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Total outsourcing is now a common strategy for delivery of building maintenance and facilities services. Standing on the cross roads of “vanish or reinvent oneself” the Maintenance and Control Division of the corporate real estate management (CREM) Service of the Eindhoven University of Technology puts new focus on the operational aspect of CREM and gives less weight to the outside market. Based on engineering management viewpoints on CREM rather than pure economic management viewpoints, the purpose of this paper is to investigate under what conditions a mutual cooperation between in‐house staff and external contractors is successful in implementing new solutions, in effective as well as efficient ways.

A single case methodology in the format of a real business case. Based on theoretical and pragmatic engineering management principles, a business case was developed with the help of a well‐known Business Consultancy. The business case had an interim evaluation and will have a final evaluation.

From the interim evaluation, it can be concluded that the CREM entrepreneurial cooperation is on the right track towards promising results in reaching its efficiency and effectiveness goals. Real cooperation in joint cross‐functional expert teams is felt as experimental and thus time consuming. So CREM entrepreneurial cooperation is only suitable for complex CREM situations where there is a real need for innovative solutions. In spite of this, a sufficient number of large and some international external contractors in diverse aspects of building and building services were willing to participate in CREM entrepreneurial cooperation. In line with the English saying “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, the official tendering of the next round will prove if the external contractors will be as satisfied as the university with the business case results.

The paper offers a non‐conformist view on mainstream outsourcing trends based on engineering management viewpoints on CREM, rather than pure economic management viewpoints. Also, the business case format of the case study is original.

Integrated project delivery (IPD) project that does not use multiparty agreement is identified as IPD-ish. The use of IPD-ish arrangement by incorporating integration practices in conventional contract can be viewed as the part of the adoption process of IPD. Moreover, inappropriate integration practices invite new forms of risks and the absence of multiparty agreement adds to the challenges of risk management in IPD-ish projects. This study discusses such challenges and proposes the use of joint risk management to address the potential pitfalls in IPD-ish arrangement.

A mixed research method was applied. First, the criticality of IPD-ish general and integration-specific risks was examined through a survey. Second, a real IPD-ish project was used to exemplify the use of joint risk management (JRM) to manage IPD-ish risks.

Two types of risks, namely integration risks (IRs) and general risks (GRs), are identified in IPD-ish projects. Two major findings for the IRs: (1) the most critical IRs are related to unbalanced incentivization and inefficient multidisciplinary teams; and (2) only team formation related pre-contract JRM strategies affect IRs. As for the GRs, the most critical ones are associated with design issues and can be effectively mitigated by post-contract JRM.

Using IPD-ish arrangement is an inevitable part of implementation of full IPD. This happens as many change-averse owners would like to test the integration principles using a conventional contract that they are familiar with. In fact, success in IPD-ish would pave the path for further adoption of IPD. This study offers insight into categorization of risks in IPD-ish projects. Appropriate use of post-contract and organization related pre-contract JRM would improve the chance of teasing out the values of IPD through IPD-ish arrangements. Care should be taken to introduce some contracting integration initiatives, such as risk/reward sharing incentive.

Purpose – This experimental economics study using brain imaging techniques investigates the risk-ambiguity distinction in relation to the source preference hypothesis (Fox & Tversky, 1995) in which identically distributed risks arising from different sources of uncertainty may engender distinct preferences for the same decision maker, contrary to classical economic thinking. The use of brain imaging enables sharper testing of the implications of different models of decision-making including Chew and Sagi's (2008) axiomatization of source preference.

Methodology/approach – Using fMRI, brain activations were observed when subjects make 48 sequential binary choices among even-chance lotteries based on whether the trailing digits of a number of stock prices at market closing would be odd or even. Subsequently, subjects rate familiarity of the stock symbols.

Findings – When contrasting brain activation from more familiar sources with those from less familiar ones, regions appearing to be more active include the putamen, medial frontal cortex, and superior temporal gyrus. ROI analysis showed that the activation patterns in the familiar–unfamiliar and unfamiliar–familiar contrasts are similar to those in the risk–ambiguity and ambiguity–risk contrasts reported by Hsu et al. (2005). This supports the conjecture that the risk-ambiguity distinction can be subsumed by the source preference hypothesis.

Research limitations/implications – Our odd–even design has the advantage of inducing the same “unambiguous” probability of half for each subject in each binary comparison. Our finding supports the implications of the Chew–Sagi model and rejects models based on global probabilistic sophistication, including rank-dependent models derived from non-additive probabilities, e.g., Choquet expected utility and cumulative prospect theory, as well as those based on multiple priors, e.g., α-maxmin. The finding in Hsu et al. (2005) that orbitofrontal cortex lesion patients display neither ambiguity aversion nor risk aversion offers further support to the Chew–Sagi model. Our finding also supports the Levy et al. (2007) contention of a single valuation system encompassing risk and ambiguity aversion.

Originality/value of chapter – This is the first neuroimaging study of the source preference hypothesis using a design which can discriminate among decision models ranging from risk-based ones to those relying on multiple priors.

Ours is a complex world. On these five words will be built a foundation for an alternative way of framing our thinking about risk management. Complexity means many things, but a key feature is that outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty. In the best cases, opportunities arise to analyse and develop some understanding of the uncertainty within a complex system, and in the most fortunate of such circumstances it is possible to anticipate specific outcomes with some degree of accuracy. The authors call such circumstances risks – that is, measurable uncertainties. Complexity, however, consists mainly of interconnected uncertainties and unknown/unknowable possible outcomes or effects. And, of course, complex systems can include humans whose (in)ability to perceive and interpret such environments makes things – well – more complex.

