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This article analyzes the moderating role of investment opportunities, business risk and agency costs in shaping the nexus between excess cash and corporate performance.

This research uses dynamic regression models (two-step system generalized method of moments) to analyze the data related to 200 Turkish companies listed on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for the years between 2009 and 2020.

The findings indicate that when excess cash increases, the financial performance deteriorates only for firms with lower investments compared to firms with more investments. In addition, investment contributes to better financial performance for firms that hold cash surplus, whereas the influence of investment is insignificant for firms that have insufficient cash. Agency costs of equity exacerbate the adverse impact of excess cash on financial performance while agency costs of debt mitigate this effect. Excess cash reduces the financial performance of highly leveraged firms. However, this impact becomes insignificant when debt ratio decreases. The findings also show that investment has more significant role than business risk in building the precautionary motive to hold cash.

The findings of this article are limited to the Turkish market. Future research is still needed in other emerging markets to compare the results and reveal more about the effect of excess cash on firm performance, and how other factors can change this effect.

The findings verify the increased significance of excess cash in the presence of investment opportunities and difficulties in accessing external funds. Nevertheless, the role of the equity related agency problem in reducing the benefits of cash surplus confirms the necessity of policies that support corporate governance, especially in emerging markets.

This article, according to the knowledge of author, is the first to examine the role of agency costs associated with debt and equity, and the compound effect of investment opportunities and business risk on the nexus between excess internal funds and corporate financial performance in emerging markets.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

The authors examine how the major board reforms recently implemented by countries around the world affect firms' choice of debt.

Using a quasi-experimental setting of major board reforms around the world that aim to improve board-related governance practices in various areas, this study investigates the impact of effective board monitoring on corporate debt choice. The authors employ difference-in-differences-type quasi-natural experiment method and path analysis for hypotheses testing.

The authors find that the implementation of board reforms is positively associated with firms' preference for public debt financing over bank debt. However, this effect tends to weaken after the fourth year following the implementation of board reforms. In additional analyses, the authors find that “rule-based” reforms have a more pronounced effect on firms' choice of debt than do “comply-or-explain” reforms. Both (1) strengthened firm-level internal governance practices that address concerns about the agency cost of debt and (2) reduced information asymmetries play important roles in facilitating firms' debt choice, but the evidence suggests that the former is the economic mechanism through which country-level reforms affect corporate debt choice.

The study extends the literature examining the heterogeneity of corporate debt choices in a global setting and the literature on the consequences of corporate governance reforms.

The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the corporate board reforms implemented in countries around the world, addressing concerns from critics about their potential harm or ineffectiveness.

The results indicate that country-level board reforms reduce the extent to which shareholder–creditor conflicts harm shareholders.

The aim of this research is to examine the effect of corporate sustainability performance on financial performance and the role of agency costs and business risk in determining this effect.

This study uses the data of 83 non-financial Turkish firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange during the period 2014–2021. Two-step system GMM models are applied to examine the study’s hypotheses.

The results indicate a positive effect of corporate sustainability performance on financial performance, and that this effect is significant only for firms that are more likely to suffer agency costs of equity, firms with R&D expenditures and firms with lower business risk.

The results of this study confirm the importance of regulations introduced by regulators to support the sustainability initiatives for firms that have less ability to access funds required for their investments. In addition, the findings provide important insight into the role of the persistence of corporate sustainability performance in enhancing financial performance through mitigating managers' opportunistic behavior.

To the author’s knowledge, this research is one of few that examine the effect of agency costs and business risk on the corporate sustainability–financial performance relationship in emerging markets.

This paper aims to empirically investigate the moderating role of corporate governance (CG) in the capital structure-performance relationship.

The analysis is based on top Business Today-500 companies and covers a time span of 10 years. The fixed effect panel regression model is used to examine the impact of CG mechanisms on the relationship between capital structure and firm performance.

The core findings of the study indicate significant positive moderating role of board independence, board size and family ownership on the relationship between leverage and performance.

The results enable the managers of Indian firms to comprehend the significance of CG framework while taking financing decisions. The findings encourage managers to raise debt funds in those firms that adhere to good governance norms.

Unlike extant studies that emphasize on the moderating impact of single CG variable in leverage-performance relationship, the current work comprehensively examines the role of many CG factors that moderate the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first of its kind with respect to India.

Digital transformation is essential for commercial banks to maintain long-term competitiveness in the digital economy era. This study aims to investigate the relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation.

This study set up a quasi-natural experiment based on implementing the executive compensation deferral system in the Chinese banking industry. Using the annual panel data of 180 commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2021, this study employed the difference-in-differences (DID) method to conduct an empirical analysis.

This study confirms a significant statistical relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation, and managerial myopia is the transmission channel of inside debt affecting the bank's digital transformation. Furthermore, the development of Internet finance and the enhancement of bankers' confidence will improve the contributions of inside debt to the bank's digital transformation.

This study contributes to the literature on inside debt and the bank's digital transformation. It has specific policy value for the scientific design of the banking compensation mechanism and accelerating banks' digital transformation.

This study aims to examine the impacts of board chairman characteristics on the decision to finance with debts.

Based on historical data from 173 active nonfinancial firms listed on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Stock Exchange Markets during 2012–2019, this research uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and dynamic system-generalized methods of moments to test its hypotheses. The final dataset comprises 1,384 firm-year observations from 10 major nonfinancial industry classifications.

Results indicate a negative impact of board chairman ownership on the decision to finance with retained earnings (RE). Negative effects of the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) from the same family on the decision to finance with RE, whereas positive effects of the chairman and CEO from the same family on the decision to finance with debts are observed. In addition, a negative effect of the chairman from a royal family on the decision to invest with debts is found.

