Search results

Literature repeatedly complains about the lack of empirical data on the costs of cyber incidents within organizations. Simultaneously, managers urgently require transparent and reliable data in order to make well-informed and cost-benefit optimized decisions. The purpose of this paper is to (1) provide managers with differentiated empirical data on costs, and (2) derive an activity plan for organizations, the government and academia to improve the information base on the costs of cyber incidents.

The authors analyze the benchmark potential of costs within existing literature and conduct a large-scale interview survey with 5,000 German organizations. These costs are directly assignable to the most severe incident within the last 12 months, further categorized into attack types, cost items, employee classes and industry types. Based on previous literature, expert interviews and the empirical results, the authors draft an activity plan containing further research questions and action items.

The findings indicate that the majority of organizations suffer little to no costs, whereas only a small proportion suffers high costs. However, organizations are not affected equally since prevalence rates and costs according to attack types, employee classes, and other variables tend to vary. Moreover, the findings indicate that board members and IS/IT-managers show partly different response behaviors.

The authors present differentiated insights into the direct costs of cyber incidents, based on the authors' knowledge, this is the largest empirical survey in continental Europe and one of the first surveys providing in-depth cost information on German organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the perceptions of supply chain managers regarding the elements that make up cyber supply chain risk management (CSCRM) and the related level of alignment, to understand how organizations can deploy a CSCRM strategy that goes beyond the technical, internal functioning of single companies and moves beyond the dyad, to create a better alignment that can ultimately lead to improved cyber supply chain resilience.

An exploratory survey in the fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry involving over 100 organizations in Italy was conducted. Results were analysed through one-way analysis of variance, to appraise the differences in the perceptions of the various actors of the FMCG supply chain (Manufacturers, Logistics Service Providers, Retailers).

While a certain degree of alignment of the perceptions across the FMCG supply chain exists, the study found that Logistics Service Providers can play a crucial role as orchestrators of the CSCRM process towards a more “supply chain-oriented” response to cyber threats and risk events. The research also highlights the necessity to see people as key elements for improving cyber resilience in the supply chain.

Through a vertical analysis of a supply chain, the study extends the existing theory on CSCRM, which contains isolated case studies. It also contributes to extending the current theory with the proposal of the paradigm of Logistics Service Providers as orchestrators of the CSCRM process. The study combines different classifications of CSCRM initiatives and embraces theories external to the supply chain literature.

Through the empirical analysis, this study helps practitioners in streamlining the design of cyber security strategies and actions that span across the supply chain for better alignment. This could mean more coordination of efforts and more targeted/accurate investments in CSCRM initiatives. The study invites practitioners to ponder the perceived relevance of the human factor as a source of risk and the perceived importance of countermeasures aimed at mitigating risk events stemming from that source.

By focusing on an entire supply chain, this is one of the first studies on CSCRM that goes beyond the dyad. Its originality also lies in its use of the investigations of perceptions along the supply chain as pillars for the alignment of CSCRM strategies and mitigation initiatives. This original perspective allows for discovering the role of Logistics Service Providers in driving the alignment of the efforts towards better outcomes of the CSCRM process.

The growing frequency of cybersecurity incidents commonly requires organizations to notify customers of ongoing events. However, the content contained within these notifications varies widely, including differences in the level of detail, apportioning of blame, compensation and corrective action. This study seeks to identify patterns contained within cybersecurity incident notifications by constructing a typology of organizational responses.

Based on a detailed review of 1,073 global cybersecurity incidents occurring during 2020, the authors obtained and qualitatively analyzed 451 customer notifications.

The results reveal three distinct organizational response types associated with the level of detail contained within the notification (full transparency, guarded and opacity), as well as three response types associated with the benefitting party (customer interest, balanced interest and company interest).

This work extends past classifications of cybersecurity incident notifications and provides a template of possible notification approaches that could be adopted by organizations.

Railways are a well-known example of complex critical infrastructure, incorporating socio-technical systems with humans such as drivers, signallers, maintainers and passengers at the core. The technological evolution including interconnectedness and new ways of interaction lead to new security and safety risks that can be realised, both in terms of human error, and malicious and non-malicious behaviour. This study aims to identify the human factors (HF) and cyber-security risks relating to the role of signallers on the railways and explores strategies for the improvement of “Digital Resilience” – for the concept of a resilient railway.

Overall, 26 interviews were conducted with 21 participants from industry and academia.

