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Decentralization has been a continual focus of attention of both scholars and practitioners for more than half a century. Even though there is a general agreement on what decentralization is, there is no consensus about how it should be measured. This article builds on the existing body of literature that specifies three major dimensions of decentralization: political, administrative, and economic. The article offers a measurement model that unifies these dimensions in a meaningful manner that allows for comparison across countries. The proposed model is then empirically tested using confirmatory factor analysis of a data set of 37 countries over the period 2000-2009. This factor analysis reveals that there are, in fact, only two dimensions of the decentralization process. The newly developed modelʼs index illustrates that the conceptually challenging processes of decentralization can be accurately measured and analyzed. The index can be used for hypothesis testing of the causality role of decentralization.

How are we to make sense of the attitudes of Social Democratic parties towards decentralisation? What do they think about what is a legitimate territorial allocation of power? What factors shapes this view? And what makes Social Democratic parties change their minds? This article addresses these questions by way of competing ideological traditions, the external strategic incentives and internal constraints. Empirically, the article presents a comparative case-study analysis of Social Democratic parties in four countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom). On the basis of this analysis, I argue that the positioning of Social Democratic parties on decentralisation is influenced by strategic incentives created by the structure of political competition, whereas the policy shifts are more often produced by factors that are internal to the party. A decentralist policy shift is always associated with the capacity of regionalist parties to set the agenda by exerting pressures on Social Democratic parties. In addition, Social Democratic parties tend to shift their policy while in opposition to distinguish themselves from their centralist mainstream rival in government. The dominant mechanism found across four countries was one in which regional branches persuade the central party leadership to adopt a pro-decentralist position. This chapter illustrates how Social Democratic parties have an instinct for ‘adaptation and control’ in the face of social-structural changes, and it demonstrates that the prevalence of different ideological traditions will vary according to external strategic incentives and, crucially, by the party's internal ability to follow those incentives.

Administrative Decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. Administrative Decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and managing of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies. This paper will search for a common theoretical framework of decentralization, then analyzes and assesses the initiatives for decentralization of administration that have been constructed after the emergence of Bangladesh. The major issues and problems of implementation of the decentralization policies in Bangladesh are also discussed suggesting policy measures. This paper is analytical in nature.

An attempt will be made to shed light on the course and pattern of the decentralization process by analyzing the historical development of local government and the territorial-administrative reform of 2015-2020 in Albania and the factors that have been shaping it. The scope is to understand the impact of the reform elements on the subnational governments and in general their overall impact on the government. The purpose of this paper is to fill the gap in the existing literature for Albania and at offering some insights on the administrative-territorial reform. Furthermore, it will contribute to the current debate on fiscal decentralization in South Eastern European (SEE) countries and the public management model implemented after the last reforms.

The first section analyzes the historical development of local government reforms from the 1990s to today and will help to identify if there is instrumentalism advocacy. The second section explains the determinants of the local government’s fiscal autonomy in Albania of the period from 2003 to 2016. Three indicators are used as proxies for fiscal decentralization: the proportion of subnational expenditure over national expenditure, of total subnational revenues over total revenues of central government and the indicator of own subnational revenues over total revenues of the central government. The data from the budget and the revised budgets are then compared.

Despite Albania’s commitment to decentralize its government functions, there is still work to do. The territorial and administrative reform has not generated the expected results. Almost 90 percent of the revenues still come from the central government’s unconditional transfers. Therefore, the Albanian Government should build capacities and skills, and train the employees of each level of government that currently benefit from international assistance.

The analysis represents a single case study on the territorial-administrative reform in Albania. Its implementation started in 2015 and it is probably too early to discuss outcomes. However, it might be useful to analyze the first results after a two-and-a-half-year period of implementation of reforms. Despite contributing to the existing gap in the literature, additional research will be necessary to better understand the decentralization process not only in Albania, but in all SEE countries.

It is necessary to first understand the lack of initial output, as well as the various challenges faced, in order to take the corrective measures on time.

This paper discusses in detail the reform adopted and the progress made by the Albanian local government units. The reform attempts to develop better relationships between the central and local governments and hence improve their service delivery, transparency and accountability. This paper is the first one that is attempting to analyze the initial output of the territorial-administrative reform of 2015-2020.

Greece has legislated health decentralization several times since the 1920s, but none had been implemented until 2001. Even so, the decentralized system was subsequently modified several times, curtailing the powers that were initially delegated to the health regions, while the whole process has been criticized as limited in scope. The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons that the decentralization process did not fulfil its initial aims.

Elite interviews were conducted with 37 of the 50 directors of health regions who served between 2001 and 2009. Interview transcripts were divided into four themes and analyzed using thematic analysis.

The participants agreed that health decentralization in Greece was only administrative rather than political and did not include fiscal decentralization. They described problematic and competitive relations with party officials and civil servants. They blamed their short tenure for the inability to fulfil their plans. Findings indicate that decentralization in Greece did not achieve its objectives because of the dominant mentality of centralized control, the lack of political support, the discontinuity in health policies and opposition from vested interests.

The value of the present study lies in the fact that it examines in depth the issue of health decentralization drawing on the experiences of the former directors of the Greek health regions, i.e. the persons who were called on to put into practice the process of regional decentralization.

