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The confidence in the qualifications and independence of the audit activities and professionals has been lost due to the financial scandals that have arisen over time. These scandals in the accounting and auditing fields caused both enterprises and investors to suffer from large amounts of losses and thus the need for reliable financial statements and corporate governance increased.

Both investors and decision-makers need independent assurance to achieve transparent, reliable, and impartial financial information. The fulfillment of this requirement is possible through independent auditing activity and independent audit firms. Business management shall carry out the selection of independent auditors based on various criteria (fee, reputation, audit team, relations, etc.). In addition, it may also be necessary to periodically change an independent audit firm due to rotation or other reasons (fee, disputes, relationships, etc.).

In this study, a ranking of the importance level of the evaluation criteria, for the selection and change of the independent audit firm in an enterprise in Borsa İstanbul (BIST) 100 in Turkey, was conducted. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), which is one of the multicriteria decision-making techniques, was used for ranking. In the hierarchy established for the selection of the independent audit firm, the main criteria of the “audit fee” and the “reputation and qualifications of the audit firm” have been established. According to the findings obtained as a result of binary comparisons, the first four ranks among sub-criteria are “provision of international service,” “quality of technical expertise of audit firm,” “industry expertise of audit firm,” and “suitability of fee offered by audit firm.”

For the change of audit firm, four main criteria “audit fee,” “disputes arising during the audit process,” “relations with the audit firm,” and “rotation” are taken into consideration. For sub-criteria, first four criteria were “rotation of independent audit firm,” “rotation of independent auditor,” “audit firm’s inability to adequately practice proactive audit approaches,” and “inadequate communication.”

This paper aims to examine the effects of firm size on audit proposal readability and audit proposal readability on auditor selection using readability metrics.

Adopting the Flesch reading ease readability formula, the authors analyze the readability of 370 hand-collected audit proposals submitted by audit firms for US state and local governments’ audit service contracts.

The authors find differences in readability across audit firm size, specifically the proposals written by smaller firms are more readable than those submitted by larger firms. The results further indicate that readability metrics correlate with auditor selection, i.e. an increase in audit proposal readability from the first to third quartile improves the likelihood of a firm winning the engagement by about 6 per cent, ceteris paribus. In addition, while audit fees and an existing auditor–client relationship are associated with engagement success, proxies for audit quality (i.e. audit firm size, audit experience of lead partner) are not.

The Flesch reading ease measure is a simple linear combination of text attributes, which assumes that readability is a single, unidimensional construct. Simple readability metrics, such as the Flesch reading ease, may confound environmental complexity with readability.

Readability improves audit proposal success.

The results provide insight to accounting stakeholders regarding the potential influence of readability on audit firm selection. In short, readability matters.

Establishing an audit committee presumably strengthens the external auditor’s independence. Several studies have examined how audit committees affect the selection of the company’s external auditor, negotiate audit fees and enhance the auditor’s independence. But what of the independence of the audit committee members themselves? Do audit committee members exhibit biases when they select their company’s auditors? The relationship between the entity’s external auditor and the audit committee member’s affiliated company’s auditors has not been examined. For example, are audit committee members prone to select or remain with audit firms with which they have developed a formal relationship within their own company? This study of 247 New York Stock Exchange firms finds significant relationships (at the 0.05 level of significance) between CPA firms selected by audit committees and by the CPA firm which audits the audit committee member’s own organization. Results indicate that audit committee members exhibit conscious or unconscious biases in their selection or retention of their companies’ auditors.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of ethnic similarity in the audit partner–client manager relationship and its impact on auditor selection and retention decisions.

The authors use name matching analysis to infer ethnicity of audit partners and client managers in the US nonprofit reporting environment. The authors examine the degree of ethnic similarity (co-ethnicity) between the two parties and model auditor selection and retention decisions as a function of co-ethnicity. The authors also model reporting attributes as a function of co-ethnicity.

