would sell that paper back to the bank's retail clients as safe investments similar to Portuguese deposits. The plan failed, and the house of cards that was the Espirito Santo empire collapsed. Students will consider whether Salgado and the board of Banco Espirito Santo acted appropriately or if they failed their fiduciary duties to the non-family shareholders of the bank.