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The aim of this study is to examine the agency problems that arise between retail property owners and outsourced facility management (FM) service vendors in Ghana.

This study was carried out using telephone and face-to-face interviews. Nine facility managers (n =9) and six retail property owners (n = 6) purposively selected participated in the interviews. The responses from the interviews were analysed using content analysis. To begin with the analysis, the recorded audio for each respondent during the interviews was transcribed to augment what was written during the interviews. The next step was the development of a coding framework where each of the agency problems was assigned unique codes and grouped under themes. Each response was assigned a predefined code based on the agency problems identified in the literature. The research team discussed the consistency of the thematic codes assigned to each of the responses to ensure that each response was captured under the appropriate agency problem theme it best represents.

The results showed that agency problems in FM outsourcing in the Ghanaian retail sector are related to disagreement on expenditure associated with maintenance and repairs and improper tenant information sharing and use by FM service providers. Based on the findings, it is recommended that property owners explore the mixed approach to FM to mitigate the risks of complete outsourcing of FM services. It is also recommended that a clear path on how tenant information can be shared be pre-agreed in FM contracts.

This study provides new literature relating to agency problems in outsourcing and may be the first of its kind for FM in the Ghanaian retail industry. The findings could serve as a starting point for service providers and their principals to find common grounds to understand each other and mitigate the agency problems that could arise and their overall impact on performance.

Classical assumptions of agency theory (AT) fall short of providing satisfactory answers to modern management and organizational knowledge (MOK) problems, and there is a need for extending the scope of the field. This article aims to compare modern AT assumptions with the agency perspective of Islamic historical political treatises (namely, siyasetnamas) and point out how AT can be furthered.

This article applies content analysis method to find out agency perspectives in Islamic political treatises and then compare them with those of the basic AT assumptions to find out similarities and differences between them in explaining agency problems.

The agency perspective in siyasetnamas are based on the following assumptions which could contribute to the development of AT with their emphasis on (1) responsibilities beyond contracts, (2) entrustment rather than ownership, (3) shared societal responsibility rather than conflicting individual interests, (4) importance of self-control for both principals and agents and (5) trust discourse which emphasizes inner virtues rather than control discourse.

Agency perspectives cannot be considered independent of cultural imprints. By introducing siyasetnamas' agency perspective, this article makes an effort to suggest implications for how to further modern MOK based overwhelmingly on individualistic cultural assumptions to rediscuss agency problems from the viewpoint of specifically the emerging markets in which collectivist culture plays an important role in social and economic life. In this respect, siyasetnamas' agency perspective based on the notion of entrustment seems, arguably, to be a better fit to the contextual realities and managerial practices of emerging markets.

This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial myopia on information technology (IT) investment. Specifically, it aims to investigate the influence of chief information officer (CIO) compensation on IT investment and the moderating role of the board monitoring strength on this relationship.

The study examines a sample of 194 firms listed on US stock exchanges with a CIO position in 2019. The authors employ hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypothesis.

The results show that CIO compensation negatively influences IT investment. Further, even though vigilant board monitoring does not necessarily reduce such opportunistic behaviors, weak board monitoring creates an environment for such actions.

First, the cross-sectional data can limit the results' generalizability. Second, the sampling frame is not perfectly random as it consists of firms that have CIO compensation information in the ExecuComp for 2019. Third, we include only two measures of board monitoring strength.

Board of directors should wisely select compensation packages' components since equity incentives potentially exacerbate managerial myopia. Moreover, firms may regulate CIOs' investment behaviors through board-level IT governance.

This study is one of the few studies that utilize CIO sensitivity to measure CIO compensation. Moreover, by examining the factors affecting IT investment behavior, this study sheds light on CIO incentives' impact on IT investment behaviors. Finally, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board monitoring's role in the relationship between CIO sensitivity and IT investment intensity.

The purpose of this paper is to provide new scientific knowledge concerning the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on auditing quality as determined by audit fees for both family- and non-family-owned firms in Jordan.

The authors use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression firm-clustered standard error employing data from 200 Jordanian enterprises between 2005 and 2020 to validate this study's hypotheses.

The regression findings suggest that enterprises run by families are better able to handle crises and spend less on audits. Companies that are not family-owned have to spend the most on monitoring tasks since they need to take extra steps to prevent the agency problem and make their financial statements stand out from their peers in order to attract more investors. Additional analysis that stretched out throughout 2005–2022 came to the same findings.

The findings can be beneficial for authorities to better regulate and supervise the auditing sector. Political leaders, legislators, regulators and the auditing industry can all learn important lessons from the findings as they assess the growing concerns in a turbulent economic situation. The results of this research can, therefore, be utilised to reassure investors and assist policymakers in crafting workable responses to Covid-19's creation of financial problems. After the devastation caused by the coronavirus, these findings may be used to strengthen the laws that oversee Jordan's auditing sector.

In emerging nations like Jordan, where there is a clear concentration of ownership and a predominance of high levels of family ownership, and to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first empirical study to compare the auditing quality of family-owned versus non-family-owned enterprises. Preliminary insights into the crisis management tactics of family and non-family organisations are provided by this first empirical investigation of the consequences of the Covid-19 crisis on family-owned firms.

This study aims at examining the contentions of the agency theory by exploring the direct relationship between environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure score and corporate financial performance (CFP) from the years 2016–2020. It also tests for the adaptability of slack resources theory by testing this relationship in the presence of a moderating variable (financial slack).

The study relies on the data obtained from Bloomberg database of 112 companies belonging to different sectors. It employs the use of partial least square structure equation modelling (PLS-SEM) for carrying out the empirical analysis.

