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The purpose of this paper is to examine how analyst recommendation change is associated with a firm’s magnitude of strategic change.

This study argues that unfavorable analyst recommendation change serves as a powerful external assessment that current strategies are inappropriate and that changes are needed. This study also incorporates the moderating roles of CEO power and board’s informal hierarchy in the relationship between analyst recommendation change and firm’s magnitude of strategic change. Results from a sample of 824 observations generally support our predictions.

The findings of this study show that the greater the analysts downgrade for the company’s stock, the larger the magnitude of strategic change will be made. This study also considers the moderating roles of CEO power and the clarity of board’s informal hierarchy. In particular, the higher the CEO power, the weaker the relationship between analyst recommendation change and the magnitude of strategic change will be. The higher the clarity of board’s informal hierarchy, the more positive the relationship between analyst recommendation change and the magnitude of strategic change will be.

It extends research on the external predictors of strategic change by incorporating the role of unfavorable analyst recommendation change. In addition, it contributes to institutional theory by showing how external legitimacy pressure and internal corporate governance tool complement each other.

The authors examine how financial analysts respond to online investor sentiment when updating recommendations for specific stocks in South Africa. The aim is to establish whether online sentiment contains significant information that can influence analyst recommendations. The authors follow up the above by examining when online investor sentiment is most associated with analyst recommendation changes.

For online investor sentiment proxies, the authors make use of the social media sentiment and news media sentiment scores provided by Bloomberg Inc. The sample size includes all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index. The study uses traditional ordinary least squares to examine the relation at the mean and quantile regression to identify the scope of the relationship across the distribution of the dependent variable.

The authors find evidence that pre-event news sentiment significantly influences analyst recommendation changes while no significant relationship is found with the Twitter sentiment. Further analysis shows that news sentiment is more influential when the recommendation changes are moderate (in the middle of the conditional distribution of the recommendation changes).

The study is the one of the first to examine the association between online sentiment and analyst recommendation changes in an emerging market using high frequency data. The authors also make a direct comparison between social media sentiment and news media sentiment, some of the most used contemporary investor sentiment proxies.

More studies have investigated the relation between option measures and stock returns during scheduled corporate events. This study adds to the literature and investigates the informational role of options concerning stock returns following unscheduled corporate news events. The authors focus on individual analysts' recommendation changes rather than consensus revisions, as the recommendation consensus might discard a large amount of potentially valuable information in the aggregation process.

Based on the econometric model, the authors follow Bakshi et al. (2003) to construct the model-free option implied measures. The authors further decompose the implied option variance into upside and downside components. In such a way, the different informational roles of call and put options can be distinguished. A variety of regression analyses are conducted to examine the predictive power of option implied measures, and the ordered probit model is used to test the tipping hypothesis of analyst recommendations.

This study’s results show that the option market impounds the “valuable” firm-specific news; thus, the pre-event option market is strongly related to stock returns around recommendations even though recommendation changes are largely “unscheduled”. At the same time, these results suggest that upside (good) and downside (bad) implied volatilities contain distinctive information on subsequent stock returns.

This study provides new evidence that an increase in upside (downside) volatility around analyst recommendation changes would increase the probability that analysts upgrade (downgrade) the stock. The findings provide implications for investors and risk managers in making investment decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine analyst followings of firms starting from one year prior to their filing for Chapter 11 and as the firms progress through bankruptcy proceedings with a focus on firms receiving “Hold” or better recommendations. The authors attempt to answer questions such as what the common characteristics of the firms receiving stronger than expected recommendations one year prior to filing for bankruptcy reorganization or while in bankruptcy are, and how the market reacts to the issuance of stronger ratings for those firms.

The authors design various regressions and apply them to a total of 2,754 sell-side analyst recommendations and 325 firms that are either approaching bankruptcy filing or in the process of reorganizing. In each analysis, the authors control for several firm and performance characteristics.

The authors find that the probability of securing stronger ratings is higher for small firms and for those followed by a greater number of analysts than for large firms and firms followed by fewer analysts. The market becomes more skeptical of optimistic evaluations closer to the date of bankruptcy filing (perhaps reflecting some anticipation) and reacts more positively to rating upgrades issued during bankruptcy protection than to the upgrades issued before the bankruptcy filing.

The conclusions are based on the analysis of analyst recommendations issued shortly before Chapter 11 filings and during bankruptcy proceedings. The conclusions could be strengthened by further analysis of firms’ post-bankruptcy recovery and performance and examination of analyst recommendations issued for the firms after they emerge from Chapter 11..