The results showed that due to increased automation, both cyber-related threats and human error can impact signallers’ day-to-day operations – directly or indirectly (e.g. workload and safety-critical communications) – which could disrupt the railway services and potentially lead to safety-related catastrophic consequences. This study identifies cyber-related problems, including external threats; engineers not considering the human element in designs when specifying security controls; lack of security awareness among the rail industry; training gaps; organisational issues; and many unknown “unknowns”.

The authors discuss socio-technical principles through a hexagonal socio-technical framework and training needs analysis to mitigate against cyber-security issues and identify the predictive training needs of the signallers. This is supported by a systematic approach which considers both, safety and security factors, rather than waiting to learn from a cyber-attack retrospectively.

The purpose of this study is to examine how companies integrate cyber risk into their enterprise risk management practices. Data breaches have become commonplace, with thousands occurring each year, and some costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Consequently, cyber risk has become one of the gravest risks facing organizations, and has attracted boardroom-level attention. On the other hand, companies already manage many kinds of difficult and growing risks, and that firms lose less than 1% of annual revenues as a result of cyber incidents. Therefore, how should firms appropriately address cyber risk? Is it indeed a materially different kind of risk area, or is it simply just one more risk that can seamlessly be integrated into existing enterprise risk management (ERM) practices?

The authors performed thematic analysis based on semi-structured interviews, with non-probabilistic, purposive sampling, to answer two main questions. First, how do firms manage enterprise risks, generally? And second, how are they integrating cyber risk into these existing processes?

The authors find that there is considerable variation in the approach and sophistication in ERM practices, such as whether they are driven more like an auditing function, or as a risk champion. The authors also find that despite the novelty of cyber risk, it can be integrated like other enterprise risks, and that cyber risk is most often seen as an operational risk (similar to workplace accidents or fraud), rather than a strategic risk, emerging from, for example, technology innovation and R&D.

The generalization of the results is limited by the sample size and variation of firms interviewed. While the authors attempted to interview enterprise risk managers across a wide variation of firms, there were clear limitations in the scope. That being said, the authors were fortunate to be able to examine ERM and cyber risk practices across small and large, private and publicly traded companies, from a variety of business sectors.

The authors believe these finding are important because they present evidence that while cyber risk may be new, it does not require specialized handling or processes to track it at the enterprise level. While some firms may choose to provide special accommodations or attention because of their data collection or business practices, this approach is neither necessary nor required of all firms in all situations.

This research is one of the only papers that, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, examines how cyber risk is integrated at an enterprise level.

The starting point for the considerations the authors make in this paper are the special features of family businesses in the area of management discussed in the literature. It has been established here that family businesses sometimes choose different organizational setups than nonfamily businesses. This has not yet been investigated for cybersecurity. In the context of cybersecurity, there has been little theoretical or empirical work addressing the question of whether the qualitative characteristics of family businesses have an impact on the understanding of cybersecurity and the organization of cyber risk defense in the companies. Based on theoretically founded hypotheses, a quantitative empirical study was conducted in German companies.

The article is based on a quantitative-empirical survey of 184 companies, the results of which were analyzed using statistical-empirical methods.

The article asked – based on the subjective perception of cybersecurity and cyber risks – to what extent family businesses are sensitized to the topic and what conclusions they draw from it. An interesting tension emerges: family businesses see their employees more as a security risk, but do less than nonfamily businesses in terms of both training and organizational establishment. Whether this is due to a lack of technical or managerial expertise, or whether family businesses simply think they can prevent cybersecurity with less formal methods such as trust, is open to conjecture, but cannot be demonstrated with the research approach taken here. Qualitative follow-up studies are needed here.

This paper represents the first quantitative survey on cybersecurity with a specific focus on family businesses. It shows tension between awareness, especially of risks emanating from employees, and organizational routines that have not been implemented or established.

Consumers increasingly rely on organisations for online services and data storage while these same institutions seek to digitise the information assets they hold to create economic value. Cybersecurity failures arising from malicious or accidental actions can lead to significant reputational and financial loss which organisations must guard against. Despite having some critical weaknesses, qualitative cybersecurity risk analysis is widely used in developing cybersecurity plans. This research explores these weaknesses, considers how quantitative methods might address the constraints and seeks the insights and recommendations of leading cybersecurity practitioners on the use of qualitative and quantitative cyber risk assessment methods.