The authors find that the ethnic similarity between the client manager and their external audit partner is a significant determinant of auditor-client alignment. Specifically, the authors find that clients are more likely to select and retain an audit partner who is ethnically similar to the client manager. The authors find that co-ethnicity is associated with a lowered propensity to issue a going concern opinion to a financially distressed client and an increased occurrence of underreporting of fundraising and administrative expenses.

Taken together, the evidence suggests that ethnic diversity (the opposite of co-ethnicity) in the auditor-client relationship is associated with higher audit quality. These findings are relevant to client managers, audit committees and public accounting firms as they make auditor selection and reporting decisions.

Prior studies have found that co-ethnicity influences the formation and future success of various business partnerships. The auditor-client relationship is a unique setting within the business environment where the two parties must balance their desire to maintain a close relationship with their need to maintain independence. The study is the first to examine the role of ethnicity in the auditor-client relationship.

This paper aims to assess internal audit quality (IAQ) by using automated textual analysis of disclosures of internal audit mechanisms in annual reports.

This paper uses seven text mining techniques to construct classification models that predict whether companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange are audited by a Big 4 firm, an auditor selection that prior research finds is associated with higher IAQ. The classification accuracy of the models is compared to predictions based on financial indicators.

The results show that classification models developed using text analysis can be a promising alternative proxy in assessing IAQ. Terms, N-Grams and financial indicators of a company, as they are presented in the annual reports, can provide information on the IAQ.

This study offers a novel approach to assessing the IAQ by applying textual analysis techniques. These findings are important for those who oversee internal audit activities, assess internal audit performance or want to improve or evaluate internal audit systems, such as managers or audit committees. Practitioners, regulators and investors may also extract useful information on internal audit and internal auditors by using textual analysis. The insights are also relevant for external auditors who are required to consider various aspects of corporate governance, including IAQ.

IAQ has been the subject of thorough examination. However, this study is the first attempt, to the authors’ knowledge, to introduce an innovative text mining approach utilizing unstructured textual disclosure from annual reports to develop a proxy for IAQ. It contributes to the internal audit field literature by further exploring concerns relevant to IAQ.

Firm-specific factors such as size, profitability, growth, risk and complexity, in addition to agency-related issues determine both auditor selection and firm life-cycle stage. This paper aims to examine whether and how the effect of Big-4 auditors (B4As) on client firms’ audit quality varies across firms’ life-cycle stages.

The sample comprises 1,813 firm-year observations in India’s emerging economy from 2011 to 2020. The Modified Jones model and Jones (signed, unsigned) model are used to compute discretionary accruals/audit quality. The authors use Koh et al.’s (2015) methodology to determine the firm life cycle.

The authors’ key findings show that the client firms employing B4As have superior audit quality than those employing non-Big-4 auditors (NB4As). The authors also show that the life-cycle stage significantly impacts the relationship between B4As and a firm’s audit quality. Furthermore, B4A client firms report superior audit quality vis-à-vis NB4A firms only in the birth- and decline-stages. The audit quality of growth- and mature-stage B4A and NB4A client firms is not significantly different.

Implications for managers include the decision to hire B4As. Given that B4As earn a significant fee premium, managers leading birth- and decline-stage firms should hire B4As, while managers of growth- and mature-stage firms should not.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the moderating effect of the firm life-cycle stage on the selection of B4As and their impact on audit quality.

This study aims to investigate the impact of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) on Chinese listed firms’ insider trading, as well as the moderating effects of firm characteristics on this impact. The economic mechanism behind this impact is also explored.

This study conducts a regression analysis on firms associated with mandatory and voluntary audit partner rotation based on 2009–2019 firm data and examines whether corporate insiders of these two types of firms increase their share sales within 12 months before their financial statements are submitted to a new rotated auditor.

