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The cultural and legal differences between foreign acquirers and African target firms can be substantial. There is also a large variation in cultures and legal systems within Africa. However, there is limited research on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance by foreign firms in Africa. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the “spillover by law” hypothesis (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) that focuses on the influence of the external environment on the governance and performance of foreign M&As in Africa.

The data set covers 415 M&A transactions by foreign firms in Africa during the period of 1999–2016. Dynamic data covering the country’s legal, cultural and political environment are collected from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation and Transparency International.

The authors find that the legal environment significantly affects the returns of bidders on African firms. For complete acquisitions, bidder returns are significantly higher when the bidder’s country has higher shareholder protection and higher creditor protection compared with the target firm’s country. The results show that the effects are significant when there is a full control change (including a change in the target firm’s nationality) but not in the case of partial control transfers. The results are consistent with the “spillover by law” hypothesis.

The authors contribute to the literature on cross-border M&As by separately studying the valuation effects of full, majority and minority changes in control; by being the first study of the legal spillover effects in Africa; and by being the most extensive study of the legal determinants of the valuations of non-African acquirers of African firms.

The paper investigates the effect of corruption on corporate investment efficiency around the world.

The sample includes 218,350 observations from 30,074 firms across 42 countries. The authors measure corruption based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, Corruption Control Index (CCI) from the World Bank and Corruption Index from the International Country Risk Guide.

The authors find that corruption is negatively related to investment efficiency. The robustness checks with different measures of corporate investment and alternative regression approaches show consistent findings. Moreover, the authors also find that the effect of corruption is stronger (weaker) in strong (weak) shareholder protection countries.

The paper has two important contributions to the literature. First, it shows that corruption environment is also a determinant of corporate investment efficiency. Second, legal protection of shareholders can mitigate the negative effect of corruption on corporate investment efficiency.

本研究擬探討世界各地貪污腐敗對企業投資效率的影響。

研究樣本涵蓋42個國家，30,074間公司，218,350個觀察。測量貪污腐敗的方法乃基於國際透明組織的腐敗感知指數、世界銀行的腐敗控制指數和國際國家風險指南的貪污指數。

研究結果顯示、貪污與投資效率成負相關。以企業投資的各種測量方法、以及用其他的回歸分析方法來進行的強度檢驗，均顯示一致的結果。而且，我們亦發現，在對股東的保障較大的國家，貪污所帶來的影響也會較大；同樣地、對股東的保障較小的國家，貪污的影響也相應會較輕微。

本研究對文獻有兩個重要的貢獻。首先，研究證明了貪污腐敗的環境亦是企業投資效率的決定因素；其次，研究亦證明給股東的法律保護會減低貪污對企業投資效率所帶來的負面影響。

The study, by focusing on a context dominated by firms with a concentrated ownership, in which type-II agency problems (principal-principal conflicts) may occur, aims to depict which board configurations may be effective in protecting minority shareholders by mitigating the risk of controlling shareholders' expropriation via cash holdings.

The research adopts a configurational approach and empirically conducts a fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis on a sample of 268 Italian listed companies.

The analysis depicts three combinations of board configurations and ownership structures that can be considered effective, namely Active Independent Control, Female Active Control and Double Internal Control.

The study revisits the topic of the risk of expropriation via cash holdings in a type-II agency problem framework and delineates the meaning of board effectiveness in a mature context ruled by family firms, like Italy. Furthermore, by drawing on a configurational approach, it overcomes the causality relationship between each board characteristic and cash holdings policies and reasons from a “bundle” perspective.

This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the capital structure of Latin American firms.

The sample included companies from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The authors collected data from 201 non-financial companies between 2009 and 2018, totalizing 1,716 firm-year observations. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and linear regression models with panel data.

The main results indicated that chief executive officer duality, legal protection system and corporate social responsibility voluntary disclosure impact the firm's total debt ratio, corresponding to a positive effect for the first two variables and a negative for the last.

This study advances in two main ways. Firstly, due to the broad approach in which the authors addressed corporate governance, involving board composition, ownership structure, minority shareholders legal protection system and information disclosure. Secondly, by presenting empirical evidence about the effects of corporate governance on capital structure from an extensive sample of Latin American firms, the authors expect to contribute to the international debate on the capital structure due to the unique characteristics of Latin America in this regard.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking behaviour of banks operating in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.

In doing so, the authors use a data set covering 165 banks located in 13 MENA countries over the period 2005–2012 and apply dynamic panel data methodology.

The results show that good governance acting in the interests of shareholders could lead to excessive risk taking; in this sense, a conflict of interest between the stakeholders, interested in the solvency of the financial system, and shareholders, trying to maximise their benefit, may occur. The greater risk can be reinforced by the governance of the country and a strong macro governance framework can incentivise a higher risk exposure in banks, showing the influence of bank regulation and law enforcement on the risks taken by banks.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper showing that corporate governance is relevant for explaining risk taking at the country and bank levels in MENA countries.

The purpose of this paper is to present a review of the literature on two lines of research, corporate governance and innovation, explaining how different internal corporate governance mechanisms may be determinants of business innovation.

It explores the theoretical background and the empirical evidence regarding the influence of both ownership structure and the board of directors on company innovation. Then, conclusions are drawn and possible future research lines are presented.

No consensus was observed regarding the relation between corporate governance and innovation, with both positive and negative arguments being found, and with empirical evidence not always pointing in the same direction. Thus, new studies trying to clarify this relationship are needed.

Over recent years, interest has grown in the influence of governance mechanisms on innovation decisions taken by the management. Innovation efforts and results depend on factors that are influenced by corporate governance, such as ownership structure or the functioning of the board of directors. Thus, the paper shows an updated state of the art in this field proposing future lines for empirical research.

This paper examines whether long-term foreign investors may force firms to use a costly dividend to mitigate inefficient managerial behavior. The authors also hypothesize that the relation between foreign investment horizons and payout policy depends upon the extent of the corporate governance. The authors find that firms held by long-term foreign investors make dividend more often in the subsequent years. The authors also find that foreign investors with long-term investments do not cause firms to pay dividends when firms have strong corporate governance. It suggests that long-term foreign investors serve as a substitute for strong corporate governance with respect to controlling agency conflicts.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of cross-country characteristics on acquirers' target status choice in cross-border mergers and acquisitions across 41 emerging markets.

The paper first reviews the existing literature and develops the related hypotheses, in conjunction with the objectives of this paper. We then describe the data employed, variable measurement and examine the effects of cross-country characteristics on the acquirers' target status choice in cross-border mergers and acquisitions while controlling for firm-level and deal-specific characteristics. The paper continues to conduct the robustness check on cross-country determinants of target status choices using the difference independent variables rather than target country-level variables only.

This research found that the likelihood of a public firm acquired relative to private one is higher if the target firm is located in countries with stronger government quality, weaker economic freedom, better financial market development and lower cultural distance between the host and home countries. The results suggest that bidders actively assess cross-country characteristics as part of their acquisition planning.

Rather than commonly analysed determinants in the previous research such as firm- and deal-specific attributes, value creation and shareholder protection, this paper indicates that institutional environments and economic conditions are closely associated with acquisition risks and benefits and have direct influences on bidder firms' acquisition bidding planning and target choice decision-making.