The results obtained show that there exists a negative relationship between ESG and CFP of the sample firms. These results lend support to the propositions of both the agency theory. Further, the financial slack in the organizations does not ensure a firm's responsible behavior.

The paper provides important implications both from the perspective of managers as well as policymakers. The results of this study will aid the managers in reducing the instances of information asymmetry in the market, thereby tackling the issue of principle agent problems within an organization. From the policy marking perspective, the results of this study will help the regulatory authorities in implementing the necessary rules, regulations and laws that will ensure increased participation from the corporate sector in disclosing their sustainability-related information.

This study is one of its kind to explore the impact of a moderating variable on the ESG-CFP relationship in the context of an emerging economy. It also contributes to the present stream of literature by providing both a theoretical and empirical support to the propositions under consideration.

The phenomenon of “broken rungs” has prevented most women from attaining managerial positions relative to men. Despite this gender disparity in management, female executives are more likely to enhance shareholder trust due to higher ethical standards, which can be hypothesized to mitigate the negative impact of family ownership on firm value. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the moderating role of female ownership and female directors in mitigating the unfavorable effects of family ownership on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q and the Market Value of Equity (MVE).

Multiple linear regression is applied to examine the proposed hypotheses, as well as other vital factors, such as board independence (BI), the dual chief executive officer (CEO)–chairman role (CEO duality) and control variables (i.e. firm size, firm age, leverage and investment ratio).

The results revealed that female directors could buffer the negative impact caused by family ownership, leading to higher firm value, when given a sufficient level of female ownership or the appointment of more female directors, regardless of female ownership levels. Otherwise, female ownership cannot help overcome the negative effects of family ownership in Thai-listed firms. This study also sheds light on corporate governance elements that impact firm value. CEO duality reduces the value of Thai-listed companies, whereas board independence increases firm value.

The managerial roles for women should be promoted in Thai-listed enterprises. The government can support new laws, policies and programs for embracing a cross-cutting gender perspective. Female network initiatives enable women to advance in their managerial careers.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study intends to fill the research gap by investigating how female directors and owners can moderate family ownership’s influence on the value of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is one of the emerging capital markets.

This paper aims to verify whether the integration of sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance and whether corporate governance characteristics enhance the relationship between sustainability compensation and firms’ non-financial performance and to expand the domain of the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is based on a sample of companies listed on the Milan Italian Stock Exchange from the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index over the 2016–2020 period. Regression analysis was used by using data retrieved from the Refinitiv Eikon database and the sample firms’ remuneration reports.

The findings of this paper show that embedding sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance. The results of this paper also reveal that specific corporate governance features can improve the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is limited to Italian firms included in the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index; however, the findings are highly significant.

The findings provide regulators with useful insights for considering the integration of sustainability goals into executive remuneration. Another implication is that policymakers should require – at least – listed firms to fulfil specific corporate governance structural requirements. Finally, the findings can provide investors and financial analysts with a greater awareness of the role played by executive remuneration in the long-term value-creation process.

This paper contributes to addressing the relationship among sustainability, remuneration and non-financial disclosure, drawing on the stakeholder–agency theoretical framework and focusing on Italian firms. This issue has received limited attention with controversial results in the literature.

This paper explores the factors that shape the complexity of company annual reports in the USA. Using a general-to-specific modeling approach, this study examines the determinants of annual reports' tone complexity.

Negative relationships were found between agency problems and tone; agency costs and readability of annual reports; profitability and tone; and ownership structure and tone complexity.

These relationships helped to confirm several of this study’s hypotheses, whereas positive associations were found between investment growth opportunities and tone complexity, which contradicts one of our initial hypotheses. Findings reveal that the more complex the language in an annual report is, the more difficult it is to strategically make a judgment or decision about the reported financial situation.

Analyzing these variables allows security analysts and investors to obtain important information, not available in the financial statements, which would enhance their understanding of the firm and improve their recommendations and investment decision-making process.

This study aims to examine the impact of agency cost, Islamic board characteristics and corporate governance on the performance of Islamic institutions.

Based on the selected criteria, 92 Islamic banks (IBs) from 20 countries were selected for further research. The authors used generalized method moments (GMM) estimation method. The agency cost and Shariah board characteristics are the explanatory variables. The author uses the age of the bank and the size of the bank for variable control.

Empirical results indicate that first, agency costs represented by cast/total assets negatively affect IBs’ return on equity and net income. As agency costs rise, IBs’ financial performance declines. Second, Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size and board independence affect IB performance. The study found that SSB size positively affects IB performance.

This research contributes to the literature on IBs in different countries, which policymakers and practitioners can use to improve agency cost functions and Shariah board characteristics. Second, this analysis shows that IBs require specific attention for agency charges, given their operations and business structures. This study contributes to agency theory, which requires Islamic banking information and practices. Finally, the author has aided regulators and IBs by identifying the sources of agency cost practices that can be resolved. The other bank governance contribution is twofold. First, the author studied dual board governance in IBs (SSB and ordinary boards of directors). Second, the author examines how SSB and traditional board governance affect IB performance. This research focuses on banks listed on stock exchanges in the 20 countries analysed.

The research has policy and practical implications for central banks and IBs. By outlining appropriate regulatory guidelines and reporting systems, regulatory authorities can ensure Sharia compliance and protect the independence of IB Shariah department officers. Regulators and relevant stakeholders must ensure Sharia compliance, audits, inspections, reporting and accurate disclosure for IBs.

This paper offers original contributions to professionals in the field of IBs and stakeholders investigating the relationship between agency costs, governance of IBs, characteristics of Islamic supervisory boards and the performance of IBs.