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Over the past decade most central governments across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have begun to decentralize some fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities to lower-levels of government, local institutions, and the private sector in pursuit of greater accountability and more efficient service delivery, often in an attempt to solve broader political, social, or economic problems (SARA, 1997). Education, in particular, has been fertile ground for such decentralization efforts. From Ethiopia to South Africa, SSA countries have engaged in some form of education decentralization, though the pace has been quite uneven. Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, and South Africa, for example, are proceeding fast, while Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe are under way more slowly. Guinea, Niger, Zambia, and Nigeria are at the other end of the continuum. Decentralization of social services, including education appears to be embedded in the political changes occurring in the region. In almost all SSA countries the introduction of decentralized systems are accompanied by popular elections for local councils as part of the general trend of the introduction of or return to democratization.

In recent years, there have been major changes in educational governance and the organization and management of primary and secondary education. This is particularly the case as indicated by debates and deliberations over notions of “good governance” and “public management,” accountability, transparency, effectiveness of public services, performance, and the generation of benchmarks and cross-national comparative data. Among these trends is the debate over educational decentralization, which in the past several decades has become a mode of governance strongly advocated by international policy organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural (UNESCO).

Korea is a highly centralized country where most administrative functions are carried out by the central government in Seoul. Increasingly, however, local governments have been given greater autonomy in their operations. This chapter examines how the ideal values of political decentralization have interacted with the country’s local bureaucracy, which inherently has dark side in itself. The focus is on how local government employees have contributed, or responded, to the democratic change of their communities, particularly since the 1980s. At the outset, the experiences of Korea’s decentralization and local autonomy are briefly reviewed. It is then examined how the bureaucrats have played in the process of democratization in terms of three features: bureaucratic power, scope, and culture. Institutionalizing competitive local bureaucracy contributed to reduce the disparity between capital regions (Seoul and its surrounded area) and noncapital regions (locals). Empowering local bureaucracy to allow own localized decision-making process was the first move of Korean governance.

In this chapter, we present results from an EU-wide survey on public administration reform. Our analysis shows that the 27 public administrations covered still organize their HR services very differently. Divergent structures, traditions, and paths taken do not seem to give rise to an overall shared new model of a European Administrative Space, yet. Different national traditions have a considerable impact on the modernization paths and the organization of HR decision-making structures and account for similarities between more related public administrations. The clusters based on the administrative traditions and on the HR systems proved to be helpful in outlining different patterns, but also revealed several directions for refinement.

This chapter examines one of the specific manifestations of political–administrative relationships, namely the delegation of powers to managers. The first part of the chapter is a literature review of political–administrative relationships in both developed and developing countries. This is followed by a discussion of the framework for delegation in South Africa that was laid down in the late 1990s. Next is an analysis of the implementation of delegation in the 2000s, along with the National Planning Commission recommendations in 2012, which has led to a resurgence in delegation initiatives. There is a well-developed government monitoring system of delegation that has led to some improvement in compliance with delegation, but the overall delegation levels are on the low side. Delegation to officials is often thwarted by Ministers who wish to retain control and/or promote patronage. Further, in some cases, managers lack capacity or are unwilling to manage and take responsibility for delegated authority.

This chapter describes how public sector reform (PSR) became important following the ‘Doi Moi’ (renovation) programme in 1986. Restructuring of state-owned sector was regarded as crucial for ensuring the quality of economic growth, and the Vietnamese government (www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English) put considerable effort in PSR. The 8th Party Congress (1996) emphasized the urgent need for a more transparent, capable and modern public sector, including efforts to improve law-making process and capacity, reducing burdensome bureaucracy, fighting corruption, increasing leadership by senior officials and improving public service delivery. The government specifies the national PSR Master programme, and the Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates its implementation among ministries, central agencies and provincial governments. Local political leaders (party leaders) determine reforms based on guidelines of the party and government. The author writes that in spite of ambitious public service reform programmes and some positive achievements, the quality of public sector remains poor. The professional capacity of civil service is low, pay is low, corruption is high and processes and structures seem ill-fitted for the market economy. Reform scope is too broad, the capacity of public agencies and civil servants is limited and existing monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems are weak. In some successes, leaders use appointment and promotion to encourage lower level to implement reforms and training to increase understanding. They believe that Vietnamese leadership has become less proactive and vigorous in practicing or embracing bold reform experiments.