This book ultimately will focus on how the authors construct a way to lead and manage in this environment, but first it is critical that the terminology and description of this world be given some precision. Therefore, Chapter One begins with an introduction to the idea of complexity, including some mention of the principles and concepts that inform our understanding of it. In turn, this discussion introduces uncertainty. Risk, as a category of uncertainty is discussed and the implications of its measurability are presented, which leads to a discussion of human perception and behaviour under conditions of uncertainty. Attention is then drawn to the unknown and the unknowable, and to emergent phenomena. Since the focus of this book is on public sector risk management, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the idea of public risk.

Many companies have either rejected or reduced the size of risk management (hedging) programs because they do not believe that the market will reward them sufficiently for the reduction in earnings volatility. In fact, many commodity companies would take the argument a step farther and argue that the market will punish them for reducing their commodity exposure.

This paper aims to study differences in risk behavior between holding companies that undertake both banking activity and insurance underwriting (labeled financial holding companies or FHCs) and stand-alone bank holding companies (BHCs).

The paper examines the discretionary accruals of FHCs to comparable BHCs and compares their bad loans-to-assets ratio in the future.

FHCs have lower discretionary accruals (loan loss provisions and realized capital gains) than BHCs. FHCs fare better than BHCs in terms of bad loans-to-assets ratio. Insurance underwriting has a dampening effect on discretionary accruals of FHCs.

This study raises additional research questions. Do shared governance and insurance underwriting serve as substitutes or complements? Will regulatory environment affect this relation?

When reported earnings do not match true earnings, the market participants lose the ability to price correctly, and the regulators lose the ability to effectively regulate banks. From the regulatory perspective, these findings suggest insurance underwriting by banks mitigate potential market distortions.

This paper is the first to study the effect of underwriting insurance risk on earnings management behavior of BHCs and its link to risk governance.

The purpose of this study is to extend previous literature and examine risk management efficiency among Takaful (TI) and conventional insurance (CI) firms in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This study also aims to determine whether Takaful firms are more efficient in managing risks, compared to CI firms.

This study examines risk management efficiency among Takaful and CI firms in the KSA and the UAE for a sample of 20 insurance firms comprising 10 TI firms and 10 CI firms for the period 2018–2020. The authors use Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate efficiency scores among insurance companies to compare risk management efficiency between CI and TI companies and apply two-way analysis of variance to statistically analyze the data.

The results of this study show that TI firms have a higher efficiency score than CI firms, but not significantly and that insurance firms in KSA have higher efficiency scores than insurance firms in UAE. The results also reveal that TI firms did not significantly outperform CI firms in managing risks; however, there is a significant difference in efficiency scores among insurance firms in KSA and UAE.

The authors also contribute to the literature by providing important insights into how the operational business environment of the country can influence the risk management efficiency of CI and TI companies.

This study promotes understanding the insurance industry, its efficiency and risk management, thus offering key implications for decision-makers, regulators and managers associated with the insurance industry in UAE, KSA and other emerging insurance markets. Regulators could provide enabling policies that foster and promote the business environment, as there is a need to improve risk management efficiency in the insurance industry. Also, the results of this study show that the operating status of the UAE insurance industry in terms of efficiency and risk management is lower than that of KSA. Hence, it would be useful for UAE managers and regulators in taking steps to improve the overall insurance industry market.

The results of this study make significant contributions by providing new insights to the existing literature on the risk management efficiency in the insurance industry, as it adopts a different methodological approach that examines risk management efficiency among TI and CI companies.

In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.

The authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.

The results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.

First, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.

First, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.

This study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the constructs underpinning risk management and explores its application in the supply chain context through the development of a framework. The constructs of performance and risk are matched together to provide new perspectives for researchers and practitioners.

The conceptual and empirical work in the supply chain management field and other related fields is employed to develop a conceptual framework of supply chain risk management (SCRM). Risk in the supply chain is explored in terms of risk/performance sources, drivers, consequences and management responses, including initial approaches to categorization within these. Two empirical cases are used to illustrate the application of the framework.

A new framework is presented that helps to integrate the dimensions of risk and performance in supply chains and provide a categorisation of risk drivers.

SCRM is at an early stage of evolution. The paper provides a clarification of the dimensions and constructs within this field together with directions for future research and development.

The focus on performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness linked to risk drivers and risk management responses provides insights to managing and measuring risk in supply chains.

The paper consolidates the work in an emerging strand of supply chain management. Two key challenges facing the research community are addressed, the ability to prescribe strategies to address particular risk drivers and the interaction of risk management and performance.

In Islamic finance (IF), the safety-first rule of investing (hifdh al mal) is held to be of utmost importance. In view of the instability in the global financial markets, the IF portfolio manager (mudharib) is committed, according to Sharia, to make use of advanced models and reliable tools. This paper seeks to address these issues.

In this paper, the limitations of the standard models used in the IF industry are reviewed. Then, a framework was set forth for a reliable modeling of the IF markets, especially in extreme events and highly volatile periods. Based on the empirical evidence, the framework offers an improved tool to ameliorate the evaluation of Islamic stock market risk exposure and to reduce the costs of Islamic risk management.

Based on the empirical evidence, the framework offers an improved tool to ameliorate the evaluation of Islamic stock market risk exposure and to reduce the costs of Islamic risk management.

In IF, the portfolio manager – mudharib – according to Sharia, should ensure the adequacy of the mathematical and statistical tools used to model and control portfolio risk. This task became more complicated because of the increase in risk, as measured via market volatility, during the financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007. Sharia condemns the portfolio manager who demonstrates negligence and may hold him accountable for losses for failing to select the proper analytical tools. As Sharia guidelines hold the safety-first principle of investing rule (hifdh al mal) to be of utmost importance, the portfolio manager should avoid speculative investments and strategies that would lead to significant losses during periods of high market volatility.