Client firms’ corporate insiders increase their share sales within 12 months before their financial statements are submitted to a new mandatory rotated auditor. In addition, such an association is less pronounced for client firms that changed from Big 4 auditors to those with higher financial constraints. This is more pronounced for client firms with higher information asymmetry. The economic mechanism of the finding is that is the MAPR implementation reduces earnings management activities from client firms. Moreover, client firms’ buy-and-hold stock returns decline in the first year after MAPR.

This study should assist investors, corporate shareholders and Chinese policymakers. Investors can be well protected through the adoption of MAPR because upcoming auditors enhance the audit quality of clients by restraining managers’ manipulation of reported earnings and declining firms’ insider trading afterwards. Investors, Chinese policymakers and corporate shareholders should pay more attention to firms’ financial report quality, auditor selection, financial situation, corporate governance and the information environment. Explicitly, firms with less transparent financial report quality, non-big 4 auditors and fewer financial constraints are more likely to be involved in insider trading.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the extant studies have examined the impact of MAPR on insider sales. This study extends the research on the effect of the audit process on firm market performance by investigating the impact of audit partner rotation policy on insider trading behaviors.

This paper aims to first investigate auditor change following mismatch by focusing on the number of times mismatch occurred prior to auditor change and on clients mismatched continuously with auditors for two or more years. Subsequently, it studies the relation of mismatch in the current year with auditor change for clients mismatched in the past year. These issues are important because of the call for regulatory intervention in auditor selection. If market forces achieve improvement in matching, then those forces should be relied upon in auditor selection.

This paper adapts the literature to estimate mismatch and uses logistic regressions on an auditor change model to study the timing of auditor change by mismatched clients and on a mismatch model to examine improvement in matching following auditor change.

This paper finds that the more frequent mismatches occurred in the past four years, the higher the likelihood of switching in the current year. Clients mismatched continuously for two or more years are more likely to change auditors. This paper also reports that mismatched clients who switch auditors are less likely to be mismatched again after the switch.

Because market forces reduce mismatch through auditor change, free choice by clients and auditors should be allowed, and regulatory intervention should be introduced cautiously. As investors and other users of financial statements have an interest in seeing that clients get the appropriate auditors for the audit, they will be assured that market forces could achieve the purpose. Thus, the results of this paper address public concern in the regulatory regime and support current audit market practices.

Prior studies assume a one-year time frame for auditor change to follow mismatch. This paper relaxes this assumption, to better reflect audit market practices, by showing that clients who are more often mismatched with auditors or those mismatched continuously for two or more years could also change auditors. Furthermore, prior studies find that mismatching motivates auditor change, but they do not show that matching improves after the change. This paper extends the literature by shedding new light to show that auditor change improves auditor–client matching.

This paper aims to introduce the emerging artificial-intelligence-based readability metrics (Coh-Metrix) to examine the effects of firm size on audit proposal readability.

Coh-Metrix readability measures use emerging computation linguistics technology to better assess document readability. These metrics measure co-relations of words, sentences and paragraphs on multi-dimensions rather than adopting the unidimensional “bag of words” approach that examines words in isolation. Using eight Coh-Metrix orthogonal principal component factors, the authors analyze the Chang and Stone (2019) data set comprised of 370 hand-collected audit proposals submitted by audit firms for the US state and local governments’ audit service contracts.

Audit firm size has a significant impact on the readability of audit proposals. Specifically, as measured by the traditional readability metric, the proposals from smaller firms are more readable than those submitted by larger firms. Furthermore, decomposed readability metrics indicate that smaller firm proposals evidence stronger (deep) text cohesion, whereas larger firm proposals evidence a stronger narrative structure and higher connectivity (relational indicators) among proposal elements. Unlike the traditional readability metric, however, the emergent readability metrics are uncorrelated with auditor selection.

Work remains to develop and validate Coh-Metrix measures that are specific to the context of accounting and auditing practice. Future research can use emerging readability measures to examine various textual features (e.g. text cohesion) in finance or accounting related documents.

