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1 – 10 of 746The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared…
Abstract
Purpose
The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either they give rise to superior Nash equilibria or they make the game fairer. For example, quantum Prisoners Dilemma generates Pareto superior outcomes as compared to defection outcome in the famous classical case. Again, a quantum-like version of cards game can make the game fairer, increasing the chance of winning of players who are disadvantaged in the classical case. This paper explores all the virtues of simple quantum games, also highlighting some findings of the authors as regards Prisoners Dilemma game.
Design/methodology/approach
As this is a general review paper, the authors have not demonstrated any specific mathematical method, rather explored the well-known quantum probability framework, used for designing quantum games. They have a short appendix which explores basic structure of Hilbert space representation of human decision-making.
Findings
Along with the review of the extant literature, the authors have also highlighted some new findings for quantum Prisoners Dilemma game. Specifically, they have shown in the earlier studies (which are referred to here) that a pure quantum entanglement set up is not needed for designing better games, even a weaker condition, which is classical entanglement is sufficient for producing Pareto improved outcomes.
Research limitations/implications
Theoretical research, with findings and implications for future game designs, it has been argued that it is not always needed to have true quantum entanglement for superior Nash Equilibria.
Originality/value
The main purpose here is to raise awareness mainly in the social science community about the possible applications of quantum-like game theory paradigm. The findings related to Prisoners Dilemma game are, however, original.
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To analyse the implications of signs of reform modification, stoppage or reversal, such as price controls, that have emerged in many developing economies, it is necessary to…
Abstract
Purpose
To analyse the implications of signs of reform modification, stoppage or reversal, such as price controls, that have emerged in many developing economies, it is necessary to understand their efficiency consequences. This paper aims to study the effect of price interventions in imperfectly competitive product markets, to investigate whether reforms reversals are necessarily harmful.
Design/methodology/approach
The model assumes firm set prices and face sunk costs of entry.
Findings
The paper shows that a minimum price can induce a Pareto improvement, by preventing price wars and encouraging entry. The result is supported by empirical evidence from some developed economies, holds when sunk cost vanishes, and is robust to some extensions. A fixed price may be optimal in the environment investigated.
Originality/value
The results may be of interest to theorists and policy-makers interested in imperfectly competitive markets.
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– This paper aims to show new ways of overcoming resistance during organizational change by applying insights from New Institutional Economics.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to show new ways of overcoming resistance during organizational change by applying insights from New Institutional Economics.
Design/methodology/approach
This is a conceptual paper that adapts findings from New Institutional Economics.
Findings
The paper highlights the relevance of interactions between managers and employees for value creation processes: interactions can generate either win–win or lose–lose situations. By altering the restrictions on managers’ and employees’ behavior, change managers can create mutual benefits for the staff and the firm. The paper thus explicitly considers the individual interests of employees and managers and highlights an approach to link individual interests with the collective interests of the firm by means of appropriate interactions. Additionally, the paper elaborates the relevant factors that determine the success of classical change management measures, like communication or participation, to overcome resistance during organizational change.
Research limitations/implications
The developed framework also indicates important conditions where approaches inspired by management, psychological and sociological theories can be successfully applied and where change management will benefit from being complemented by New Institutional Economics.
Practical implications
Change managers can optimize inter-organizational competition or cooperation to generate a win–win situation by means of appropriate formal or informal restrictions (like incentives or binding mechanisms).
Originality/value
This paper applies insights from New Institutional Economics to show how organizational change can be facilitated by producing mutual benefits. This paper postulates that organizational change often fails or, at the very least, meets with stiff resistance due to dysfunctional interactions within the company. However, such interactions actually contain great opportunities for change managers: by shifting the focus of these interactions, they can generate the potential for win–win situations. In this approach, mutual benefits are a decisive factor in increasing the acceptance to organizational change and overcoming resistance.
