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To protect information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and resources against poor cyber hygiene behaviours, organisations commonly require internal users to confirm they will abide by an ICT Code of Conduct. Before commencing enrolment, university students sign ICT policies, however, individuals can ignore or act contrary to these policies. This study aims to evaluate whether students can apply ICT Codes of Conduct and explores viable approaches for ensuring that students understand how to act ethically and in accordance with such codes.

The authors designed a between-subjects experiment involving 260 students’ responses to five scenario-pairs that involve breach/non-breach of a university’s ICT policy following a priming intervention to heighten awareness of ICT policy or relevant ethical principles, with a control group receiving no priming.

This study found a significant difference in students’ responses to the breach versus non-breach cases, indicating their ability to apply the ICT Code of Conduct. Qualitative comments revealed the priming materials influenced their reasoning.

The authors’ priming interventions were inadequate for improving breach recognition compared to the control group. More nuanced and targeted priming interventions are suggested for future studies.

Appropriate application of ICT Code of Conduct can be measured by collecting student/employee responses to breach/non-breach scenario pairs based on the Code and embedded with ethical principles.

Shared awareness and protection of ICT resources.

Compliance with ICT Codes of Conduct by students is under-investigated. This study shows that code-based scenarios can measure understanding and suggest that targeted priming might offer a non-resource intensive training approach.

Literature repeatedly complains about the lack of empirical data on the costs of cyber incidents within organizations. Simultaneously, managers urgently require transparent and reliable data in order to make well-informed and cost-benefit optimized decisions. The purpose of this paper is to (1) provide managers with differentiated empirical data on costs, and (2) derive an activity plan for organizations, the government and academia to improve the information base on the costs of cyber incidents.

The authors analyze the benchmark potential of costs within existing literature and conduct a large-scale interview survey with 5,000 German organizations. These costs are directly assignable to the most severe incident within the last 12 months, further categorized into attack types, cost items, employee classes and industry types. Based on previous literature, expert interviews and the empirical results, the authors draft an activity plan containing further research questions and action items.

The findings indicate that the majority of organizations suffer little to no costs, whereas only a small proportion suffers high costs. However, organizations are not affected equally since prevalence rates and costs according to attack types, employee classes, and other variables tend to vary. Moreover, the findings indicate that board members and IS/IT-managers show partly different response behaviors.

The authors present differentiated insights into the direct costs of cyber incidents, based on the authors' knowledge, this is the largest empirical survey in continental Europe and one of the first surveys providing in-depth cost information on German organizations.

Railways are a well-known example of complex critical infrastructure, incorporating socio-technical systems with humans such as drivers, signallers, maintainers and passengers at the core. The technological evolution including interconnectedness and new ways of interaction lead to new security and safety risks that can be realised, both in terms of human error, and malicious and non-malicious behaviour. This study aims to identify the human factors (HF) and cyber-security risks relating to the role of signallers on the railways and explores strategies for the improvement of “Digital Resilience” – for the concept of a resilient railway.

Overall, 26 interviews were conducted with 21 participants from industry and academia.

The results showed that due to increased automation, both cyber-related threats and human error can impact signallers’ day-to-day operations – directly or indirectly (e.g. workload and safety-critical communications) – which could disrupt the railway services and potentially lead to safety-related catastrophic consequences. This study identifies cyber-related problems, including external threats; engineers not considering the human element in designs when specifying security controls; lack of security awareness among the rail industry; training gaps; organisational issues; and many unknown “unknowns”.

The authors discuss socio-technical principles through a hexagonal socio-technical framework and training needs analysis to mitigate against cyber-security issues and identify the predictive training needs of the signallers. This is supported by a systematic approach which considers both, safety and security factors, rather than waiting to learn from a cyber-attack retrospectively.

As the means and harms of technology-facilitated violence have become more evident, some governments have taken steps to create or empower centralized bodies with statutory mandates as part of an effort to combat it. This chapter argues that these bodies have the potential to meaningfully further a survivor-centered approach to combatting technology-facilitated violence against women – one that places their experiences, rights, wishes, and needs at its core. It further argues that governments should consider integrating them into a broader holistic response to this conduct.

An overview is provided of the operations of New Zealand's Netsafe, the eSafety Commissioner in Australia, Nova Scotia's Cyberscan Unit, and the Canadian Centre for Child Protection in Manitoba. These types of centralized bodies have demonstrated an ability to advance survivor-centered approaches to technology-facilitated violence against women through direct involvement in resolving instances of violence, education, and research. However, these bodies are not a panacea. This chapter outlines critiques of their operations and the challenges they face in maximizing their effectiveness.

Notwithstanding these challenges and critiques, governments should consider creating such bodies or empowering existing bodies with a statutory mandate as one aspect of a broader response to combatting technology-facilitated violence against women. Some proposed best practices to maximize their effectiveness are identified.

There is widespread concern about the fact that small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seem to be particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks. This is perhaps because smaller businesses lack sufficient situational awareness to make informed decisions in this space, or because they lack the resources to implement security controls and precautions.

