Search results

The purpose of this paper is to propose a new classification of rules-driven sports and technology-driven sports that suggests different models of how sports develop. This paper outlines some key aspects of an evolutionary view of sports economics research and, separately, an institutional view of sports economic research.

This paper is a conceptual/theoretical piece rather than an empirical analysis of a research question. The authors scaffold a proposed analytic framework that is a combination of evolutionary economics and new institutional economics.

A new dynamic approach to the study of sports industries is called for. The authors observe that sports and sports industries exhibit dynamic qualities but in the study of sports there is no analogue of “industrial dynamics” as in economics. What is missing is the field of “evolutionary sports dynamics.” To build this, the authors frame a new evolutionary approach to the study of the sports economy and sports industries – by examining the evolution of sports, their industries, and the complex industrial ecosystems they operate in, through the lens of institutional and evolutionary economics.

The paper establishes a theoretical basis for a “New Economics of Sports” – as a shift in the types of questions that sports economics seeks to answer. These are away from “sports statics” – as a branch of applied economics of industrial organization and optimal allocation of sports resources (ala Rottenberg, 1956; Neale, 1964) – and toward concern with the economics of “sports dynamics.” The prime questions are less with the optimal organization of existing sports, and more toward understanding the origin of new sports and the evolutionary life cycles of sports.

The author presents a comparative study of the three evolutionary economic schools, namely the Austrians, neo-Schumpeterians, and institutionalists. The comparison is based on an analysis of nine basic features of the evolutionary process and evolutionary approach, including a dynamical view of economic phenomena (seen from a historical perspective), a focus on far-from-equilibrium analysis, a proper and realistic perception of time, and a population perspective (to what extent emergent properties are results of interaction among economic agents). The relevant features of the evolutionary process are the heterogeneity and behavior of economic agents, the search for novelty based on a concept of economic agents’ hereditary information, a selection process (based on the concept of rivalry), spontaneity of development, and the presence of decision-making procedures (how economic agents make decisions, and to what extent their subjective values play a role). The goal of the comparative analysis is to estimate the level of “evolutionary content” of the three schools. My subjective evaluation suggests that only the Austrian school can be called entirely evolutionary. Slightly less evolutionary are the neo-Schumpeterians, and the least evolutionary are the institutionalists.

Because belief in a supernatural agent with extraordinary power is rooted in psychology, Veblen's instinct psychology was the essential basis for his evolutionary economics of religion. The innate behavioral traits that Veblen called instincts in human nature are now recognized in evolutionary psychology as domain-specific mechanism that evolved as adaptations to enable human survival and reproduction. The authors aim to explain how the modern evolutionary psychology of religion provides a modern psychological basis for Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion.

First, the authors review how Veblen's theory of an evolved human nature of instincts was applied to explain the origins of religion in primitive societies and remained a resilient force despite evolutionary erosion of institutional religion as science advanced. Second, the authors note how evolutionary psychology explains the origins of religion in terms of the functioning of domain-specific psychological mechanisms that evolved as adaptations for purposes other than religion.

The similarities between Veblen's instinct psychology and the explanation of religion as by-products of domain-specific psychological mechanisms are sufficient to allow the conclusion that the evolutionary psychology of religion provides a modern psychological basis for Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion.

An evolutionary economics of religion has a great social value if it provides credible explanations of both the origins of religious belief and innate tendency for religious belief to continue even as science refutes elements of religious doctrines. With a modern psychological basis, Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion accomplishes that purpose.

The modern revival of “Austrian economics” dates to the South Royalton conference of 1974 (Vaughn, 1994, pp. 103–111). At that time, neoclassical orthodoxy excluded evolutionary concepts. It was, in Ludwig Lachmann’s memorable phrase, “late classical formalism” (1977, p. 35). Opposition to neoclassical orthodoxy was part of the definition of Austrian economics. It formed part of our identity. Today it is no longer clear what “orthodoxy” is or whether current mainstream economics is “neoclassical” at all (Colander et al., 2004). One of the more salient changes in mainstream economics over the last 30 years is the introduction of evolutionary ideas. Mainstream economics is rich with evolutionary concepts. Evolutionary game theory, for example, is certainly a part of today’s standard toolbox. Thirty years ago, it did not even exist.¹ Some of the evolutionary ideas entering mainstream economics are similar or identical to ideas from the Austrian tradition. In this situation, it is no longer clear what the Austrian differentiae are. I hope this volume will help to sort out some of the issues relating to Austrian economics and one group of evolutionary ideas, namely, those of evolutionary psychology.

The methodological individualism and subjectivism of the Austrian tradition in economics is often associated with a methodological dualism, i.e. the claim that the nature of its subject matter, namely purposeful and intentional human action, requires economics to adopt a methodology that is fundamentally different from the causal explanatory approach of the natural sciences. This paper critically examines this claim and advocates an alternative, explicitly naturalistic and empiricist outlook at human action, exemplified, in particular, by the research program of evolutionary psychology. It is argued that, within the Austrian tradition, a decidedly naturalistic approach to subjectivism can be found in F. A. Hayek’s work.

