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We propose a novel method of forecasting the level of informed trading at merger announcements. Informed traders typically take advantage of their knowledge of the forthcoming merger by trading heavily at announcement. They trade on positive volume or informed buys for cash mergers and negative volume or informed sells for stock mergers. In response, market makers set wider spreads and raise prices for informed buys and lower prices for informed sells. As liquidity traders trade on these prices, our vector autoregressive framework establishes the link between informed trading and liquidity trading through price changes. As long as the link holds, informed trading may be detected by measuring levels of liquidity trading. We observe the link during the −1 to +1 period for cash mergers and −1 to +5 period for stock mergers.

We investigate institutional investors’ trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992–2001. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts, and insurance companies as passive institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolution. Our results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” However, they update their beliefs between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the final resolution.

Prior literature suggests that managers have an incentive to increase stock prices prior to stock‐based acquisitions. This article aims to examine if there is any relationship between product market advertising and method of payments in mergers.

To examine the hypotheses the paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and regressions based on a propensity score matching approach, which controls for the possibility that differences in firm characteristics are driving the results.

The paper finds that managers of firms that use stock to finance bids increase advertising intensity in the pre‐merger period and find that advertising is high prior to stock‐based mergers, relative to that of cash‐based acquirers. It also finds that managerial ownership in stock based acquiring firms is positively related to pre‐merger advertising intensity.

Although this paper examines whether stock‐based acquirers increase their advertising intensity in the pre‐merger period to gain economic benefit it does not discuss in detail through which mechanism advertising affects stock price.

The paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between product market advertising of the acquirer and the method of payment in mergers. The results shown in this paper may motivate investors of the target firms to re‐evaluate the acquirers offer if the medium of payment is acquirers own stock.

To the authors' knowledge this paper is the first to document the link between advertising prior to a merger and the method of payment used in that merger.

This paper aims to propose a method of forecasting the level of informed trading at merger announcements by permitting liquidity traders to adjust their trading based upon signals from informed traders. Informed traders typically take advantage of their knowledge of forthcoming mergers by trading heavily at announcement. For cash mergers, they respond to a positive signal by purchasing stock, and for stock mergers, they respond to a negative signal by selling stock. In response, exchanges (market makers) set wider spreads (charge higher transaction fees) for informed buyers. Uninformed traders are subject to such excessive fees unless they can accurately predict the period during which such fees are charged.

This paper proposes a technique by which uninformed traders may make predictions by creating a vector autoregressive framework that links informed and liquidity trading through price changes.

For cash mergers, transaction fees remained excessive for days −1 to +1. For stock mergers, fees remained high on days −1 to +1, started declining on days 2 and 3, and vanished on days 4 and 5.

Most theoretical models of informed trading have viewed informed trading and liquidity trading as tangentially linked. This study finds a direct link between these two trading activities.

Uninformed traders may wish to limit their trading until after day +1 for both types of mergers.

This paper defines the time period during which transactions costs for traders are at the maximum level. Short sellers have more information about the direction of stock movements and may sell during days of informed selling set forth by this study and repurchase stock afterwards.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether bank mergers are driven by equity overvaluation and management compensation incentives.

To test whether equity mispricing drive bank mergers, the authors employ two alternative price-to-residual income valuation (P/V) measures for bidders and targets while the authors control for their growth prospects with the price-to-book (P/B) (two years before) ratio. The intrinsic value (V) is estimated using the three-period forecast horizon residual income model of Ohlson (1995) and perpetual residual income model that does not rely on analysts’ forecasts of future earnings prospects. The latter measure allows the authors to estimate V for a much larger sample of banks. The empirical analysis is supplemented with a standard event analysis and assessment of the long-term performance of bank mergers subsequent to the announcement date.

The evidence shows that bidders are overvalued relative to their targets, especially in equity offer deals. The authors also find that highly valued bidders: are more likely to use stock than cash; are willing to pay more relative to the target market price; are more likely to acquire private than public targets; earn lower announcement-period returns; fail to create synergy gains; experience long-term underperformance; and reward their top managers of with large compensation increases subsequent to mergers.

This study provides results consistent with the view that behavioral and managerial incentives play an important role in motivating bank mergers.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether mutual funds (MFs) take positions in companies that subsequently engage in M&As and whether fund managers adjust portfolio holdings in the same direction as wealth creation from mergers. Further, the study is the first to examine the relation between active trading surrounding M&As and risk-adjusted performance in MFs.

The sample includes mergers conducted by publicly traded acquirers of public and private targets over 2003–2016. Several measures of MF managerial activeness in M&As are introduced: merger trading intensity (proportional change in fund’s holdings of M&A stocks), active merger weight (deviation of the fund’s actual weights in M&A stocks and value weights) and active merger trading (deviation of the fund’s actual weights in M&A stocks from the average weights in M&A stocks across the funds within the same Center for Research in Security Prices objective).

Fund managers who are more vested in the firms engaged in M&As and who are more active in their trades of M&A firms generate higher contemporaneous and subsequent risk-adjusted performance, indicative of managerial skill. Active M&A trading effect on performance is economically meaningful.