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Economic theory rests on the principal axiom of egoism; that everyaction is driven by self interest, and is therefore seen as a moral‐freescience. Morality, on the other hand…
Abstract
Economic theory rests on the principal axiom of egoism; that every action is driven by self interest, and is therefore seen as a moral‐free science. Morality, on the other hand, concerns subjective value judgement, usually in the interpersonal context of whether an action is right or wrong. Although the two are seemingly unrelated, welfare economic theory and its applications cannot proceed very far without the assistance of moral codes. This article discusses the origin and rationale behind the construction of moral codes, the moral codification of preferences and its associated problems.
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Douglas A. Norton and R. Mark Isaac
Purpose – Motivated by new models of nonprofit organizations, we study a voluntary contributions environment in which the productivity of the public goods process is chosen…
Abstract
Purpose – Motivated by new models of nonprofit organizations, we study a voluntary contributions environment in which the productivity of the public goods process is chosen endogenously by a manager. The experimental treatments incorporate two institutions of transparency in the organization, which we conjecture will assist the manager in achieving an outcome superior to the standard free-riding prediction.
Methodology – The chapter uses the methodology of laboratory experimental economics.
Findings – The findings demonstrate that transparency institutions can be important for assisting the manager and the stakeholders achieve relative stable and efficient outcomes.
Limitations – We discuss obvious areas for further investigation including environments in which firm productivity is only stochastically related to the decisions of the manager.
Practical and Social Implications – The chapter is oriented to real-world issues in the organization of nonprofit enterprises, which were a once ubiquitous and now re-emerging source of charitable activity. The chapter is written so that it should be accessible to informed practitioners in nonprofit organizations.
Originality – The study of endogenous environments and institutions in the provision of charitable and public goods is a relatively new advance and is indeed the theme of Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 13, “Charity with Choice.”
This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.
Abstract
Purpose
This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.
Design/methodology/approach
The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.
Findings
The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.
Originality/value
The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.
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This paper presents the results of an experiment where an unequal wealth distribution was created and then subjects could act to change this wealth distribution. Subjects received…
Abstract
This paper presents the results of an experiment where an unequal wealth distribution was created and then subjects could act to change this wealth distribution. Subjects received money by betting and possibly by arbitrary (“undeserved”) gifts; they could then pay to reduce, redistribute and, in half of the sessions, steal money from others. The experimental results are incompatible with some standard models of interdependent preferences. Over 80% of redistributors were rank egalitarian, but how subjects perceived the problem significantly affected their redistribution activity: perceptions of fairness were not simply a matter of relative payoff, and changed according to whether a subject was undeservedly advantaged or otherwise.
Maria‐Alejandra Gonzalez‐Perez and Santiago Gutierrez‐Viana
The purpose of this paper is to present a cross‐country study comparing Colombia and Vietnam, two of the major coffee exporting countries in the world, in terms of their…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to present a cross‐country study comparing Colombia and Vietnam, two of the major coffee exporting countries in the world, in terms of their infrastructures, the roles of external shocks, technology adoption at different stages of production, added value, positioning in both domestic and global markets, internationalisation patterns, marketing and branding innovations, regulatory frameworks, and policy environments. This study also explores other aspects linked to production, and marketing strategies that open niche markets such as speciality coffees, and socially‐, labour‐ and environmentally‐responsible trade. Furthermore, it identifies opportunities of cooperation and competition between these two countries.
Design/methodology/approach
Using value chain analysis as primary research method, this paper identifies links and dynamics in the value chains that have been developed in the coffee industry in both countries to improve competitiveness, increase sustainability, and respond to market demands.
Findings
Using value chain analysis, it was found that Colombia and Vietnam produce different types of coffee, and that both have implemented diverse strategies in order to be more competitive in domestic and foreign markets via product differentiation. These differences make explicit room for cooperation between these two countries in an international environment where fierce competition persists.
Originality/value
Cooperation between producing countries is an under‐researched subject. These findings will be useful both for policy makers in coffee‐producing countries and agribusiness researchers.
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