A collection of essays by a social economist seeking to balance economics as a science of means with the values deemed necessary to man′s finding the good life and society enduring as a civilized instrumentality. Looks for authority to great men of the past and to today′s moral philosopher: man is an ethical animal. The 13 essays are: 1. Evolutionary Economics: The End of It All? which challenges the view that Darwinism destroyed belief in a universe of purpose and design; 2. Schmoller′s Political Economy: Its Psychic, Moral and Legal Foundations, which centres on the belief that time‐honoured ethical values prevail in an economy formed by ties of common sentiment, ideas, customs and laws; 3. Adam Smith by Gustav von Schmoller – Schmoller rejects Smith′s natural law and sees him as simply spreading the message of Calvinism; 4. Pierre‐Joseph Proudhon, Socialist – Karl Marx, Communist: A Comparison; 5. Marxism and the Instauration of Man, which raises the question for Marx: is the flowering of the new man in Communist society the ultimate end to the dialectical movement of history?; 6. Ethical Progress and Economic Growth in Western Civilization; 7. Ethical Principles in American Society: An Appraisal; 8. The Ugent Need for a Consensus on Moral Values, which focuses on the real dangers inherent in there being no consensus on moral values; 9. Human Resources and the Good Society – man is not to be treated as an economic resource; man′s moral and material wellbeing is the goal; 10. The Social Economist on the Modern Dilemma: Ethical Dwarfs and Nuclear Giants, which argues that it is imperative to distinguish good from evil and to act accordingly: existentialism, situation ethics and evolutionary ethics savour of nihilism; 11. Ethical Principles: The Economist′s Quandary, which is the difficulty of balancing the claims of disinterested science and of the urge to better the human condition; 12. The Role of Government in the Advancement of Cultural Values, which discusses censorship and the funding of art against the background of the US Helms Amendment; 13. Man at the Crossroads draws earlier themes together; the author makes the case for rejecting determinism and the “operant conditioning” of the Skinner school in favour of the moral progress of autonomous man through adherence to traditional ethical values.

In the light of a resurgence of “evolutionary” research, sets out to raise some of the philosophical issues associated with an evolutionary conception of economics. Considers Tony Lawson′s work on transcendental realism as a point of departure in the building of an argument which promotes the adoption of a pluralist and holistic conception of economics. Suggests that, while Lawson′s transcendental realism has largely been developed independently of evolutionary economics, with the modifications outlined it may provide a suitable starting point for the formulation of philosophical foundations of evolutionary economics. Augments Lawson′s argument by the suggested adoption of an organic framework and the notion of types as the means of providing a base for the pluralist outlook of evolutionary economics.

This essay explores evolutionary and competence‐based theories of the firm. Evolutionary theories can be regarded as a subset of a wider class of theories, variously described as “capabilities”, “resource‐based”, or “competence‐based” theories of the firm. These contrast with a different set of contractarian theories, emanating largely from the work of Coase. It is argued that the contractarian theories of the firm misleadingly assume given individuals thus neglecting processes of individual learning and transformation. Similarly underestimated is importance of technology and the persistence of variety in firm structure and performance. The genesis of the alternative, competence‐based approach is outlined, including the important subset of “evolutionary” approaches of the Nelson‐Winter type. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the competence‐based approach to strategic management.

Recently, the concept of financial technology (FinTech) has attracted extensive attention from international organisations and regulators, in particular, how to achieve a “win–win” situation between financial institutions' FinTech innovation and effective regulation has become a hot topic. This study purposes to explore the evolutionary game relationship between FinTech innovation and regulation by constructing both static and dynamic earmarking game models.

A simulation experiment was conducted using primary data obtained from a commercial bank in China.

The results of the theoretical analysis of evolutionary game models were consistent with the corresponding simulation results, proving the validity of the proposed evolutionary game models. It was also found that the dynamic earmarking game model was more stable and effective than the static earmarking game model in promoting FinTech innovation and regulation. Furthermore, when the regulators utilised a dynamic earmarking mechanism, the evolutionary path of financial institutions and regulators' behaviour strategies took the shape of a spiral and eventually converged to a central point, indicating the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy and Nash equilibrium. Finally, because the behaviour strategies of financial institutions were mainly influenced by the regulators' policies, the regulators were inspired to adjust the corresponding regulation policies on FinTech innovation.

This study bridges the knowledge gap in the existing literature on financial innovation and regulation, in particular by establishing evolutionary game models from the perspective of financial earmarking policies. Also, the case study for simulation experiments can gain a more intuitive insight into FinTech innovation and financial earmarking policies.

Political economies evolve institutionally and technologically over time. This means that to understand evolutionary political economy one must understand the nature of the evolutionary process in its full complexity. From the time of Darwin and Spencer natural selection has been seen as the foundation of evolution. This view has remained even as views of how evolution operates more broadly have changed. An issue that some have viewed as an aspect of evolution that natural selection may not fully explain is that of emergence of higher order structures, with this aspect having been associated with the idea of emergence. In recent decades it has been argued that self-organization dynamics may explain such emergence, with this being argued to be constrained, if not overshadowed, by natural selection. Just as the balance between these aspects is debated within organic evolutionary theory, it also arises in the evolution of political economy, as between such examples of self-organizing emergence as the Mengerian analysis of the appearance of commodity money in primitive societies and the natural selection that operates in the competition between firms in markets.