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This study explores the emergence of discrimination based on observable characteristics. In many instances, agents presume differences arising from traits such as race or gender, even when these parameters are irrelevant to the situation at hand. This paper intends to reveal an emergent behavior and a persistent culture of discrimination caused by miscategorization in strategic interactions.

We assume that agents occasionally engage in conflicts modeled as asymmetric hawk and dove games, where boundedly rational agents may categorize their opponents based on observable traits to make effective decisions. Three categorization strategies are considered: fine-grained, regular, and coarse-grained. Subsequently, an evolutionary agent-based model is employed to examine the performance of these strategies in a dynamic environment.

The results demonstrate that fine-grained categorization provides an advantage when the cost of fighting is low, while coarse-grained categorizers exhibit more peaceful behavior, gaining an advantage when the cost of conflict is high. Our primary finding indicates the emergence of discrimination based on non-relevant traits, manifested through consistent aggressive behavior towards individuals possessing these traits.

This paper is the first to investigate the emergence of discrimination without assuming prior differences between groups. Previous studies have assumed either an initial population difference or a homophily-based approach. In contrast, we demonstrate that discrimination can emerge even in the absence of such assumptions. Discrimination between two groups may arise as long as there are agents who label these categories.

The game strategies differ when different regions participate in the oil game. Under what circumstances will different participants choose cooperation or sanction strategies? This is the core issue of this paper.

Regarding the current and future game behavior between different regions in the oil trade, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between two regions to explore the possibility of sanctions strategies between the two sides in different situations.

The research finds: (1) When the benefits of in-depth cooperation between the two regions are greater, both sides tend to adopt cooperative strategies. (2) When the trade conflict losses between the two regions are smaller, both sides adopt sanctions strategies. (3) When a strong region trades with a weak region, if the former adopts a sanctions strategy, the net profits are greater than the benefits of in-depth cooperation between the two regions. If the latter adopts a sanctions strategy, the net profits are less than the trade conflict losses between the two regions. There will be the strong region adopting a sanctions strategy and the weak region adopting a non-sanctions strategy. At this time, the latter should reasonably balance the immediate and future interests and give up some current interests in exchange for in-depth cooperation between the two regions. Otherwise, it will fall into the situation of unilateral sanctions by the strong against the weak.

There is no paper in the existing literature that uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the oil game problem between the two regions. This paper constructs a two-party evolutionary game model composed of crude oil importers and crude oil exporters and, based on this, analyzes the evolutionary stability between the two regions under sanctions and cooperation strategies, which enriches the energy research field.

The promotion of autonomous vehicles introduces privacy and security risks, underscoring the pressing need for responsible innovation implementation. To more effectively address the societal risks posed by autonomous vehicles, considering collaborative engagement of key stakeholders is essential. This study aims to provide insights into the governance of potential privacy and security issues in the innovation of autonomous driving technology by analyzing the micro-level decision-making processes of various stakeholders.

For this study, the authors use a nuanced approach, integrating key stakeholder theory, perceived value theory and prospect theory. The study constructs a model based on evolutionary game for the privacy and security governance mechanism of autonomous vehicles, involving enterprises, governments and consumers.

The governance of privacy and security in autonomous driving technology is influenced by key stakeholders’ decision-making behaviors and pivotal factors such as perceived value factors. The study finds that the governmental is influenced to a lesser extent by the decisions of other stakeholders, and factors such as risk preference coefficient, which contribute to perceived value, have a more significant influence than appearance factors like participation costs.

This study lacks an investigation into the risk sensitivity of various stakeholders in different scenarios.

The study delineates the roles and behaviors of key stakeholders and contributes valuable insights toward addressing pertinent risk concerns within the governance of autonomous vehicles. Through the study, the practical application of Responsible Innovation theory has been enriched, addressing the shortcomings in the analysis of micro-level processes within the framework of evolutionary game.

The purpose of this paper is to increase the knowledge and understanding of organizational and supervisory support in the context of employee deviant workplace behavior (DWB) by examining the potential associations of employees’ cultural value orientations. This paper aims to: clarify DWB; review perceived organizational support (POS) and perceived supervisory support (PSS); discuss the meaning of employees’ cultural value orientations (individualism–collectivism, power distance and paternalism); use the fuzzy logic model to analyze relationships between DWB and POS, as well as PSS and employees’ cultural value orientations.

This research applies a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis.

The results show the role of employee perceived organizational and supervisory support and cultural dimension (power distance and paternalism) configurations on employee DWB.

The main originality of this study is to further increase the understanding of organizational and supervisory support in the context of employee DWB by examining the potential associations of employees’ cultural value orientations. This study extends the previous research by providing evidence that organizational and supervisory support influences employees’ DWB.

Location-based games (LBGs) have afforded novel information technology (IT) developments in how people interact with the physical world. Namely, LBGs have spurred a wave of territoriality (i.e. controlling) and exploration (i.e. discovering) of augmented physical space that are driven by different social dynamics related to group formation, social connectivity and altruism. The aim of this study is to investigate this dynamic and how it is further related to the use intensity of location-based IT.

This work presents a structural equation model that connects social dimensions of play to territorial control and exploration, and playing intensity. The model was tested with psychometric data gathered from a global sample of Pokémon GO players (N = 515).

In the tested sample, players' social self-efficacy and altruism were positively associated with team identification. Team identification, in turn, was positively associated with both territorial control and exploration tendency. Territorial control had a significant relationship with playing intensity; however, exploration tendency did not. This implies territorial control is the stronger predictor of playing intensity.

The findings suggest that human primal urges to conquer and control geographical territory may surface in the digital reimagination of physical space. LBGs offer opportunities for making use of new forms of play (territorial control and exploration) in motivating locative behaviours.

This research quantifies the relationships between a social predisposition, team identification, territorial control, exploration tendency and playing intensity in the context of Pokémon GO. It contributes new knowledge to the understanding of territorial behaviour (control and exploration) in location-based IT.

The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either they give rise to superior Nash equilibria or they make the game fairer. For example, quantum Prisoners Dilemma generates Pareto superior outcomes as compared to defection outcome in the famous classical case. Again, a quantum-like version of cards game can make the game fairer, increasing the chance of winning of players who are disadvantaged in the classical case. This paper explores all the virtues of simple quantum games, also highlighting some findings of the authors as regards Prisoners Dilemma game.

As this is a general review paper, the authors have not demonstrated any specific mathematical method, rather explored the well-known quantum probability framework, used for designing quantum games. They have a short appendix which explores basic structure of Hilbert space representation of human decision-making.

Along with the review of the extant literature, the authors have also highlighted some new findings for quantum Prisoners Dilemma game. Specifically, they have shown in the earlier studies (which are referred to here) that a pure quantum entanglement set up is not needed for designing better games, even a weaker condition, which is classical entanglement is sufficient for producing Pareto improved outcomes.

Theoretical research, with findings and implications for future game designs, it has been argued that it is not always needed to have true quantum entanglement for superior Nash Equilibria.

The main purpose here is to raise awareness mainly in the social science community about the possible applications of quantum-like game theory paradigm. The findings related to Prisoners Dilemma game are, however, original.