Search results

Most Americans are keenly aware of the costs political corruption extracts on system support, fiscal policies and economic development, and ultimately, government effectiveness. Among a list of 10 challenges facing the nation, the public ranks political corruption as the nation's biggest crisis Samussen (2019). Importantly, this issue cuts across partisan and demographic lines. Members of both political parties and independents consistently cite political corruption as a serious problem facing the country.

However, there is a specific kind of political corruption that is disturbing for the health of American democracy – the corruption of Congress. Most Americans appear to have little faith in lawmakers to do the right thing. Majorities believe that Congress is out of touch with average Americans, focused on the needs of special interests, and is corrupt. To be sure, political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, and social structures. This chapter considers the problem of congressional corruption including what forms it takes, where it arises, what anti-corruption reforms are needed, and what these findings mean for the future of American democracy. More specifically, this chapter will permit us to examine if and how perceptions of congressional corruption influence citizens' interactions with government and provide a better understanding of citizens' policy preferences for regulating political corruption.

Citizens are demanding better performance from governments and they are increasingly aware of the costs of poor management and corruption. In view of scarce resources and the major transformations already underway in the global economy, identification and awareness of good governance and preventing corrupt practices have become key to ensuring structural reforms and critical investments necessary for encouraging, sustaining, and enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, social, and environmental structures.

Youth and young adults with emotional and/or behavioral difficulties (EBD) face particularly difficult challenges in their efforts to fit into adult roles and functions. The purpose of this chapter is to assist providers, educators, and administrators from the mental health, education, child welfare, justice/corrections, and adult service system sectors understand (a) a practice for improving the progress and outcomes for young people in transition, and (b) how this practice model is implemented in communities to impact the lives of youth in transition to adulthood. This is accomplished in two major parts in this chapter. The first part provides an overview of the Transition to Independence Process (TIP) model, a description of its status as an evidence-supported practice, and tools and strategies that support its implementation in communities and regions across North America. The TIP model is further illustrated through a description of how it is applied with a young person. The second part of the chapter provides an overview of implementation science, a description of how its strategies and tools can guide the implementation of an intervention or model; and an illustration of a large-scale TIP implementation initiative with collaboratives of agencies and schools. This chapter concludes with implications regarding the importance of having effective transition-to-adulthood models; and ensuring the implementation and sustainability of these to improve the progress and outcomes of youth and young adults with EBD.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.