The results provide practitioners with insight into the proposal writing strategies and practices of larger and smaller firms. In addition, the results highlight the differing audit firm selection outcomes from traditional and Coh-Metrix readability metrics.

This study introduces new data and holistic readability measures to the auditing literature.

Product market competition may have various impacts on audit fees. On the one hand, according to the agency theory, product market competition can mitigate agency problems between management and shareholders. For clients with higher product market competition, auditors will lower the level of engagement risk assessment and reduce the required level of audit evidence, and hence audit fees will be lower. On the other hand, according to the audit risk model, product market competition will increase client business risk and audit engagement risk. Moreover, for clients with competition advantage, client business risk and audit engagement risk will be lower, and hence a lower audit fee. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

In this paper, the authors collect financial accounting data and audit fee data from CSMAR database. Our sample selection starts with all available observations on the Chinese listed companies during 2006–2011. Since there is a big difference in accounting practices between financial companies and other industries, the authors delete observations on financial companies. The authors further remove observations with missing data, yielding 6,709 observations for the final analysis. To define the industry, the authors use the first two digits of standard industry classification code set by China Securities Regulatory Commission. In order to reduce the effect of extreme observations, the authors also truncate the data at 1 and 99 percent. The authors use the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) and the natural logarithm of the number of listed companies within the industry to measure product market competition intensity. HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of revenues of the client firm among the total revenues of all public companies, i.e. HHI = ∑ i = 1 N ( s i / S ) 2 . N is the number of listed companies in the industry, S_i is the revenues for an individual firm and S is the total revenues of all public companies within the same industry. A higher HHI score indicates fewer companies dominate the industry and hence lower intensity of competition in the product market. The second measure of industry competition intensity is LNN, the natural logarithm of the total number of public companies in the same industry of a client firm. A larger value of LNN indicates a larger number of competitors in the industry, and a higher level of competition intensity. Following the literature (Kale and Loon, 2011), the authors use Lerner index (or price-cost margin (PCM)) to measure the listed company’s competitive advantage. It is actually a measure of a firm’s power to influence product prices in the industry. The authors adopt the Peress (2010) method to estimate Lerner index as net operating income, divided by sales, i.e. PCM=(Sales–COGS–Selling expenses–Administrative expenses)/Sales. A higher value of PCM indicates more product pricing power and a higher competitive advantage of a company. The authors also use Lerner index ranking (R_PCM) to measure the competitive advantage of a company in the industry. The authors sort PCM values in ascending order in each industry and divide into ten groups. Then, the authors assign a value from one to ten to each listed company within each group in each industry. A higher R_PCM value represents higher market power and higher competitive advantage of a company. Based on Simunic (1980) framework, the authors develop the following model to test the relationship between product market competition, competition advantage and audit fees: LNAF_it=β₀+β₁ PMC_it+β₂ SIZE_it+β₃ INV_it+β₄ REC_it+β₅ GROWTH_it+β₆ PRELOSS_it+β₇ LEV_it+β₈ QUICK_it+β₉ OPIN_it+β₁₀ IBIG4_it+β₁₁ DBIG10_it+β₁₂ SWITCH_it+β₁₃ LOCATE_it+β₁₄ STATE_it+∑β YearDummies+ε_it.

Using a sample of 6,709 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2007–2011, the authors find that the product market competition intensity has a negative impact on audit fees, which means that agency cost effect is dominant in audit pricing at industry level. In addition, a company’s competitive advantage in the industry has a significant and negative impact on audit fees, which means that business risk effect also plays a critical role in audit pricing of individual engagement. The findings indicate that, in determining audit fees, auditors in the emerging market of China consider both the competition intensity of their clients’ product market at the industry level and the competitive advantage of the specific clients within the industry.

The findings indicate that, in determining audit fees, auditors in the emerging market of China consider both the competition intensity of their clients’ product market at the industry level and the competitive advantage of the specific clients within the industry.