In this paper, Endsley’s theory of situation awareness was extended to propose a model of SMEs’ cyber situational awareness, and the extent to which this awareness triggers the implementation of cyber security measures. Empirical data were collected through an online survey of 361 UK-based SMEs; subsequently, the authors used partial least squares modeling to validate the model.

The results show that heightened situational awareness, as well as resource availability, significantly affects SMEs’ implementation of cyber precautions and controls.

While resource limitations are undoubtedly a problem for SMEs, their lack of cyber situational awareness seems to be the area requiring most attention.

The findings of this study are reported and recommendations were made that can help to improve situational awareness, which will have the effect of encouraging the implementation of cyber security measures.

This is the first study to apply the situational awareness theory to understand why SMEs do not implement cyber security best practice measures.

Cyberattacks are becoming increasingly widespread, and cybersecurity is therefore increasingly important. Although the technological aspects of cybersecurity are its best-known characteristics, the cybersecurity phenomenon goes beyond the detection of technological impacts, and encompasses all the dimensions of an organization. This study thus focusses on an additional set of organizational elements. The key elements of cybersecurity organizational readiness depicted here are cybersecurity awareness, cybersecurity culture and cybersecurity organizational resilience (OR). This study aims to qualitatively assess small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) overall level of organizational cybersecurity readiness.

This study focused on conducting a cybersecurity organizational readiness assessment using a sample of 53 Italian SMEs from the information and communication technology sector. Informed mixed method research, this study was conducted consistent with the principles of the explanatory sequential mixed method design, and adopting a quanti-qualitative methodology. The quantitative data were collected through a questionnaire. Qualitative data were subsequently collected through semi-structured interviews.

Although many elements of the technical aspects of cybersecurity OR have yielded very encouraging results, there are still some areas that require improvement. These include those facets that constitute the foundation of cybersecurity awareness, and, thus, a cybersecurity culture. This result highlights that the areas in need of improvement are exactly those that are most important in fighting against cyber threats via organizational cybersecurity readiness.

Although the importance of SMEs is obvious, evidence of such organizations’ attitudes to cybersecurity are still limited. This research is an attempt to depict the organizational issue related to cybersecurity, i.e. overall cybersecurity organizational readiness.

This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework to predict susceptibility to cyber-fraud victimhood.

A survey was constructed to examine whether personality, socio-demographic characteristics and online routine activities predicted one-off and repeat victimhood of cyber-fraud. Overall, 11,780 participants completed a survey (one-off victims, N = 728; repeat victims = 329).

The final saturated model revealed that psychological and socio-demographic characteristics and online routine activities should be considered when predicting victimhood. Consistent with the hypotheses, victims of cyber-frauds were more likely to be older, score high on impulsivity measures of urgency and sensation seeking, score high on addictive measures and engage in more frequent routine activities that place them at great risk of becoming scammed. There was little distinction between one-off and repeat victims of cyber-frauds.

This work uniquely combines psychological, socio-demographic and online behaviours to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework to predict susceptibility to cyber-frauds. Importantly, the work here challenges the current utility of government websites to protect users from becoming scammed and provides insights into methods that might be used to protect users from becoming scammed.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the perceptions of supply chain managers regarding the elements that make up cyber supply chain risk management (CSCRM) and the related level of alignment, to understand how organizations can deploy a CSCRM strategy that goes beyond the technical, internal functioning of single companies and moves beyond the dyad, to create a better alignment that can ultimately lead to improved cyber supply chain resilience.

An exploratory survey in the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry involving over 100 organizations in Italy was conducted. Results were analysed through one-way analysis of variance, to appraise the differences in the perceptions of the various actors of the FMCG supply chain (Manufacturers, Logistics Service Providers, Retailers).

While a certain degree of alignment of the perceptions across the FMCG supply chain exists, the study found that Logistics Service Providers can play a crucial role as orchestrators of the CSCRM process towards a more “supply chain-oriented” response to cyber threats and risk events. The research also highlights the necessity to see people as key elements for improving cyber resilience in the supply chain.

Through a vertical analysis of a supply chain, the study extends the existing theory on CSCRM, which contains isolated case studies. It also contributes to extending the current theory with the proposal of the paradigm of Logistics Service Providers as orchestrators of the CSCRM process. The study combines different classifications of CSCRM initiatives and embraces theories external to the supply chain literature.

Through the empirical analysis, this study helps practitioners in streamlining the design of cyber security strategies and actions that span across the supply chain for better alignment. This could mean more coordination of efforts and more targeted/accurate investments in CSCRM initiatives. The study invites practitioners to ponder the perceived relevance of the human factor as a source of risk and the perceived importance of countermeasures aimed at mitigating risk events stemming from that source.

By focusing on an entire supply chain, this is one of the first studies on CSCRM that goes beyond the dyad. Its originality also lies in its use of the investigations of perceptions along the supply chain as pillars for the alignment of CSCRM strategies and mitigation initiatives. This original perspective allows for discovering the role of Logistics Service Providers in driving the alignment of the efforts towards better outcomes of the CSCRM process.