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Political economies evolve institutionally and technologically over time. This means that to understand evolutionary political economy one must understand the nature of the evolutionary process in its full complexity. From the time of Darwin and Spencer natural selection has been seen as the foundation of evolution. This view has remained even as views of how evolution operates more broadly have changed. An issue that some have viewed as an aspect of evolution that natural selection may not fully explain is that of emergence of higher order structures, with this aspect having been associated with the idea of emergence. In recent decades it has been argued that self-organization dynamics may explain such emergence, with this being argued to be constrained, if not overshadowed, by natural selection. Just as the balance between these aspects is debated within organic evolutionary theory, it also arises in the evolution of political economy, as between such examples of self-organizing emergence as the Mengerian analysis of the appearance of commodity money in primitive societies and the natural selection that operates in the competition between firms in markets.

The first American university to have a graduate programme was Johns Hopkins, founded in 1876. Between 1880 and 1914 a number of new universities such as Stanford and Chicago were established, and older institutions such as Yale and Harvard were modernised. The University of Chicago was founded in 1892, with the help of a large founding endowment from the oil tycoon, John D. Rockefeller.

This paper compares the contexts of the writing of T. R. Malthus’s first edition of An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798); its reception by William Godwin, to whom the Essay was addressed; its interpretation by naturalists Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace; and its interpretation by modern commentators Kenneth Boulding and A. M. C. Waterman. The analysis helps explain how an essay that was written to defend social and economic institutions from critiques in utopian visions associated with the French Revolution came to be regarded as a model predicting overpopulation and exhaustion of natural resources.

In much of philosophy and social theory since classical antiquity, human belief and reason have been placed in the driving seat of individual action. In particular, social theory has often taken it for granted, or even by definition, that action is motivated by reasons based on beliefs. In contrast, a minority has criticized the adoption of this ‘folk psychology’ that explains human action wholly in such ‘mind first’ terms. Critics point out that such explanations are a mere gloss on a much more complex neurophysiological reality. These dualistic and ‘mind-first’ explanations of human behavior are unable to explain adequately such phenomena as sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions (Bunge, 1980; Churchland, 1984, 1989; Churchland, 1986; Rosenberg, 1995, 1998; Kilpinen, 2000).

The author presents a comparative study of the three evolutionary economic schools, namely the Austrians, neo-Schumpeterians, and institutionalists. The comparison is based on an analysis of nine basic features of the evolutionary process and evolutionary approach, including a dynamical view of economic phenomena (seen from a historical perspective), a focus on far-from-equilibrium analysis, a proper and realistic perception of time, and a population perspective (to what extent emergent properties are results of interaction among economic agents). The relevant features of the evolutionary process are the heterogeneity and behavior of economic agents, the search for novelty based on a concept of economic agents’ hereditary information, a selection process (based on the concept of rivalry), spontaneity of development, and the presence of decision-making procedures (how economic agents make decisions, and to what extent their subjective values play a role). The goal of the comparative analysis is to estimate the level of “evolutionary content” of the three schools. My subjective evaluation suggests that only the Austrian school can be called entirely evolutionary. Slightly less evolutionary are the neo-Schumpeterians, and the least evolutionary are the institutionalists.

Are the learning procedures of genetic algorithms (GAs) able to generate optimal architectures for artificial neural networks (ANNs) in high frequency data? In this experimental study, GAs are used to identify the best architecture for ANNs. Additional learning is undertaken by the ANNs to forecast daily excess stock returns. No ANN architectures were able to outperform a random walk, despite the finding of non-linearity in the excess returns. This failure is attributed to the absence of suitable ANN structures and further implies that researchers need to be cautious when making inferences from ANN results that use high frequency data.

This essay charts an intellectual journey. Geoffrey M. Hodgson became an institutional economist in the 1980s. He explains how he discovered institutional economics and what strains of institutional thought were attractive for him. Another issue raised in this essay is how institutional researchers organize and move forward. Hodgson argues for an interdisciplinary approach, but this is not without its problems.