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This study aims to examine the impact of agency cost, Islamic board characteristics and corporate governance on the performance of Islamic institutions.

Based on the selected criteria, 92 Islamic banks (IBs) from 20 countries were selected for further research. The authors used generalized method moments (GMM) estimation method. The agency cost and Shariah board characteristics are the explanatory variables. The author uses the age of the bank and the size of the bank for variable control.

Empirical results indicate that first, agency costs represented by cast/total assets negatively affect IBs’ return on equity and net income. As agency costs rise, IBs’ financial performance declines. Second, Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size and board independence affect IB performance. The study found that SSB size positively affects IB performance.

This research contributes to the literature on IBs in different countries, which policymakers and practitioners can use to improve agency cost functions and Shariah board characteristics. Second, this analysis shows that IBs require specific attention for agency charges, given their operations and business structures. This study contributes to agency theory, which requires Islamic banking information and practices. Finally, the author has aided regulators and IBs by identifying the sources of agency cost practices that can be resolved. The other bank governance contribution is twofold. First, the author studied dual board governance in IBs (SSB and ordinary boards of directors). Second, the author examines how SSB and traditional board governance affect IB performance. This research focuses on banks listed on stock exchanges in the 20 countries analysed.

The research has policy and practical implications for central banks and IBs. By outlining appropriate regulatory guidelines and reporting systems, regulatory authorities can ensure Sharia compliance and protect the independence of IB Shariah department officers. Regulators and relevant stakeholders must ensure Sharia compliance, audits, inspections, reporting and accurate disclosure for IBs.

This paper offers original contributions to professionals in the field of IBs and stakeholders investigating the relationship between agency costs, governance of IBs, characteristics of Islamic supervisory boards and the performance of IBs.

The purpose of this study is to examine the linear and non-linear relationship between capital structure (CS) and firm performance (FP) and the moderating and mediating roles of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus.

This study used static and quadratic panel data regression models to examine the linear and non-linear relationships and structured equation models to analyze the mediating effect of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus of 38 listed non-financial Mauritian firms from 2009 to 2019.

Leverage has a significant negative effect on FP supporting the pecking order theory. Agency costs are significantly and positively associated with FP. There is a strong non-linear relationship between leverage and FP supporting the trade-off and agency cost theories. Agency costs are an important moderator and mediator in the CS-FP nexus. Overall, the sensitivity analyses showed that the results were robust.

Firms need to carefully consider the levels and types of debt and equity in their CS involving the use of dynamic strategies to adjust CS in response to changing economic conditions and FP. The moderating effect of agency costs may guide firms in optimizing CS and may contribute to corporate governance discussions, emphasizing the importance of aligning interests to foster sustainable business practices.

This study adds to the extant literature by providing new evidence on the non-linear relationship between leverage and FP and the moderating and mediating roles of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus in emerging capital markets, where such studies are rare.

This study aims to examine the effects of agency cost on auditor choice. This paper also deals with the moderating role of the board’s financial expertise (Bfe) and the status of the internal control (Intecon) system on the relationship between agency cost and auditor selection.

This study’s sample consists of 1,040 firm-year observations of Iranian nonfinancial companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2019. The information required for this research is mainly extracted from Comprehensive Database of All Listed Companies (in Iran Stock Exchange). Data from 130 companies were obtained during the research period. This study used logistic regression to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from lower classes. As the proportion of financial expert members on the board increases, the intensity of this relationship will be reduced. Companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from the lower classes, but the higher the ratio of financial expert board members, the more these companies will choose high-quality auditors. However, findings showed that the status of the Intecon system has no moderating effect on the relationship between agency costs and auditor selection.

The results of this study can expand the existing literature on the relationship between auditor selection and agency costs and the factors affecting this relationship, especially the Bfe and Intecon. This research has significant suggestions for regulators, stakeholders, shareholders and analysts in emerging economies that may encounter similar contextual implications.

This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

This paper investigates the constraints an organisation faces when using recruitment agencies and having to trade-off between the speed of hiring a candidate, the cost of a candidate and the match of the candidate against the job requirements across different job seniorities. We analyse how technology can shift the cost and hiring speed in spite of these constraints.

The research design is exploratory, quantitative and cross-sectional. The study employed a two-factor, unbalanced class Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) including interaction effects to test the difference between the means of the class of interest and a control class.

Our empirical findings confirm that (1) the technological innovation of a recruitment agency marketplace can liberate organisations from their time, cost and quality hiring constraints, accelerating the time to hire by four times and reducing costs by over 12%, and (2) these results hold across varying role seniority levels.

This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways: (1) it introduces the recruitment triangle from project management into the recruitment literature; (2) it demonstrates how technological innovations such as recruitment agency marketplaces are able to provide a shift in the constraints posed by the recruitment triangle.

The aim of this study is to examine the agency problems that arise between retail property owners and outsourced facility management (FM) service vendors in Ghana.

