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The use of choice-based, matched, and other stratified sample designs is common in auditing research. However, it is not widely appreciated that the data analysis for these studies has to take into account the non-random nature of sample selection in these designs. A choice-based, matched or otherwise stratified sample is a nonrandom sample that must be analyzed using conditional analysis techniques. We review five research streams in the auditing area. These streams include work on determinants of audit litigation, audit fees, auditor reporting in financially distressed firms, audit quality and auditor switches. Cram, Karan, and Stuart (CKS) (2009) demonstrated the accuracy of conditional analysis, compared to unconditional analysis, of nonrandom samples through the use of simulations, replications, and mathematical proofs. Papers since published have continued to rely upon questionable research, however, and it is hard for researchers to identify what is the reliability of a given work. We complement and extend CKS (2009) by identifying audit papers in selected research streams whose results will likely differ if the data gathered are analyzed using conditional analysis techniques. Thus research can be advanced either by replication and reanalysis, or by refocus of new research upon issues that should no longer be viewed as settled.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether the corruption level of a country is associated with a firm’s decision to choose Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors. In addition, the authors examine whether firms that are cross-listed in a country with a corruption level different from that of the home country are more likely to appoint Big 4 auditors.

Based on a sample of 185,549 firm-year observations from 78 countries over 2003-2012, panel regression analysis is used to investigate the research questions.

The authors find a negative association between corruption and the propensity to hire Big 4 auditors and that cross-listed firms are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors than their domestic counterparts. Interestingly, the authors find that when firms cross-list in less corrupt countries relative to their home countries, firms are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors. However, this tendency disappears when firms cross-list in more corrupt countries.

The authors contribute to the audit choice literature by providing evidence that the political environment, as manifested in the corruption level of a country, plays a role in the decision to choose Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors. The study complements the prior auditor choice literature, which focuses mostly on single countries such as the USA, by expanding the scope to 78 countries. Furthermore, the authors enhance the understanding of how the absolute and relative performance of the political environment affects cross-listed firms’ choice of auditors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the intensity of accruals and auditor industry specialization. It investigates whether a client firm’s accruals intensity is a factor associated with the firm being audited by an industry specialist auditor.

This paper employs an empirical archival methodology using publicly available data. The sample consists of client firms that switched auditors from 2004 to 2014.

The results show that accruals intensity is positively associated with the choice of an industry specialist auditor, measured both at the national and the city levels. These findings imply that companies with high levels of accruals choose an industry specialist auditor to signal the quality of their accruals and to gain more credibility for their financial reporting.

This paper provides original empirical evidence of the association between accruals intensity and the choice of an industry specialist auditor. This link is new to the literature. Extant literature shows that firms with high levels of accruals are regarded as risky and suffer from reduced credibility in financial markets. This study contributes to the literature by showing that these firms choose an industry specialist auditor to alleviate investors’ credibility concerns about the high levels of accruals. These findings provide insightful information to audit firms, to managers of firms that inherently display high levels of accruals and to the capital markets participants in general.

This study examines the effects of institutional and government ownership on audit quality in Kuwait. Kuwait provides an interesting regulatory context as listed firms are legally required to appoint two external auditors from different auditing firms. This offers a unique opportunity to examine differentiation in demand for audit quality when there are three potential combinations of auditors: two non-Big 4, one Big 4 and one non-Big 4 and two Big 4.

The sample consists of all firms listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange in 2013. Multinomial logistic regression examines the influence of ownership structure on audit quality. Analyses are controlled for the effect of company characteristics. Control variables are: firm size, complexity, growth, leverage, profitability and industry category.

The results show that institutional ownership is positively related to the number of Big 4 auditing firms that audit a company’s financial statements. This reflects the powerful and influential role institutional investors play in discouraging management from choosing lower-quality providers. In contrast, government ownership has a negative impact on audit quality. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that audit quality is a function of, among other factors, the structure of equity ownership.

Given the importance of audits, knowledge of the determinants of audit quality is of particular interest to regulators, enforcement agencies and investors. The findings imply that different ownership structures have different effects on the demand for audit quality; some structures strengthen it, while others weaken it. The negative relation between government ownership and audit quality raises serious questions about the effectiveness of government in monitoring its investments.

This paper extends the literature by investigating the determinants of the choice of auditors in an emerging market where there is a joint audit requirement. It highlights the important role played by ownership structure in shaping demand for audit quality. A distinguishing feature in previous research is the classification of the audit quality proxy into two choices (Big 4 vs non-Big 4 auditors). However, the regulatory context in Kuwait means that there are three choices. Thus, unusually, a multinomial logistic regression is used for the analysis.

This study is motivated by recent research suggesting that the funding benefits of using Big Four auditors may not be as uniform as were previously assumed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between use of Big Four auditors and access to debt capital by applying data from microfinance institutions (MFIs) in emerging countries, a population typically not investigated in accounting research.

The authors apply a unique hand-collected data set from 60 emerging markets and empirically investigate whether access to various debt categories is related to the use of Big Four auditors.

The authors find that access to international commercial debt, international subsidized debt and government agency debt is positively related to the use of a Big Four auditor. For local commercial debt, the authors find no association between auditor type and access to debt capital. The association between auditor choice and access to debt capital is stronger for nonprofit than for-profit MFIs.

This is the first audit quality study to include a broad sample of emerging countries, which in itself is an important contribution. As far as general audit quality research is concerned, the authors take the literature one step further by showing that the benefits of using a Big Four auditor may be dependent on the specific source of debt financing a firm or organization seeks to use. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that the for-profit vs nonprofit dimension influences the relationship between auditor choice and access to capital.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the political connections of firms, managerial incentives and auditor choice. Data from China were used to determine whether managers in firms with political connections are more likely to hire auditors of low quality to help them cover up earnings management and opportunistic behavior.