Analyst security ratings that are more positive than expected are perhaps the result of superior expertise and access to private information. During bankruptcy proceedings, when information disclosure is limited, investors could greatly benefit from reports issued by security analysts.

This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the authors contribute to the literature on the analyst ratings of firms in distress by considering the period between bankruptcy filing and emergence, while the existing literature provides analysis of pre-bankruptcy recommendations and forecasts. Second, the authors focus on better than expected ratings rather than all types of ratings as the firms approach bankruptcy filings and proceed through reorganization. Finally, they evaluate how investors react to stronger than expected analyst ratings.

This paper investigates individual investors' responses to stock underpricing and how their trading decisions are affected by analysts' forecasts and recommendations.

This empirical study uses mutual fund fire sales as an exogenous source that causes stock underpricing and analysts' forecasts and recommendations as price-correcting information. The study further uses regression analysis to examine individual investors' responses to fire sales and how their responses vary with price-correcting information.

The authors first show that individual investors respond to mutual fund fire sales by significantly decreasing net buys, and this effect appears to be prolonged. Next, the authors find that the decrease of net buys diminishes following analysts' price-correcting earnings forecast revisions and stock recommendation changes. Hence, the authors suggest that individual investors are not “wise” enough to recognize flow-driven underpricing; however, this response is weakened by analysts' price-correcting information.

There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether individual investors should be portrayed as unsophisticated traders or informed traders who can predict future returns. The authors study a unique information event and provide new evidence related to both perspectives. Overall, our evidence suggests that the “unsophisticated traders” perspective is predominant, whereas a better information environment significantly reduces individual investors' information disadvantage. This finding could be of interest to both academic researchers and regulators.

Firms’ real activities management (RAM) can have a more detrimental effect on firms’ future performance than accrual earnings management. This paper aims to examine whether analysts, who play an important role as information intermediaries, understand the negative effect of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond to it accordingly.

The authors investigate whether analysts lower their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of the firms with RAM. The authors measure RAM by examining firms’ abnormal decreases in discretionary expenses, abnormal increases in production and abnormal decreases in cash flow from operations following prior literature.

The authors find that after controlling for earnings surprises and other important firm characteristics, analysts lower their forecasts of future annual earnings and stock recommendations of the firms that show signs of RAM.

First, as in other RAM studies, the results in this study are subject to measurement errors inherent in the estimation of RAM (i.e. abnormal production costs, abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenditures). Second, we include only firm-year observations that barely make positive income in our samples following the previous study. This sample selection criterion helps increase the power of the test by examining the “suspect firms group,” which are more likely to engage in earnings management. However, one can challenge that our findings on the association between RAM and analysts’ reactions could be only case-specific and cannot be generalized.

This study contributes to the literature on earnings management and especially on RAM. Specifically, none of the previous studies clearly examines whether analysts understand the negative impact of RAM on firms’ future performance and respond accordingly, although there are studies showing the negative association between RAM and firms’ future operating performance and studies showing the negative association between analysts following and RAM. Thus, filling the gap, this study provides a specific reason for the negative association between the analyst following and real earnings management presented in previous studies.

The findings will be of interest to regulators, who are concerned about the potential negative consequences in which tighter accounting standards can result. For example, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically demonstrate that tighter accounting standards can prompt more RAM instead of accounting earnings management. The study provides important evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market. If the market is able to detect RAM and allocate fewer resources to the firms that engage in it, then the concerns associated with the substitution effect between accrual-based earnings management and RAM can be diminished.

Prior research suggests that tighter accounting regulations (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) prompt more RAM than accounting earnings management. The study provides evidence supporting that such suboptimal operating activities are closely watched by analysts and are potentially penalized by the market.

The purpose of this paper is to increase the transparency of the value‐creation chain in the stock market. It aims to: conceptualize the value‐added through the relational capital, inductively develop models on how values are created, and discuss the values created for the analyst firm, the clients and investors in the stock market in general.

The paper is based on a case study of sell‐side analysts at a big Swedish investment bank and their work with real life situations of changes in recommendations.

The findings of the case study indicate that analysts, through their relational capital, access competitive advantages needed for remaining on a highly competitive market. They get access to value‐added information and knowledge and also business for the firm. This helps them to fulfill the three roles played, i.e. as information intermediaries, knowledge builders and businessmen. However, the analysts' dependencies, due to their relational capital and the analysts' conflicting roles, result in ambiguous or even biased information. The values added to clients differ between prioritized clients who receive value‐added information through the relational capital with the analysts and non‐prioritized clients with limited, or no access, to the analysts' services.