This study was carried out using telephone and face-to-face interviews. Nine facility managers (n =9) and six retail property owners (n = 6) purposively selected participated in the interviews. The responses from the interviews were analysed using content analysis. To begin with the analysis, the recorded audio for each respondent during the interviews was transcribed to augment what was written during the interviews. The next step was the development of a coding framework where each of the agency problems was assigned unique codes and grouped under themes. Each response was assigned a predefined code based on the agency problems identified in the literature. The research team discussed the consistency of the thematic codes assigned to each of the responses to ensure that each response was captured under the appropriate agency problem theme it best represents.

The results showed that agency problems in FM outsourcing in the Ghanaian retail sector are related to disagreement on expenditure associated with maintenance and repairs and improper tenant information sharing and use by FM service providers. Based on the findings, it is recommended that property owners explore the mixed approach to FM to mitigate the risks of complete outsourcing of FM services. It is also recommended that a clear path on how tenant information can be shared be pre-agreed in FM contracts.

This study provides new literature relating to agency problems in outsourcing and may be the first of its kind for FM in the Ghanaian retail industry. The findings could serve as a starting point for service providers and their principals to find common grounds to understand each other and mitigate the agency problems that could arise and their overall impact on performance.

This paper aims to examine the effect of executive compensation incentives, specifically CEO inside debt holdings, on the choice of industry specialist auditor.

High inside debt holdings are expected to constrain excessive managerial risk-taking and align the interests of managers and outside debtholders. The authors hypothesize that reduced debtholders’ expropriation concerns will decrease the demand for high audit quality, measured by industry specialization. The authors investigate a sample of US firms from 2006 to 2018 using OLS regression and use CEO relative leverage to proxy for CEO inside debt holdings. The authors conduct an additional two-stage least squares regression analysis to address potential endogeneity issues.

The paper finds that firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend not to appoint an auditor with industry specialization. This result is consistent with the notion that inside debt mitigates agency conflicts between managers and debtholders, reducing the demand for high-quality audits as a monitoring mechanism. The paper also finds that among firms which are excessively leveraged, those with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend to appoint an industry specialist auditor.

The findings contribute to the literature on agency cost and auditor choice by demonstrating that CEO inside debt has both substitutive and complementary effects on demand for industry specialist auditors.

The authors measure the cost of equity to earnings yield differential for a sample of 2,035 non-financial firms. In a series of Logit and Tobit regressions, the authors examine if the cost of equity to earnings yield differential is related to dividend policy in the manner predicted by agency theory.

Agency theory says a firm's optimal dividend policy is partially determined by the relationship between the earnings yield and the cost of equity capital. When the cost of equity is higher (lower) than the earnings yield, firms are motivated to (not) pay dividends as this reduces the cost of capital and holding other things constant, increases corporate valuations. The authors test whether managers set dividend policies to maximize the value of the firm.

The study’s findings show that when the cost of equity is higher (lower) than earnings yield, firms are more (less) likely to be dividend payers and the payouts are higher (lower). The results are robust to the inclusion of share repurchases as an alternative to cash distributions. The study’s findings support the cost of equity hypothesis and are consistent with alternative dividend theories.

The study’s findings support the cost of equity hypothesis and are consistent with alternative dividend theories. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper testing the cost of equity hypothesis.

This study aims to investigate the direct nexus between board characteristics, corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and the cost of equity capital (CEQ). This is done by using agency theory, stakeholder theory and signalling theory, followed by an investigation into the indirect mediation impact of CSR disclosure in the board characteristics-CEQ nexus. It intends to present new experimental evidence from Jordan’s developing economy.

The study’s target population was services companies registered on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2012 and 2020. As a result, the population and sampling of this study are represented by all services companies for whom complete data are available over the period, with a total of 43 services companies yielding 387 company-year observations. Data for our study were obtained from their annual disclosures and the ASE’s database.

The main findings demonstrated that board size, board gender variety and the number of board sessions positively affect CSR disclosure significantly. In addition, three board characteristics (i.e. board size, board independence and board gender variety) significantly negatively affect CEQ. Besides, CSR disclosure significantly negatively affects CEQ and it fully mediates the relationship between two board characteristics (i.e. board size and board gender variety) and CEQ, whereas it partially mediates the nexus between board independence, CEO/Chairman duality and the number of board sessions of board characteristics and CEQ.

This study varies from earlier studies, in that it builds a new research model by looking at the mediating role of CSR disclosure in the nexus among board characteristics and the CEQ.

Prior literature on the cultural determinants of cash holdings focuses on time-invariant cultural variables measured at the geographical level. These measures of culture do not capture the firm-level variation in corporate culture. Using a validated time-variant measure of firm-level corporate culture, specifically teamwork, we examine the effect of teamwork on a firm's cash holdings.

In this paper, we explore the effect of corporate teamwork culture on firms' cash holdings. Using sudden CEO turnover as an exogenous shock to a firm's teamwork culture, we find teamwork increases cash holdings. Also, we test and find two channels—financial constraint and agency—and two new labour-related channels—human capital quality and labour inefficiency—through which teamwork culture affects cash holdings. Our results are robust to endogeneity tests.

We find that teamwork increases the cash holdings of firms. We find that a firm with a high teamwork culture has higher cash holdings: an increase of one standard deviation in teamwork leads to a 14.6% rise in the mean cash holdings.

To our knowledge, our study is the first to introduce the firm-level teamwork cultural construct as a determinant of cash holdings.