The study is based upon a literature review and thematic analysis of in-depth qualitative interviews with 16 senior cybersecurity practitioners representing financial services and advisory companies from across the world.

While most organisations continue to rely on qualitative methods for cybersecurity risk assessment, some are also actively using quantitative approaches to enhance their cybersecurity planning efforts. The primary recommendation of this paper is that organisations should adopt both a qualitative and quantitative cyber risk assessment approach.

This work provides the first insight into how senior practitioners are using and combining qualitative and quantitative cybersecurity risk assessment, and highlights the need for in-depth comparisons of these two different approaches.

Cyber resilience has emerged as an approach for seaports to deal with cyberattacks; it emphasizes ports’ ability to prepare for an attack and to keep operating and recover quickly. However, little research has been undertaken on the challenges of governing cyber risks in seaports. This study aims to address this gap.

Governing cyber resilience is shaped by distributed responsibilities, uncertainties and ambiguities. The authors use this conceptualization to explore the governance of cyber risks in seaports, taking the Port of Rotterdam as a case study and analyzing semistructured interviews with stakeholders, participatory observation and policy documents and legislation.

The authors found that many strategies for governing cyber risks remain dedicated to protecting computer systems against cyberattacks. Nevertheless, port stakeholders have also developed strategies in anticipation of disruptions. However, these strategies appear informal and uncoordinated due to a lack of information exchange, insufficient knowledge regarding cyber risks and disagreement about how to make the Port of Rotterdam cyber resilient. What mainly hampers the cyber resilience of the port is the lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework and economic incentives. The authors conclude that resilience is merely an ideal at the Port of Rotterdam, meaning related governance strategies remain incremental and await institutionalization.

This paper offers insights into the cyber resilience of critical socio-technical systems, which have been underexposed in cyber resilience debates, but, when exploited, can manifest in large-scale disruptions.

Cyberattacks are becoming increasingly widespread, and cybersecurity is therefore increasingly important. Although the technological aspects of cybersecurity are its best-known characteristics, the cybersecurity phenomenon goes beyond the detection of technological impacts, and encompasses all the dimensions of an organization. This study thus focusses on an additional set of organizational elements. The key elements of cybersecurity organizational readiness depicted here are cybersecurity awareness, cybersecurity culture and cybersecurity organizational resilience (OR). This study aims to qualitatively assess small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) overall level of organizational cybersecurity readiness.

This study focused on conducting a cybersecurity organizational readiness assessment using a sample of 53 Italian SMEs from the information and communication technology sector. Informed mixed method research, this study was conducted consistent with the principles of the explanatory sequential mixed method design, and adopting a quanti-qualitative methodology. The quantitative data were collected through a questionnaire. Qualitative data were subsequently collected through semi-structured interviews.

Although many elements of the technical aspects of cybersecurity OR have yielded very encouraging results, there are still some areas that require improvement. These include those facets that constitute the foundation of cybersecurity awareness, and, thus, a cybersecurity culture. This result highlights that the areas in need of improvement are exactly those that are most important in fighting against cyber threats via organizational cybersecurity readiness.

Although the importance of SMEs is obvious, evidence of such organizations’ attitudes to cybersecurity are still limited. This research is an attempt to depict the organizational issue related to cybersecurity, i.e. overall cybersecurity organizational readiness.

As the means and harms of technology-facilitated violence have become more evident, some governments have taken steps to create or empower centralized bodies with statutory mandates as part of an effort to combat it. This chapter argues that these bodies have the potential to meaningfully further a survivor-centered approach to combatting technology-facilitated violence against women – one that places their experiences, rights, wishes, and needs at its core. It further argues that governments should consider integrating them into a broader holistic response to this conduct.

An overview is provided of the operations of New Zealand's Netsafe, the eSafety Commissioner in Australia, Nova Scotia's Cyberscan Unit, and the Canadian Centre for Child Protection in Manitoba. These types of centralized bodies have demonstrated an ability to advance survivor-centered approaches to technology-facilitated violence against women through direct involvement in resolving instances of violence, education, and research. However, these bodies are not a panacea. This chapter outlines critiques of their operations and the challenges they face in maximizing their effectiveness.

Notwithstanding these challenges and critiques, governments should consider creating such bodies or empowering existing bodies with a statutory mandate as one aspect of a broader response to combatting technology-facilitated violence against women. Some proposed best practices to maximize their effectiveness are identified.