Cross-sectional analysis was conducted using data covering the period from 2003 to 2009 and the Top 10 auditors were used as a proxy to represent the demand for high-quality auditors. Three proxies were used to measure the political connectedness: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), politically connected CEOs and state ownership.

This paper provides empirical evidence that firms with political connections do not demand stringency in the monitoring and information roles of auditing. Moreover, politically connected firms with high managerial incentives are likely to choose non-Top 10 auditors.

This paper provides a unique focus on the role of managerial incentives in the appointment of auditors. This paper tests the managerial opportunism hypothesis in another context and results of this paper help to elucidate the effects of managerial incentives on the demand of audit quality.

Using data on Indian listed companies for 2005, the purpose of this paper is to examine how firm ownership relates to auditor choice. More specifically, the author tests several hypotheses about the links between firm ownership, auditor relationships and earnings management.

Several econometric techniques were employed including ordinary least squares, logit regression, ordered logit regression, Poisson and negative binomial regression to test the association between firm ownership and auditors.

The results indicate that firms having high discretionary accruals are less likely to be audited by domestic entities. The analysis also suggests that domestic auditors are less likely to be preferred by both foreign and Indian private corporations. In addition, the analysis indicates that audit fees are higher for firms with higher earnings opacity.

Driven by data availability, the paper relies on cross‐sectional data.

The results demonstrate that firm ownership is an important consideration for firm auditor relationships. Thus, policymakers should not worry if firms persistently choose to do business with the same auditor. Second, the results are a pointer to the fact that given the differences in their governance structures, the role of domestic and foreign auditors in servicing business groups and state‐owned corporations is distinctly different. Finally, the evidence suggests that the choice of multiple auditors is more to address the complexities involved in multiple business lines, as opposed to curtailing audit fees.

To the author's knowledge, this is perhaps the first study for an emerging economy and more certainly for India to examine the firm ownership‐auditor nexus.

The purpose of this research is to provide further evidence on the association between the IPO signaling mechanisms (i.e. retained ownership, auditor choice, and earnings forecast) by using a less restrictive sample and by performing additional empirical tests.

Single equations are used as the baseline approach to estimate the three models. In addition, Copley and Douthett's 2002 simultaneous equation systems are applied to examine whether the results remain the same. Moreover, ranked values of the risk proxies of IPOs are derived and general least squares are run on these ranked variables.

Findings indicate that auditor reputation and retained ownership are not substitute signals. It is observed that as firm risk increases, entrepreneurs are more likely to retain higher ownership to signal firm value. In addition, contended that positive earnings disclosure before IPO is not associated with retained ownership in a significant manner. An analysis of the economic implication of the results suggests that findings are more representative.

In this study the risk measures used (as well as those used in other studies) may not adequately proxy for offering firm risk. Additionally, the sample is restricted by missing values of the retained ownership variable. Further study can expand the sample using retained ownership obtained from other data sources. A study employing alternative approaches to control for the supply‐side effect of firm risk could be also productive.

Findings are of particular interest to firms that are planning to go to the public. They need to evaluate the benefit and cost of selecting a particular information system in signaling firm value to the market.

Using a larger sample, comprehensive testing periods, and ranked risk proxies contribute to the literature on evaluating singling mechanisms of IPOs.

Competitive pressures in the audit market have led to aggressive fee renegotiation and tendering by companies. This paper reviews microeconomic tender theory and finds it to be of limited value in the audit context. Content analysis of semi‐structured interviews conducted with the finance directors of 12 UK listed companies which had recently tendered and/or changed auditor are used to investigate the tender/change process. Contrary to popular belief, fee levels do not necessarily dominate the decision to change auditors, rather changes within the client company, audit staffing, and auditor’s professionalism and competency issues dominate. Nor is the selection of a tender “winner” generally based solely on price, as predicted by tender theory and as would be expected when the consequences of audit failure do not fall on the directors. However, consistent with economic theory, the winning bid appears frequently to be too low, resulting in attempts by auditors to subsequently increase fees and resentment by the finance director. Directors generally appear to view the audit tender as relating to not only the attest function per se, but to a larger package of services concerning the financial reporting function. The relative importance of price versus non‐price competition in auditor choice is found to vary across companies. Auditor choice is influenced strongly by both economic and behavioural factors, in particular, by directors’ assessment of the quality of non‐attest services and the expected quality of working relationships, in addition to price and audit quality.

This study is motivated by the lack of internal audit function (IAF) research and by the call for research on the impact of dominant owners such as family shareholders on audit fees and the demand for audit quality. This study aims to examine the impact of the IAF budget on the selection of industry-specialist auditors and on audit fees, particularly in companies with family-controlled shareholders, a feature unique to Malaysia.

Data of Malaysian-listed companies during the period 2009-2012 are used. To examine the relationships, logit and ordinary least square regressions are used. Several additional analyses are conducted to assess the robustness of the main results, including alternative measures of specialist auditor and family ownership, endogeneity problems and self-selection bias.

The results show that the IAF budget is positively related to hiring industry-specialist auditors and audit fees. However, family companies are less likely to support the positive association between IAF costs and engage specialist auditors than non-family companies. In addition, a complementary association between the costs of IAF and audit fees for both family and non-family companies was found. Finally, the results show that there is a negative association between family ownership and the ratio of IAF costs to audit fees, suggesting that family companies rely more upon external auditing than internal auditing.

The contribution of this study is to provide an empirical evidence about the tradeoff between IAF and both industry-specialist auditors and audit fees with considering the moderating impact of family-ownership shareholdings. This issue is yet to be examined, and it provides implications for policymakers and practitioners, as it offers insights into the importance of investing in IAF toward hiring industry-specialist auditors and pricing the audit services.