Many board chairmen characteristics, such as age, gender, experience, education level, periodic change and ethnicity, are unaddressed. Financial decisions (FDs) are also limited to two decisions (internal financing with RE and external financing with debts).

Findings of this study provide an improved understanding of the role of chairman characteristics in FDs in GCC. Investors and lenders dealing with companies in GCC markets benefit from the authors' results because of the effects of chairman characteristics on FDs when making investment decisions in company stocks.

The study clarifies how each of the three board chairman characteristics (i.e. chairman ownership, chairman and CEO from the same family and the chairman from the royal family) affects FDs, especially the decisions to finance with debts and RE.

This paper aims to study the impact of geopolitical uncertainty on corporate cost of debt and the moderating role of information asymmetry between creditors and borrowing firms.

This study uses 5,223 firm-quarter observations on German-listed firms spanning 2010:Q1–2021:Q4. This study regresses the cost of debt financing on the geopolitical risk, accounting quality and other control variables. Information asymmetry is measured using the performance-matched Jones-model discretionary accrual and the stock bid-ask spread. It uses interaction terms to check if information asymmetry moderates the impact of geopolitical uncertainty on the cost of debts and control for the moderating role of business risk. For the sake of robustness check, it uses long-term cost of debt and bond spread as alternative dependent variables. In addition, this study executes instrumental variables regression and propension score matching to control for potential endogeneity problems.

Estimation results show that geopolitical uncertainty exerts a positive impact on the cost of debt. This impact is found to be more important on the cost of long-term debts. Information asymmetry is found to exacerbate the positive impact of geopolitical risk on the cost of debt. These results are robust to the change of the dependent variable and to the mitigation of potential endogeneity. At high levels of information asymmetry, this impact is more important for firms belonging to “Transportation”, “Automobiles and auto parts”, “Chemicals”, “Industrial and commercial services”, “Software and IT services” and “Industrial goods” business sectors.

Geopolitical uncertainty should be seriously considered when setting strategies for corporate financial management in Germany and similar economies that are directly exposed to geopolitical risks. Corporate managers should design a comprehensive set of corporate policies to improve their transparency and accountability during increasing uncertainty. Policymakers are required to implement innovative monetary and fiscal policies that take into consideration the heterogeneous impact of geopolitical uncertainty and information transparency in order to contain their incidence on German business sectors.

Despite its relevance to corporate financing conditions, little is known about the impact of geopolitical uncertainty on the cost of debt financing. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is still no empirical evidence on how information asymmetry between creditors and borrowing firms shapes the impact of geopolitical uncertainty on the cost of debt. This paper tries to fill this gap by interacting two measures of information asymmetry with geopolitical uncertainty. In contrast with previous studies, this study shows that the impact of geopolitical uncertainty on the cost of debt is non-linear and heterogeneous. The results show that the impact of geopolitical uncertainty does not exert the same impact on the cost of debt instruments with different maturities. This impact is found to be heterogeneous across business sectors and to depend on the level of information asymmetry.

This study aims to guide firms in emerging markets on whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement facilitates their access to debt with the moderation of asset structure and firm performance. Considering the moderating effect analysis, this study explores the substitutive or complementary effect of these two contingencies on CSR-oriented firms in accessing debt financing.

Drawing on data collected for 16 emerging markets between 2008 and 2019, this study runs country–industry–year fixed-effects regression.

This study finds that CSR performance and reporting facilitate access to debt in emerging markets. However, CSR performance does not have an inverted U-shaped influence on firms’ access to debt financing. The moderation analysis of this study shows that asset tangibility has a negative moderating effect on the link between CSR engagements (i.e. both CSR performance and reporting) and access to debt, confirming a substitutive relationship between asset tangibility and CSR engagements in accessing debt. In contrast, firm performance is positively moderating the nexus between CSR engagement proxies and access to debt, which confirms a complementary type of relationship between firm performance and CSR engagements in accessing debt.

The empirical evidence of this study implies that creditors critically consider CSR engagements of firms in the loan-granting decision process. Similarly, the inverted U-shaped relationship between CSR and access to debt implies that there is an optimal level of CSR engagement creditors might consider in their decision. Likewise, the moderating effects analysis highlights that asset tangibility and firm performance are two conditions under which CSR performance and reporting are linked to access to debt.

Emerging countries are a different set of countries than developed ones; they have high growth rates and hence need financing, have a weaker institutional environment and have weaker stakeholder power. These particularities motivated the authors to conduct a separate study focusing on CSR and debt financing links drawing on a wide range of emerging countries. Thus, this study adds to the ongoing debate by examining the conditions under which CSR-oriented firms can access debt financing in emerging economies.

This chapter analyzes how the macro-environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, political factors including political uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, political corruption, and democracy may have two opposite effects on dividend decisions. For example, firms learn democratic practices to improve their corporate governance, but dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for poor corporate governance. Second, firms in countries of high national income, low inflation, and highly developed stock markets tend to pay more dividends. A monetary restriction (expansion) reduces (increases) dividend payments, as economic shocks like financial crises and the COVID-19 may negatively affect corporate dividend policy through higher external financial constraint, economic uncertainty, and agency costs. On the other hand, they may positively influence corporate dividend policy through agency costs of debt, shareholders' bird-in-hand motive, substitution of weak corporate governance, and signaling motive. Third, social factors including national culture, religion, and language affect dividend decisions since they govern both managers' and shareholders' views and behaviors. Fourth, firms tend to reduce their dividends when they face stronger pressure to reduce pollution, produce environment-friendly products, or follow a green policy. Finally, firms have high levels of dividends when shareholders are strongly protected by laws. However, firms tend to pay more dividends in countries of weak creditor rights since dividend payments are a substitute for poor legal protection of creditors. Furthermore, corporate dividend policy changes when tax laws change the comparative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.