The rise of cultural governance has made cultural democracy important in East Asia. South Korea and China have chosen to develop cultural democracy by means of developing community-based cultural houses. Cultural houses in Korea were first managed from the center but have now been decentralized, and those in China have been developed based on local financing and administration. Since central-local intergovernmental relations, as they relate to public culture, have gone untouched in East Asia, the purpose of this paper is to study how central-local intergovernmental relations have impacted the development of cultural democracy in this area, in order to better understand how public culture should be developed.

A comparative study of the cases of South Korea and China has been used. The materials and information collected for the study were gathered by a review and an analysis of extant literature, policy documents, data and other materials from the relevant departments of both countries. It was also based on semi-structured interviews conducted with the national cultural departments, regulatory institutions, and with officials and scholars.

This study shows that central-local intergovernmental relations can have an impact on the management of community-based cultural houses and the effectiveness of cultural democracy’s development. Only complete decentralization that directly invites democratization will provide positive local conditions for cultural democracy’s growth. In short, meaningful governmental responses to local demands and a strong civil society are critical for the advancement of cultural democracy.

This study seeks to provide insights into the relationship between central-local intergovernmental relations and cultural democracy. At the micro project level, cultural project management should be improved; at the medium local level, the public must be made part of any decentralization effort; and at the macro national level, the multiple impacts caused by decentralization need to be considered.

This study is unique in terms of both its research questions and its research area. Central-local intergovernmental relations, as they relate to public culture, have gone comparatively untouched, especially in the context of East Asia. It is in this context that studying how central-local intergovernmental relations impact the development of cultural democracy is worthwhile, in order to better understand how public culture has developed and will be developed in future. A comparative study of the cases of South Korea and China has been used to discover the impacts of different dimensions of central-local decentralization on cultural development.

The purpose of this research is to identify some determinants of rural‐urban disparity in the implementation of decentralised educational management programmes in Nigeria.

The study examines how political leadership's disposition to decentralised educational management, allocation of funds and physical facilities established for decentralised educational management programmes differ in rural, suburban and urban communitites of Nigeria. Employing a survey design, the study uses national survey data on educational statistics and planning of the Federal Ministry of Statistics, in addition to the administration of questionnaires to 200 key stakeholders in educational management. Sampled groups included political leaders, policy makers in educational administration, traditional rulers, women leaders, leaders of different unions and the youths.

Data collected were analysed using comparative means and findings show that several facts are responsible for the reported disparity between rural, suburban and urban communities in the implementation of educational decentralization programmes. These factors ranged from inequitable distribution of physical facilities, to poor leadership disposition, to decentralised educational management functions.

The implication of the findings from this study is that in spite of the rhetorics of universalisation of educational developments, national policies and attitude towards implementation of decentralised management reform programmes is still low, particularly in rural and suburban communities.

Hopefully, findings from this study would provide practical solutions to existing disparity between rural, suburban and urban communities in the implementation of educational decentralization programmes in Nigeria, since some of the impending factors for current disparity have been identified in this study.

This paper analyses the degree of political decentralisation and its relation to the local councils in Tanzania. It explores the institutional and political set-up of the local councils originating from the degree of political decentralisation and how it influences the tension between the bureaucrats and local politicians.

Qualitative approach by a comparative case study is adopted to investigate the phenomenon in two local governments in Tanzania. The data were collected through interviews with 37 senior local government officials and eight focus group discussions with 48 administrators and councillors.

The findings indicate that the two local governments are subjected to a similar political system guided by similar rules and guidelines from the central government bureaucracy for implementing the party manifesto and central government priorities. Thus, the local politicians have little room for negotiation in adopting local agenda to reflect the preferences of the local community. Any attempt to challenge this status quo creates political tensions between bureaucrats and the administrators.

The findings provide invaluable insights to different stakeholders such as political scientists, government officials, and policymakers with interests in research or practice of political decentralization and political-administrative relation.

Korea is a highly centralized country where most administrative functions are carried out by the central government in Seoul. Increasingly, however, local governments have been given greater autonomy in their operations. This chapter examines how the ideal values of political decentralization have interacted with the country’s local bureaucracy, which inherently has dark side in itself. The focus is on how local government employees have contributed, or responded, to the democratic change of their communities, particularly since the 1980s. At the outset, the experiences of Korea’s decentralization and local autonomy are briefly reviewed. It is then examined how the bureaucrats have played in the process of democratization in terms of three features: bureaucratic power, scope, and culture. Institutionalizing competitive local bureaucracy contributed to reduce the disparity between capital regions (Seoul and its surrounded area) and noncapital regions (locals). Empowering local bureaucracy to allow own localized decision-making process was the first move of Korean governance.

Decentralization is an important element in the policy formulation and implementation of Primary Health Care (PHC) in developing countries. While this may well be the case, certain forms of “decentralization” policies can have negative implications for the development of PHC. It can be associated with a reduced role of the public sector, weaken the central Ministry of Health, be instrumental in producing inequity and facilitate political domination. It is necessary to examine decentralization with a view to securing its effective formulation and implementation. A set of ten questions and related issues is set out to facilitate this examination.