Value created through relational capital within organizations has been intensively studied within the area of intellectual capital. However, the sell‐side analysts' value‐creation chain linked to their relational capital with company representatives and clients, considered in the present study, has been neglected.

This study aims to evaluate the short-term impact of brokerage analysts’ recommendations on abnormal returns using a sample selected from the S&P BSE 100 in the Indian context. The efficient market hypothesis, specifically, its semi-strong form, is tested for “Buy” stock recommendations published in the electronic version of Business Standard. The crucial issue is, are there any abnormal returns that can be earned following a recommendation? If so, how quickly do prices incorporate the information value of these recommendations? It tests the impact of analyst recommendations on average abnormal returns (AARs) and standardized abnormal returns (SRs) to determine their statistical significance.

Using a sample of stock recommendations published in the e-version of Business Standard, the event study methodology is used to determine whether AARs and SRs are significantly different from zero for the duration of the event window by using several significance tests.

The findings indicate a marginal opportunity for profit in the short term, restricted to the event day. However, the effect does not persist, i.e. the market is efficient in its semi-strong form implying that investors cannot consistently earn abnormal returns by following analysts’ recommendations. Post the event date, the market reaction to analyst recommendations becomes positive, however, insignificant until the ninth day after the recommendation providing support to the underreaction hypothesis given by Shliefer (2000) and post-recommendation price drift documented by Womack (1996). The study contributes by using different statistical tests to determine the significance of returns.

There are important implications for traders, investors and portfolio managers. The speed with which market prices incorporate publicly available information is useful in formulating trading strategies. However, stock characteristics such as market capitalization, volatility and level of analyst coverage need to be incorporated while making investment decisions.

The study contributes by using different statistical tests to determine the significance of returns.

This study aims to document the influence of information content and the informativeness of analyst reports towards cumulative abnormal return in the Malaysian market.

Samples of analyst reports for the period 4th January 2010 until 24th December 2015 were collected from the Bursa Malaysia’s repository system for daily basis information. The study uses market-adjusted method for the calculation of cumulative abnormal return and panel regression to test the research objective. In addition, diagnostic tests, which include the variance inflation factor (VIF), correlation analysis, heteroscedasticity tests, serial auto-correlation and the Hausman test, were also performed to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.

Result from the unbalanced panel data reveals that not all information contained in the analyst reports is able to detect stock returns movement. Only five variables are shown to have a strong association with the returns, and these are target price, earnings forecast, return on equity, cash flows to price and sales to price ratio. The R-square value has also been shown to be relatively low (0.79 per cent), indicating the low predictive power of information content and the informativeness of the analyst report in explaining stock returns. To support the findings based on the knowledge obtained, a descriptive analysis on whether the analyst reports were able to predict the recommendation accurately was performed. Result from the descriptive analysis shows that only 57 per cent of the recommendations are accurate, evidenced by the differing target price and ending price. This outcome appears to contradict the theory of signalling hypothesis. Hence, it can be concluded that analyst reports have less informational role among investors.

This paper has, thus, provided insight into how information disclosed in the analyst report influence the return of stocks, further extending the limited research on analyst report in the context of the Malaysian markets. The paper has also added to the existing literature by providing several implications to practitioners and researchers alike.

The purpose of this paper is to document performance of analysts’ recommendations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the period between 1999 and 2010.

This paper uses post-announcement market-adjusted returns as a measure of performance and computes returns for different holding periods. Significant positive (negative) returns following buy (sell) recommendation will indicate value relevance of these recommendations.

The authors show that analysts’ buy recommendations have significant information in them, while their sell recommendations contain no significant information. Significant positive returns are reported following analysts’ buy recommendations and insignificant returns following their sell recommendations. Furthermore, it is also shown that these results hold true only in markets where institutions are relatively strong (common law countries and countries with stronger property rights) and for firms which have lower agency conflicts (firms that pay dividends and have concentrated ownership). For markets where institutions are relatively weak and for firms which have greater agency conflicts, these results show no value in analysts’ recommendations.

These results imply that investors should not blindly follow analyst recommendations while making their investment decisions in the MENA region.

This paper makes detailed analysis of analyst recommendations in previously unexplored MENA region. Some conditions under which analyst recommendation have no value and some conditions under which they have partial value have also been identified.