This is the first study to examine whether previously documented predictive power of active institutions regarding M&As’ profitability leads to higher risk-adjusted returns for MF investors. The study introduces several measures to gauge how actively fund managers trade companies engaged in M&As and contributes to the literature on MF managers’ ability to pick stocks.

This study examines acquirers' earnings management in intragroup mergers to investigate whether stock-for-stock mergers between affiliated firms within the same family-controlled business group facilitate the controlling shareholder's rent seeking. Specifically, it investigates the acquiring firm's incentive to inflate premerger-announcement earnings in intragroup mergers given the controlling shareholder's relative equity holdings in the target and acquiring firms. The authors also examine how creditor monitoring affects premerger-announcement earnings in intragroup mergers compared to mergers between independent firms.

Using univariate analysis, panel regression based on accruals and cross-sectional regression based on discretionary accruals, the authors compare earnings management in mergers between affiliated firms with that in mergers between independent firms in the context of Korean business groups. The authors also compare the effects of creditors on earnings management in both cases.

Acquirers' premerger-announcement positive abnormal accruals are less evident in mergers between affiliated firms than in mergers between independent firms. These accruals decrease with high financial leverage only in the latter case, suggesting that creditor monitoring mitigates earnings management only in independent firm mergers.

The authors examine intragroup mergers, unlike previous studies, which focus on unaffiliated firm mergers. They also contribute to the literature on stock-for-stock mergers, showing that lender monitoring can mitigate the acquiring firm's premerger earnings management in unaffiliated firm mergers but not in intragroup mergers. These findings suggest that stock-for-stock mergers between affiliated firms may facilitate the controlling shareholders' rent seeking, which has policy implications for emerging markets with large family-controlled business groups.

The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of UAE Stock Exchange industry. In particular this paper aims to assess a potential merger between Dubai Financial Markets-Nasdaq-Dubai and Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, evaluating risks, rewards, policy and business implications.

The paper presents a theoretical framework and a literature review of M & As in financial sector. It then carries out a case study on a potential merger between the UAE Stock Exchanges and a discussion on the implications for the actors involved.

The contraction both in market capitalization and in trading value in the three UAE Stock Exchanges caused by subprime financial crisis and market fragmentation could be a key factors in implementing a merger between them. Because of high-fixed costs and trading platform, a single consolidated stock exchange may benefit from significant economies of scale, particularly network effects, and economies of scope.

This paper could be useful to Security and Commodity Authority, in order to support a merger between Dubai and Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange. Given that UAE capital market regulator has tried to improve efficiency in UAE stock market over the last years, a merger between UAE Stock Exchanges could have positive effects on overall efficiency.

It is the first paper that analyze UAE Stock Exchange industry. It is the first study that focusses on a potential merger between emerging markets’ stock exchanges. It is one of the first contributions that relates stock exchanges belonging to emerging and developed countries.

The purpose of this paper is to study merger momentum and its driving factors in China by sampling 376 listed bidders from 2008 to 2013.

The empirical model captures the dependency of market reaction on recent merger and stock market states. The independent variables are designed from two dimensions, i.e. at the level of market-wide as an integral and bidder-specific as individuals. Furthermore, both the market and bidding firms contain merger momentum and market momentum, respectively.

The empirical results show that there is merger momentum in the market. Particularly, merger momentum is significant both in short run and long run for the mergers with cash payment, which supports the synergy effect. It also implicates the mergers with stock driven by investor sentiment. Besides, investors’ over-optimism is significant in the bull markets while managerial hubris is found in the bear markets.

The driving factors for merger momentum in China are complex. Three impacts with different effects interact with one another. They are investor sentiment and managerial hubris with negative effects resulting in reversal abnormal return in the long run, and synergies with positive shocks resulting in no reverse at all. The limitation of the paper is insufficient analysis of the mergers financed by stocks, which will be the focus for future study.

The conclusions of the study help to intensify the understanding of the immature and unnormalized capital market in China. The empirical analyses give some inspiration and suggestions to three parties in the market, i.e. investors, bidding firms and regulators, respectively.

There are three contributions. The first one is to provide a novel model to identify how these different effects work on the merger momentum. The second one is the measurement of investor sentiment from different perspectives. The last but most important one is the new findings with novel explanations, which proves that the impacts on merger momentum are complex.

In recent years, stock exchanges have been increasingly integrating and merging their activities at a national and international scale. While consolidation is often driven by technological, legal and competitive changes, whether merger activities are efficient in terms of market microstructure remains unknown. Academic research to date has analyzed the causes behind these mergers primarily from the technological, legal and competitive perspective, whereas relatively little literature considers their impact on the exchange itself. The paper aims to consider the case of the Euronext merger to explain this topic by studying this merger and its effect on Euronext's market risk (measured by volatility).

The paper uses a standard General Auto‐regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH (1,1)) process to study the volatility of the underlying markets and use break methodology to highlight the merger effects. It also adds control samples to account for any change in volatility that could be caused by factors other than the merger event.

The results suggest that the Euronext merger did not affect the market risk. In particular, the paper finds no evidence that the integration onto the same platforms for trading and clearing had a significant effect on the volatility of the merging markets.

This study contributes to clarify business issues and to guide policy makers on exchange industrial organization.

The present paper further contributes to the ongoing discussion about the drawbacks and merits of horizontal exchange integration.